
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET CVG-12/REW: an AIR FORCE A16-13
COMMANDER CARRIER AIR CROUP TWELVE (CVG-12) Ser: 05
11 Feb 1953



From: Commander, Carrier Air Group TWELVE To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)


Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period 7 January through 11 February 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480-4 (b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480-1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with references (a) and (b).

Schase G. P. CHASE



#### ACTION REPORT OF

#### CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE FOR THE PERIOD

7 January through 11 February 1953

#### CONTENTS

PART I	MISSION AND COMPOSITION
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PART V	PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VI	OPERATIONS
PART VII	SURVIVAL
PART VIII	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

#### PART I


#### MISSION AND COMPOSITION

#### MISSION:

1. The mission, upon returning to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the area off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces, was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program of interdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities, power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces to be furnished upon request.

#### COMPOSITION:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATION 7 JAN	NAL A/C 11 FEB	PIL 7 JAN	OTS 11 FEB
CVG-12 CDR G. P. CHASE Commanding	NONE	NONE	NONE	6	7
VF-121 LCDR S. R. HOLM Commanding	F9F <b>-</b> 5	15	]]i*	25	25



UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATI 7 JAN	ONAL A/C	PIL 7 JAN		
VF-122 LCDR J. W. WYRICK Commanding	F9F5	15	1 <u>/</u>  **	25	25	
VF-124 LCDR M. D. CARMODY Commanding	FLU-L	171	11 %	24	24	
VA-125 LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON Commanding	AD-3/AD-4	16	13 #	22	21	
VC-3 (Det "G") LCDR G. W. STAEHELI Officer-in-Charge	F4U-5N	4	3	5	5	
VC-11 LT H. F. GERNERT Officer-in-Charge	AD—LW	3	2	5	5	
VC-35 LT W. P. KISER Officer-in-Charge	AD-LIN	4	Ĭ,	5	5	
VC-61 LT J. F. GROSSER Officer-in-Charge	F2H <b>-2</b> P/F9F-5P	3	2	5	5	
CHANGE ATEND OF	TOTALS [74]	79	63	122	121	[/22]


\*VF-121 Received three replacement aircraft on board during this period.
\*\* VF-122 Received one replacement aircraft on board during this period.

% VF-124 Received two replacement aircraft on board during this period.


# VA-125 Received one replacement aircraft on board during this period.

LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON assumed Command of VA-125 upon the death of CDR J. C. MICHEEL on 1 February 1953.

The Air Group Commander flies alternately with VF-121 and VA-125. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flies with VF-122. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator, the Electronics Officer and three L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining five pilots on the Staff and they do not fly from the ship.









#### PART II

#### CHRONOLOGY

- 7 January Departed YOKOSUKA, Japan, to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Conducted air operations, exercises in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, totaling fifty sorties.
- 8 January Rough seas and weather forced cancellation of scheduled exercises.
- 9 January Emroute to the operating area, fifty-two refresher sorties were flown.
- 10 January No flight operations replenishment.
- 11 January No flight operations weather.
- 12 January No flight operations rough seas and weather.
- 13 January No flight operations rough seas and weather.
- 14 January No flight operations rough seas and weather.
- 15 January Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO returned to action flying fifty-nine sorties and dropping forty-one tons of bombs. The AD's and FlyU's, flying close air support, destroyed nine bunkers and forty yards of trenches and damaged seven artillery positions. Both the props and the jets attacked supply concentrations and personnel shelters near the front lines. An estimated seventeen buildings were destroyed and twenty-eight damaged. Several secondary explosions were observed.
- bivouse area south of HAMHUNG causing secondary explosions. The Skyraiders and Corsairs combined efforts in strikes on supply shelters southwest of SONGJIN and a mining area south of KHICHU. Eighteen buildings were destroyed and another twelve damaged. The F9F-5's, after flying north central reconnaissance routes, attacked fishing facilities at SIMPO. Poor visibility prevented observation of results. In the afternoon, jets flew flak suppression for the props attacking supply and personnel build-up areas south of CHANGYON-NI, along the eastern front lines. A secondary explosion was observed as two buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. Five boxcars were destroyed and ten damaged as a jet strike attacked rail-road facilities near YANG-DOK. Fifty-two tons of bombs were dropped during the day's eighty-five sorties.
- 17 January A flight of Panther jets attacked supply dumps just behind the enemy's front lines. Ten supply buildings were destroyed and four damaged.





Jets flying recommaissance destroyed three supply storage shelters near PUKCHONG and killed six enemy troops caught repairing railroad tracks near HAMHUNG. The Flu's and AD's continued to press attacks against enemy supply concentrations behind the front lines. Eighty-five sorties were flown and fifty-nine tons of bombs dropped.

LTJG John C. DUCK, USNR, VF-874, successfully landed his flak-damaged FhU at K-18.

18 January - USS ORISKANY planes dropped forty-two tons of bombs during sixty-three sorties before air operations were cancelled because of bad weather and rough seas. The morning hecklers, covering the coastal recco routes, destroyed two barracks buildings and damaged eleven trucks, a transformer station and a highway bridge north of HUNGNAM. A jet strike severely damaged a mining complex near SONGJIN while jet reccos damaged two locomotives, three railroad repair shops, a camouflaged tank and several boxcars in the HAMHUNG area. The propeller aircraft bombed supply build-ups and troop shelters east of PYONGGANG. Damage assessment was hampered by smoke and dust over the target.

ENS Leo D. LINHARD, USNR, VF-783, was rescued uninjured by a helicopter when his F9F-5 was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire, forcing him to ditch in WONSAN Harbor.

19 January - No flight operations - replenishment.

20 January - The AD's and Fhu's flew close air support. The controller's evaluation was 100 percent coverage of the targets and 100 percent effective use of ordnance. Twenty supply stacks were destroyed and five damaged. The propeller aircraft strikes were against supply shelters along the bombline and factory buildings and warehouses north of WONSAN. Eight supply shelters were destroyed and five factory buildings and six warehouses were heavily damaged. Jets damaged seven buildings in a strike on a storage area near HONGWON. They killed six troops, destroyed a radar installation and damaged a large warehouse during the day's recco missions. Ninety-six sorties were flown and sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

21 January — With jets providing flak suppression, two large secondary explosions resulted as the props covered an estimated ninety percent of a supply build-up area northeast of ANDO-RI. In strikes on storage buildings east of MAJON-NI and marshalling yards at WONSAN, the AD's and Flu's destroyed a roundhouse, two buildings and two railroad cars. Two storage buildings and four boxcars were damaged. The Corsairs and Skyraiders also flew close air support, killing twenty and wounding eighty-five enemy troops. Ten gun positions and 150 yards of trenches were damaged. The





jets attacked warehouses and troop billeting areas in strikes near MAJON-NI and HUNGNAM, destroying throu buildings and damaging two others. The hecklers, searching west and north of WONSAN, destroyed seven and damaged six trucks. Sixty-four tons of bombs were dropped during the days ninety-nine sorties.

22 January - USS ORISKANY propeller aircraft attacked supply shelters east of MAJON-NI and an oil processing plant at KIICHU. A large fuel fire was started, eight buildings were destroyed and twelve damaged. The jets destroyed four boxcars as they cut the railroad tracks in three places between KUM-NI and WONSAN. In the afternoon the props concentrated on cutting rails between ORI-RI-KYONGHUNG-NI and SONGJIN-KIICHU while the jets were bombing supply shelters in the vicinity of SANGHOE-RI near the front lines. Twenty-one railcuts were made by the AD's and Flu's. The jets left five large fires burning in the supply area. Ninety-five sorties were flown and seventy-four tons of bombs were dropped.


23 January - Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO dropped sixty-seven tons of bombs during ninety-nine sorties. The AD's flew close air support while the FhU's struck industrial buildings south of HAMHUNG. At the front lines, the Skyraiders destroyed three ammo dumps and damaged four gun positions while the Corsairs destroyed seven and damaged ten factory-type buildings at the industrial site. During the afternoon jets attacked military supply concentrations near the bombline and record northwest of HAMHUNG. The props flew three strikes, destroying six and damaging nine personnel shelters south of WONSAN. They destroyed two military barracks north of WONSAN and heavily damaged three buildings at a power sub-station west of TANCHON.

2h January - No flight operations - replenishment.

25 January - The early morning hecklers, searching recco routes north and east of WONSAN, destroyed nine trucks and damaged twenty-four others. AD's and FhU's, flying close air support, damaged seven bunkers and three artillery positions and destroyed one hundred yards of trenches. A jet strike near KILCHU destroyed one warehouse and damaged five. One great explosion and large fires were seen as three buildings were destroyed and four damaged on a prop strike against personnel billeting areas northwest of HOEYANG. One hundred three sorties were flown and sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

26 January - Sixty-four tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninetynine sorties as both props and jets conducted strikes against enemy supply
stockpiles and personnel shelters behind the eastern section of the enemy
front lines. Ninety percent of the assigned target areas were covered. In
two close air support missions the props damaged or destroyed twenty-six
bunkers, three mortar positions and 150 yards of trenches. Bombs and napalm





were effectively employed against coastal gun positions north of WONSAN. Three of the four gun ports were scaled. The night hecklers, harrassing traffic along the north central recco routes, destroyed seven and damaged nine trucks and set one fuel dump ablaze.

ENS D. L. BRENNER, USNR, VF-874, was forced to ditch off HUNGNAM when probable enemy small arms fire damaged his Fau on a naval gun fire spotting mission. ENS BRENNER, uninjured, was rescued by a helicopter from the cruiser USS LOS ANGELES.


27 January - The Panther jets continued to devastate material build-up concentrations as they attacked supply shelters northeast of PYONGGANG, and southwest of CHANGYON-NI. Complete damage assessment was hampered by smoke and debris, but an estimated ten supply stacks were destroyed and fifteen damaged. Four secondary explosions were set off and three fires were left burning. The Corsairs and Skyraiders provided close air support and attacked warehouse facilities near NAJON-NI. Twenty-five bunkers were hit along the front lines while two direct hits and five secondary explosions were observed in the warehouse area. The day's totals were 103 sorties flown and sixty-seven tons of bombs dropped.

28 January - Jets, searching recco routes from KUWON west to SUNU-DONG, destroyed two buildings, killed fifteen troops in strafing runs on billeting areas and damaged twelve oxcarts. The props destroyed eight and damaged twelve warehouses as they attacked supply areas near PUKCHONG and south of TANCHON. Sixty-one sorties were flown with thirty-nine tons of bombs dropped before bad weather forced cancellation of flight operations.

29 January - No flight operations - partial replenishment in rough seas.

30 January — Continued replenishment delayed commencement of flight operations. In two strikes in the afternoon the jets attacked newly constructed barracks buildings above CHONGJIN and storage buildings just south WONSAN. Three barracks were destroyed and seven damaged. Poor visibility hampered damage assessment at the storage site, although ninety percent of the ordnance was dropped in the target area. The Skyraiders, diverted from close air support, attacked personnel buildings and shelters. They reported twelve destroyed and ten damaged as large fires were left burning. The Corsairs, attacking a vehicle refueling area near SANGNONG—NI, observed six secondary explosions and a large fire. The entire area, including possible underground storage facilities, was heavily damaged. The night hecklers destroyed six trucks and damaged at least twenty—three others. Thirty—two tons of bombs were dropped during the day's fifty—two sorties.

31 January - Throughout the day Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO planes from the USS ORISKANY conducted well-coordinated strikes against a variety of targets



26

in and about WONSAN. In the morning, the jets attacked supply shelters and a sub-power station while the props bombed military billeting areas. numerous secondary explosions and fires were seen. Heavy damage was apparent as ninety percent of the ordnance fell in the assigned target areas. The F9F-5's flew TARCAP during the afternoon as the AD's and F4U's bombed concrete hangars, fuel tanks, supply shelters, ammo storage revetments and underground storage facilities. Two fuel tanks were seen to be destroyed while one hangar and one fuel tank were damaged. Panther jets damaged eleven buildings, started three fires and caused a large secondary explosion in a strike on a military billeting area near PUKCHONG. One hundred sorties were flown and seventy-five tons of bombs were dropped.

I February — Jet reccos with prop strikes and close air support comprised most of the day's ninety-nine sorties during which seventy tons of bombs were dropped. Searching for moving targets along the main supply routes west and northwest of WONSAN, the jets damaged several trucks and scattered small columns of oxcarts. A jet strike on supply shelters near PUKCHONG caused a large secondary explosion and left seven shelters burning. The AD and FUU strikes were conducted against supply shelters near MAJON-NI and a vital highway bridge at OUSIL, close to the front lines. All the ordnance was dropped in the assigned supply shelter area, resulting in a large secondary explosion with several fires observed. The bridge was heavily damaged as two cuts were made by direct hits. The Skyraiders and Corsairs, on close air support, destroyed four bunkers and 260 yards of trenches. Eleven trucks were destroyed and fourteen damaged as the night hecklers disrupted traffic along the coastal recco routes.

CDR John C. MICHEEL, USN, Commanding Officer of VA-923, was killed in action when his Skyraider crashed after a bombing run.

2 February - The jets searched recco routes from WONSAN north to CHONGJIN and inland to the CHOSEN Reservoir area. Eight storage buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. The Panthers also conducted strikes on a supply warehouse compound near CHANGP-YONG-NI and supply shelters at SOKHYON. Five warehouses were destroyed and four damaged at the compound while a saw mill and five shelters were also destroyed. In addition, the jets provided TARCAP as the Skyraiders destroyed five and damaged six buildings in a storage area west of PUNGSAN. The Corsairs destroyed three railroad bypasses and scored seven rail cuts in attacks near the coast at SOHORI and LISIN-DONG. Both the AD's and the Flu's flew close air support, with six bunkers destroyed and ten damaged while six secondary explosions were seen. Total scrties, ninety-five, while sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

LTJG B. L. IVES, USNR, VF-781, was forced to ditch his flak-damaged F9F-5 in WONSAN Harbor. He was rescued, uninjured, by the destroyer USS HAILEY.





3 February - No flight operations SIFIED
4 February - The falls.

4 February - The following changes in designation became effective this date: Carrier Air Group TWELVE vice Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO, VF-121 vice VF-781, VF-122 vice VF-783, VF-124 vice VF-874, VA-125 vice VA-923.

Carrier Air Group TWELVE aircraft, from the USS ORISKANY, flew ninety-five sorties and dropped seventy-one tons of bombs. The early hecklers, searching north and east of HAMHUNG reported light traffic. Four trucks were destroyed and three damaged. Overcast conditions prevented damage assessment of a jet strike at PUKCHONG. The morning's close air support and strike missions by the props were diverted to weather alternate targets. The AD's scored ten hits in a warehouse area near WONSAN while the Fuu's heavily damaged twelve supply shelters south of HONGWON. The afternoon's prop missions were also diverted. The Skyraiders damaged a highway bridge and a railroad bridge near PUKCHONG. The Corsairs destroyed nine supply storage buildings in that vicinity.

5 February - Two sorties were flown and all remaining flight operations were cancelled because of weather.

6 February - Poor weather caused postponement of flight operations until mid-afternoon. Thereafter, thirty-six sorties were flown and thirty-two tons of bombs were dropped. A jet strike, diverted from its primary and secondary targets, bombed supply facilities near SONGJIN. Several buildings were damaged as an estimated fifty percent of the ordnance fell into the target area. The Skyraiders' close air support mission was diverted to its secondary target, a warehouse area west of WONSAN. Three buildings were destroyed and three damaged. The Corsairs' strike bombed the weather alternate, a supply area at SANGTONG-NI. It was estimated all bombs fell into the target area. Further assessment was prevented by clouds obscuring the target.

7 February - No flight operations - replenishment.

8 February - With jets suppressing flak, the props attacked personnel shelters and truck revetments near PYONGJIN-DONG. Forty percent of the shelter area was bombed. Two large storage buildings were destroyed by a Panther jet strike near PONGUL-RI. In the afternoon, the Skyraiders bombed a supply building area near SAMGA-RI, destroying one and damaging four. The Corsairs provided excellent close air support to the ground troops, damaging twenty bunkers, six mortar positions, two automatic weapons positions and causing two secondary explosions. Ninety-eight sorties were flown and fifty-seven tons of bombs were dropped.



28




SPOORGE

9 February - The day's jet strike bombed supply shelters and barracks buildings near CHIK-TONG. Five shelters and two barracks were destroyed while three shelters and four barracks were damaged. Jets searched recco routes from HAMHUNG to the CHANGJIN-GANG Reservoir and from ICHON north to MAJON-NI. They damaged five vehicle shelters, four warehouses, eleven oxcarts and a supply stockpile. Prop strikes destroyed two camouflaged warehouses near SINGJONG-NI and damaged thirteen supply shelters in SONGJIN. On two close air support missions, the AD's and Flu's damaged twenty-one bunkers and caused two secondary explosions. The night hecklers, harassing vehicular traffic from WONSAN to CHONGJIN, destroyed two trucks and damaged four others. Fifty-eight tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-two sorties.

10 February - Air Group TWELVE planes from the U.S.S. ORISKANY flew seventysix sorties and dropped forty tons of bombs before weather forced cancellation of flight operations. In two strikes the Panther jets attacked open
supply stockpiles near CHONGO-RI and an oil storage area west of CHONGJIN.
The stock pile area was heavily damaged. Many fires were left burning and
a large secondary explosion was observed. Two large flash fires were seen
as the oil storage area was hit and six hits were observed in a barracks
building compound nearby. The Skyraiders caused structural damage to a railroad bridge south of MOKCHOK-TONG. The Corsairs, meanwhile, damaged two boxcars and cut the railroad tracks in six places between SUWON-DONG and CHONGJIN.

11 February - No flight operations - replenishment. Departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN enroute to NAGOYA, Japan. End of reporting period.





PART III


ORDNANCE


#### ORDNANCE

- 1. The performance of the 20MM guns in the F9F-5 aircraft for this period was excellent with an average of better than 1200 rounds per stoppage. Disconnecting the gun heaters produced no adverse effects on performance. E51 gun lubricating oil was used exclusively. Six 20MM driving spring guide plunger failures occurred. These plungers all sheared at the head and were of the new, improved type, part numbers 07238261 or 862651, as mentioned in the Bureau of Ordnance Material Letter GV 5-51.
- 2. Bomb racks employed by this Air Group are the Aero LLA, MK 51, MK 55, and the Douglas Bomb Ejector. No significant troubles or failures developed with these racks. Hung bomb percentage was less than one half of one percent of the total bombs dropped.
- 3. The need of a more adequate shipboard allowance for Douglas Bomb Ejector spare parts became apparent during this period, particularly in regards to piston rings and piston retaining keys. Piston rings are moplaced on the average of every twenty-five shots while retaining keys are replaced after approximately forty shots. The present allowance for these parts is inadequate. During the first thirty days of this period, thirty-six rings and fourteen retaining keys were replaced. On the basis of this expenditure, it is recommended that the following thirty days spare parts allowance for ships supporting a squadron of sixteen AD aircraft operating in the Korean Area be established:

Piston Rings -45 (Usage plus 25% excess)
Retaining Keys -18 (Usage plus 25% excess)
Foot Assemblies -3

Action requesting the establishment of this allowance is being initiated.







7 JANUARY - 31 JANUARY 1953

#### TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE BY SQUADRONS:


	AD-3,AD-4 (VA-125)	AD-4N (VC-35)	F4U-4 (VF-124)	F4U-5N (VC-3)	<b>F9F-5</b> (VF-121)	F9F-5 (VF-122)	TOTAL
2,000# GF							14
1,000# GF	305		Li .				309
500# GP	244	17	195	29	45	115	645
250# GP	699	49	693		490	407	2338
260# FRAG	243	34	78	176	402	396	1329
100# GP	509	133	,		229	150	1021
NAPALM	8				-	-	8
AN-M124 I	NCEN 24		•				24
ATAR	•		73		•		73
20 MM	15340	12895		15750	64390	48375	156750
50 CAL	•		97900				97900

#### HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE ORDNANCE	AERO 14A	MK 55	TOTAL
500# GP	3		3
250# GP	9		9
260# FRAG	2	2	4
100# GP	7		9
ATAR	8		8

#### DISPOSITION HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE	REMAINING	DROP OFF	TOTAL
ORDNANCE	ON RACK	ON LANDING	
500# GP	3	<b>1</b>	3
250# GP	9		9
260# FRAG	3		4
100# GP	9		9
ATAR	8		8





#### TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE BY SQUADRONS:


## DECLASSIFIED

TYPE	AD-3,AD-4	<u>^ДD-4N</u>	F4U-4	F4U-5N	F9F-5	F9F-5	TOTAL
ORDNANCE	(VA-125)	(VC-35)	(VF-124)	(VC-3)	(VF-121)	(VF-122)	
2000# GP 1000# GP 500# GP 250# GP 260# FRAC 100# GP ATAR 20MM 50 CAL	26 194 52 255 210	9 54 27 7460	97 306 78 34100	14 72 4700	14 212 150 81 18 22285	292 200 61 10 17165	26 194 186 1065 764 169 28 59065 34100


#### HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE ORDNANCE	AERO 14A	MK 55	TOTAL
260# FRAG ATAR (5¶)	2	1	1 2

All hung ordnance remained on racks








PART IV

DAMAGE

#### DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY 7 - 31 JANUARY 1953:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Buildings, Barracks Buildings, Factory Buildings, Warehouse	11	1 3 7
Buildings, Warchouse Buildings, Unidentified	206	304
Bunkers	5	50
Bridges, Highway	-	3 2
Bridges, Railroad		2
Cars, Vehicle	3	
Cars, Railroad	33	56
Cuts, Highway	10	
Cuts, Rail	ħĴ	1.7
Carts, Oxen	5	46
Docks	8	1 1 1 3
Fuel Facilities	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fuel Dumps Installations, Power	± 3	3, ∓
Installations, Radar	2 1 1	,
Locomotives	<u> </u>	3
Oxen	5	•
Supply Dumps	5 15	
Tanks		1
Trenches (Yards)	240	150
Troops	46	20
Trucks	77	148
Tunnels, Railroad		1 1
Tunnels, Highway		1





#### DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY 1 - 11 FEBRUARY 1953:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Buildings, Barracks	5 3 48	8
Buildings, Warehouse	. 3	10
Buildings, Unidentified		77
Bunkers	10	23
Bridges, Highway		2
Bridges, Railroad	_	2
By-Passes, Railroad	3	
Cars, Railroad		2
Cuts, Highway	10	
Cuts, Rail	14	
Carts, Oxen	2	11
Gun empläcements	_	12
Installations, Power	1	1
Lumber mills	<u>1</u> 8	
Oxen	δ	n!
Shelters, Personnel	~	24
Shelters, Supply	<b>T</b>	4
Supply Dumps	060	7
Trenches (Yards)	260	20
Trucks	25	38
Tunnels, Railroad		F.
Vehicle Shelters		כ

#### COMBAT LOSS OF AIRCRAFT:

DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
1-18-53	VF-121	F9F <b>-</b> 5	125967	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	L
1-26-53	VF-124	F4U-4	81401	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	L
2-1-53	VA-125	AD-3	122822	Probable enemy anti-aircraft fire.	T.
2-2-53	VF-121	F9 <b>F-5</b>	126152	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	L






#### DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ENEMY TO OWN AIRCRAFT:

DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	<u>CAU SE</u>	CODE
1-15 <b>-</b> 53	VF-124	F4U <b>-</b> 4	82099	Small arms fire	D-3
1-17-53	VF-124	F4U-4	97210	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-2
1-18-53	VF-124	F4U-4	9 <b>7059</b>	Small arms fire	D-3
1-20-53	VA-125	AD-3 .	122769	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-21-53	VC-3	F4U-5N	124713	Small arms fire	D-3
1-21-53	VC-35	AD-4N	125740	Small arms fire	D-3
1-23-53	VA-125	AD-4	129008	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-23-53	VF-124	FUU-L	97291	Small arms fire	D-3
1-23-53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	125544	Auto-matic weapons fire and small arms fire	D-3
1-23-53	VF-122	F9F-5	125312	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-25-53	VF-124	FLU-L	968 <b>36</b>	Small arms fire	D-3
1-26-53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	125462	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-27-53	VF-124	F4U-4	96796	Small arms fire	D-3
1-27-53	<b>VF-1</b> 22	F9F-5	125969	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-27-53	VF-124	FLU-L	81964	Small arms fire	D-3
1-28-53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	125544	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-31-53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	125541	Auto-matic weapons fire	D-3
1-31-53	VF-121	F9F-5	126202	Auto-matic weapons fire	D <b>-</b> 3
2-1-53	VF-121	F9F-5	125461	Small arms fire	D-3
2-4-53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	126005	Small arms fire	D <b>-</b> 3
2-8-53	VC-35	AD-LIN	125740	Auto-matic weapons fire	D <b>-</b> 3
2-8-53	VF-122	F9F-5	126219	Auto-malic weapons fire	D <b>-</b> 3







OPERATIONAL LOSS OF AIRCRAFT:

DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNC	<u>CAU SE</u>	CODE
1-18-53	VA-125	AD-3	122793	Overspeeding propeller	D-1



7,6



#### PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

#### PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. The performance of Air Group Personnel during this period is considered excellent. Many difficulties encountered earlier due to utilization of strikers in certain ratings have been overcome because of the added experience and training gained during the past months.

#### CASUALTIES

1. An AD piloted by CDR J. C. MICHEEL, 85362, USN, Commanding Officer of VA-923, was observed to crash while on a combat mission over North Korea on 1 February 1953. Anti-aircraft fire is considered the probable cause of the crash. A wing was observed to seperate from the aircraft while in a dive. Neither pilot nor chute was observed to leave the airplane. CDR MICHEEL is listed as killed in action.







#### PART VI

#### **OPERATIONS**

- 1. During this third period with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, Carrier Air Group TWELVE flew a total of 1991 flights and flew 4,066 hours during 21.5 scheduled operational days. Approximately 7.5 days operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 92.6 flights per operating day. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft was 15.2 and for the jet pilots was 18.8.
- 2. During the first two action periods, pilots of Fighting Squadron ONE TWO FCUR experienced several instances of wing "snatch" during recoveries from glide-bombing dives in Fhu-4's. This wing "snatch" is best described as a tendency to snap roll during a wings level pullout commenced at an indicated airspeed in excess of 365 knots. It was frequently preceded by a mild buffeting, followed by wing heaviness, and resulted in a violent roll, more often to the left, with the ailerons' effectiveness greatly reduced. In some cases where the ailerons were effective in returning the plane to wings level flight, a violent roll in the opposite direction immediately developed. Released back pressure and less positive acceleration only slightly alleviated the condition after it was established. No cases of wing "snatch" were experienced by this squadron during this period as a result of employing the following doctrine:
- a. Approach the target at an indicated airspeed of 165 knots or less.
- b. Just prior to commencing the dive, set the rudder and aileron tabs at <u>MEUTRAL</u> and the propeller at 2200 r.p.m.
- c. When rolling into the dive, retard the throttle to twenty inches manifold pressure.
- d. Enter the dive at an altitude of nine or ten thousand feet above the terrain; commence the pullout 3000 feet above it.
- e. During completion of the recovery, restrict use of the ailerons for jinking maneuvers to about one quarter of the stick lateral travel.
- 3. Early in this period the "daisy-cutter" fuze was authorized for use on the 260 pound fragmentation bombs carried by the night hecklers and the effectiveness of that bomb against trucks was significantly increased.
- 4. On night heckler missions requiring the use of flares, VC-3 Detachment GECRGE, has enjoyed increased effectiveness by combating the flare's glare with the following procedure:






- a. The attacking aircraft of a two-plane section drops flares from about 3000 feet above the target.
- b. The other plane remains four thousand feet higher, directly over the flare, where sighting of targets on the ground is not seriously hampered by the flare's glare.
  - c. The higher pilot spots targets and directs the lower pilot to them.
- When an aviator has bailed out over enemy territory, it is felt that his immediate rescue is, for the most part, dependant upon the actions of his flight members. The greatest urgency and importance is placed upon sighting the pilot and/or crashed aircraft immediately and not looking away until they are accurately marked on the ground with reference to prominent landmarks. The senior flight leader present assumes command of the RESCAP and notifies the Task Force Commander. If he is not immediately informed that his flight will be relieved on station by another RESCAP flight within twenty minutes, the senior flight leader, as CTF-77's representative, requests RESCAP via the nearest Tactical Air Direction Center from the U. S. Air Force, which has a RESCAP flight on fifteen minutes stand-by.
- 6. Coordinated jet flak-suppression with propeller aircraft strikes against well defended targets has been most successful. Without exception the enemy's anti-aircraft fire has been greatly reduced in intensity and denied any accuracy. The following considerations in the conducting of jet flak-suppression are offered:
- a. Conduct a joint briefing of the propeller and jet pilots. Review all the known flak positions within a ten mile radius of the target. The strike leader presents his attack plan.
- b. Jets effect a running rendezvous with the earlier launched propeller strike group before reaching the target. This is expedited when the strike leader reports passing predetermined fixes to the jet leader.
- c. A jet flight immediately precedes each element of the propeller group in its attacks. Repeated jet attacks afford protection for the retirement of the flight ahead as well as flak-suppression for the following element. If it is not feasible for the jets to attack between propeller attacks, the jets should make repeated runs, avoiding interference with the propeller aircraft's attacks.


Those jets not actually in an attack watch closely to pin-point firing anti-aircraft positions.





declassified

f. Repeated firing runs into a flak area are most effective. If the jet pilot does not see the actual gun installation, it is vitally important that he exert maximum fire on the coordinate fix of the reported area.




#### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS 7 - 31 JANUARY 1953


MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4		VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W			AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE: Strike Recco Flak Suppression	109 77	75 77 27	145	139					468 154 31
NGF ECM Photo			23		5		2 12	48	30 12 48
Photo Escort CAS TAR CAP	19	19	36	54					38 90 8
RESCAP Heckler TOTAL OFFENSIVE	213	202	4 208	193	<u>30</u> 35		<u>27</u> 41	48	8 4 <u>57</u> 940
DEFENSIVE: CAP ASP	88	90				40			178 40
ASP Escort TOTAL DEFENSIVE	88	90	<del>-4</del>	<u>20</u> 20	2 2	41	$\frac{1}{14}$		41 259
MISCELLANEOUS:									
Refresher Slow time or Te Ferry	20 st 4	19 1	2l <sub>1</sub> 5 6	23 3 6	14 15	4 1	5 1 6	3	102 9 38
TOTAL MISC.	24	20	35	32	19	5	12	3	149
ABORTS:	3	8	1	<u>_4</u>		=	2	<u></u>	21
TOTALS	328	320	248	249	57	47	69	52	1369
			• •						٤
Average Flights Per <b>Pi</b> lot	13.1	12.2	10.4	10.9	11.4	9.4	13.8	10.4	11.6
Average Flight hours per pilot	19.6	19.0	26.5	28.7	24.8	23.6	34.2	17.0	23.4



#### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS 1 - 11 FEBRUARY 1953

MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE: Strike Recco Flak Suppression	32 43 n 2	55 36 5	64	61					212 79 7
NGF ECM Photo		·	4				6	23	4 6 23 23
Photo Escort CAS TAR CAP Heckler	15 4	8	32	28	٥		0		23 60 4 16
RESCAP TOTAL OFFENSIVE	96	104	100	93	8 - <u>1</u> 9		8 2 16	23	$\frac{16}{7}$
DEFENSIVE: CAP ASP	56	66			1	14	1		12 <b>3</b> 15
ASP Escort TOTAL DEFENSIVE	56	66		$\frac{3}{3}$	1	16	10		15 153
MISCELLANEOUS:									
Slow time or Tes Ferry TOTAL MISC.	st		1	<u>4</u>	2 3 5		1 2 3		8 <u>5</u> 13
ABORTS:	7	<u></u>	<u></u>	3	2	_1	******	***	15
TOTALS	159	171	102	103	17	17	30	23	622
									'. ·
Average Flights Per Pilot	6.3	6.6	4.3	4.5	3.4	3.4	6.0	4.6	5.3
Average Flight hours per pilot	10.1	10.3	11.5	12.8	7.5	8.8	16.8	7•3	11.0







#### PART VII

#### SURVIVAL

- 1. There were three cases of ditchings due to accurate enemy anti-aircraft fire, two F9F-5's and one F4U-4. All three pilots abandoned their planes with their parachutes strapped tight and encountered no difficulties in leaving. Only one pilot inflated his Mae West in the water. The other two pilots did not because of the buoyancy afforded by the Mk IV anti-exposure suit.
- 2. The Corsair pilot did not undo his parachute straps immediately after entering the water and found himself floating with his posterior high and dry and his head and shoulders underwater. In paddling to keep his face above water, he was unable to take time out and unbuckle the parachute straps. He did not attempt to use the Mae West because the parachute harness chest straps were still buckled. The helicopter was over the pilot right after his entry into the water and after much paddling the pilot got an arm through the sling. Halfway out of the water he lost his grip and fellback into the sea. The next attempted pick-up was normal. In the water less than five minutes, the pilot was exhausted and ill from fighting and drinking the salt water.
- 3. The two jet pilots unbuckled their parachutes upon entry into the water and utilized their pararafts. Rescue was prompt (within fifteen minutes) and routine, one being by helicopter and the other by a destroyer.
- 4. The following recommendations on ditching were made by the pilots:
- a. Carry nothing but the special gloves in the lower leg pockets of the anti-exposure suit for ready utilization.
- b. Do not roll and tie the gloves in a bundle because it is very difficult to untie in the cold water.
- c. Put balloons over the ends of the PRC-17 radio as a more positive method of keeping it waterproof.






#### PART VIII

#### MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL


- l. Auto-acceleration and loss of throttle centrol is still being experienced. All cases that occurred during this period were under conditions similar to the thirty-nine cases reported previously. Cases ranged from slight increases in acceleration, to one case of sudden surging, resulting in a rich flame-out. The addition of alcohol appeared to eliminate auto-acceleration. However, concentrations of an amber colored precipitate were discovered after forty hours of operation and corrosion of fuel pressure and shut off valves, P/N 185018-1, occurred. This corrosion resulted in several cases of the throttle mechanically sticking. Pending permanent solution to the problem of auto-acceleration and corrosion occasioned by moisture, the following procedure is used:
- a. Addition of two quarts alcohol in the after fuselage tank per 1000 gallons of fuel.
- b. Draining of fuel traps prior to each flight until no trace of alcohol or precipitate is noted.
- c. After each instance of throttle sticking attributable to corrosion of the fuel pressure and shut off valves, the fuel line to the pressurizing valve and shut off cock is disconnected at the fuel control, drained of fuel and refilled with lubricating oil. The line is then connected and the throttle worked vigorously several times. This information has been furnished to activities concerned.
- 2. Some trouble was experienced with F9F-5 brakes seizing. When aircraft were inactive on the flight deck for prolonged periods during heavy weather, salt spray caused corrosion in the recessed surfaces of the magnesium brake housing and the brake lining, P/N 9520641. This has been the subject of an RUDM.
- 3. Material support during this period was considered highly satisfactory. Over sixty-five percent of ACOG aircraft were down less than one day. The items holding aircraft ACOG more than one day were F9F-5 nose sections and tail hooks, AD-LW fuel quantity gage, FLW-L voltage regulator, and FLW-L port elevator. One aircraft was ACOG six days because of a shortage of F9F+5 tail hook assemblies in this area. Seven more F9F-5 aircraft would have been ACOG for approximately ten days except for waiving the provisions of T.O. 48-52 by BuAer to permit 120 landings on each assembly. The normal usage of jet hook assemblies over a ninety day period of Korean combat averages twelve hook assemblies per sixteen plane. squadron. Practically all aircraft in each squadron reach the one hundred landing limit at approximately the same date. Action requesting an increase in allowance is being initiated.





#### AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY:

UI	NIT	TYPE A/C	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON BOARD EXCLUSIVE OF "DUD" AIRCRAFT	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE	PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE
V: V	F-121 F-122 F-124 A-125 C-3"G" C-11"G" C-35"G"	AD-LIN	13.6 13.9 12.9 14.8 3.8 2.9 3.9	11.9 11.8 11.9 12.4 2.9 2.1 3.3 2.8	88% 85% 92% 84% 79% 72% 85% 93%
A3	IR CROUP	<b>&gt;</b>	67.8	59.1	87%



### UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIR FORCE

CVG-12/REW:an

A16-13

COMMANDER CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE (CVG-12) Ser: 06

30 Mar 1953



From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWELVE

To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISHANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period

1 March through 29 March 1953; submission of


Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4


(b) CINCPACELT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

l. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with references (a) and (b).

Plehace G. P. CHASE







#### ACTION REPORT

#### CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE FOR THE PERIOD 1 MARCH THROUGH 29 MARCH 1953

#### CONTENTS

PART I	MISSION AND COMPOSITION
PART II	CHRONOLOGY
PART III	ORDNANCE
PART IV	DAMAGE
PART V	PER SONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VI	OPERATIONS
PART VII	AIR INTELLIGENCE
PART VIII	SURVIVAL
PART IX	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

#### PART I

#### MISSION AND COMPOSITION

#### MISSION:

1. The mission, upon returning to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the area off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces, was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program of interdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities, power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces to be furnished upon request.

#### COMPOSITION:

		OPERATI	ONAL A/C	PILOTS		
UNIT	TYPE A/C	1 MAR	29 MAR	1 MAR	29 MAR	
CVG-12 CDR G. P. CHASE Commanding	NONE	NONE	NONE	7	7	
VF-121 LCDR S. R. HOLM Commanding	F9F <b>-</b> 5	15	15*	25	25	



	•	•			
UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERAT 1 MAR	IONAL 29 MAR	PILOTS 1 MAR	29 MAR
VF→122 LCDR J. W. WYRICK Commanding	F9F-5	15	12**	25	214
VF-124 LCDR M. D. CARMODY Commanding	F4U-4	74	12	24	24
VA-125 LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON Commanding	AD-3/AD-4	16	15	21	21
VC-3 (Det "G") LCDR G. W. STAEHELI Officer-in-Charge	F4U <b>-</b> 5N	14	L <sub>1</sub>	5	5
VC-11 (Det "G") LT H. F. GERNERT Officer-in-Charge	AD-LW	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (Det "G") LT W. P. KISER Officer-in-Charge	AD-4N	Ţŧ	<b>L</b> #	5	5
VC-61 (Det "G") LT J. F. GROSSER Officer-in-Charge	F2H-2P	3	L## 	. 5	5
TOTALS		74	69	122	121

\*\*VF-121 received one F9F-5 replacement aircraft on board during this period.


\*\*VF-122 received one F9F-5 replacement aircraft on board during this period.

\*\*VC-35 received one AD-4N replacement aircraft on board during this period.

\*\*#VC-61 received one F2H-2P as an addition to normal complement of aircraft on board.

The Air Group Commander flies with VF-121 and VA-125. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flies with VF-122. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator, the Electronics Officer and three L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining five pilots on the Staff and they do not fly from the ship.







#### CHRONOLOGY

- 1 March Departed Yokosuka for operating area. Two planes were launched in an unsuccessful attempt to locate a reported life raft with survivors.
- 2 March Forty-nine refresher sorties were flown.
- 3 March Forty-eight refresher sorties were flown.
- 4 March Air Group TWELVE planes, from the U.S.S. ORISKANY, resumed combat flying. Six Skyraiders destroyed four buildings and damaged eight in an attack on a supply area south of WONSAN. Six sorties were flown and twelve tons of bombs were dropped.
- 5 March Although poor visibility hampered attacks on the primary targets, Tifty tons of bombs were dropped during one hundred sorties. The AD's and F4U's bombed industrial buildings at HUNGNAM, destroying six and heavily damaging ten. Later in the day they flew close air support and attacked supply shelters near HWANGP'O-DONG. Four bunkers and twenty-five yards of trenches were destroyed and six bunkers damaged as the effort was evaluated at one hundred percent coverage of the targets and fifty percent effective use of ordnance. Five shelters were destroyed and eight damaged. The jets attacked a vehicle parking area in the vicinity of HARI-DONG. Seventy percent of the bombs hit in the target area. One warehouse was destroyed and four damaged in another attack by the F9F's near YONGAM-NI. The hecklers, harrassing vehicular traffic along the coast from MACHAE-RI to CHONGJIN, destroyed five trucks and damaged eight. They scored a direct hit on a railroad repair party near PYONG-DONG-NI.
- 6 March The props attacked personnel and supply shelter concentrations east of HAMSONG with jets providing flak suppression. The area was fifty percent covered, but damage was unassessable. Coastal guns south of WONSAN were attacked by the Corsairs while the Skyraiders were providing close air support for the ground troops. One large gun, seven bunkers and one hundred fifty yards of trenches were damaged. One large fire and four secondary explosions were seen. The F9F-5's, flying close air support for the first time, were credited with ten bunkers destroyed. Other jet missions heavily damaged a power relay station near TANCHON and four barracks buildings south of WONSAN. Ninety-one sorties were flown and seventy-three tons of bombs were dropped before a flight deck accident forced cancellation of air operations. A hung bomb on a returning aircraft was dislodged on recovery and it exploded on the flight deck.

7 March - No flight operations - replenishment.





8 March - One hundred five sorties were flown and sixty-six tons of bombs were dropped as both jets and props concentrated their efforts on supply build-up areas and personnel shelters. The Skyraiders and Corsairs, with excellent flak suppression from the jets, destroyed four buildings and damaged two others while attacking a supply area along the main supply route south of WONSAN. A large secondary explosion was seen and large fires were left burning in the area. In addition, the props bombed personnel shelters near the bomb line at CHANG-YONG-NI and jets again suppressed flak. Five secondary explosions were noted as an estimated seven buildings were destroyed and thirteen damaged. Panther jets attacked vehicle and supply shelters northwest of HYON-NI, dropping ninety-five percent of their ordnance in the assigned area.


9 March - In addition to destroying two trucks and damaging five others. the hecklers stopped a train near TAE-DON by cutting rails ahead of and behind it. Additional runs resulted in heavy damage to the locomotive and six cars. Three railroad cars were destroyed. Corsairs were diverted from a strike to attack this train. They derailed and overturned the locomotive and tender. Five additional boxcars were destroyed. The same division of F4U's was then sent to attack another train near SYONGP-YONGNI. This train had been stopped by FIFTH AF planes which cut the rails but did not damage the train. This locomotive was also destroyed and twelve cars were damaged. Jets damaged seven camouflaged buildings in a strike on a supply concentration area near IP-O-RI. Skyraiders and Corsairs, diverted from close air support because of weather, destroyed eight and damaged eight buildings in an attack on a supply and billeting area near CHANGJOI-DONG. Other props attacked supply storage buildings south of WONSAN. Four buildings were destroyed and eleven damaged. One hundred eleven sorties were flown and fifty-two tens of bembs were dropped.


10 March - The early morning hecklers reported light traffic as they destroyed four trucks and damaged five others along the coastal reconnaissance routes from WONSAN to SONGJIN. The Corsairs and Skyraiders, prevented by poor weather from attacking their primary or alternate targets, successfully attacked recently used railroad tracks. Fourteen rail cuts and two rail covering landslides were scored from CH-O-RI to CH\*ADO. Thirty-four tons of bombs were dropped by forty-five sorties before weather forced cancellation of the day's remaining events.

11 March - No flight operations - replenishment.

12 March - No flight operations - weather and rough seas.

13 March - Air Group TWELVE planes, flying from the U.S.S. ORISKANY, concentrated on enemy railroad tracks and bridges throughout the day. Flying together, the Skyraiders and Corsairs destroyed fifty yards of tracks, scored two other rail cuts and destroyed a railroad bypass near SOHORI. The jets






scored several rail cuts and heavily damaged a railroad bridge south of HONGWON. Another jet flight destroyed a railroad bridge west of KUWON. F9F's attacked a bridge north of HAMHUNG. inflicting heavy damage. AD's and F4U's continued the attacks on rails, railroad bridges and facilities. Six rail cuts were scored between HONGWON and SOHORI. The approach to a railroad bridge was heavily damaged as was a water tower west of KUWCN. Three other rail cuts were scored and a billeting area for railroad repair crews southwest of CH'ADO was attacked. An estimated fifteen barracks buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged as large fires wept the entire area! Searching along the coastal recco routes from WONSAN to SONGJIN, the evening hecklers destroyed two trucks and damaged three others. One hundred sorties were flown and eighty-five tons of bombs were dropped. EMS David B. PLACE, USNR, VA-125, was rescued uninjured by a helicopter from the LST 735. His aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire over KOWON and he was forced to ditch west of HODO-PANDO near the northern end of WONSAN harbor.

14 March - One hundred four sorties were flown and seventy-two tons of bombs were dropped. The morning's main effort was a combined prop and jet attack on a large mining complex northwest of SONGJIN. The Corsairs and Skyraiders covered eighty percent of the assigned target area with an estimated seventy-five percent effectiveness. At least five buildings were destroyed by direct hits. The Panther jets provided flak suppression for the props and. in addition, destroyed three buildings while damaging five in the target area. Another jet flight scored a direct hit, heavily damaging a railroad turntable in the SONGJIN marshalling yard. Two afternoon Panther jet missions reported one hundred percent and sixty percent coverage respectively in attacks on a troop billeting area south of WONSAN and a supply storage area southwast of the same city. Diverted because of weather from their close air support mission, the afternoon prop flights attacked a troop billeting area at T'ONGOH-ON. Eight military barracks buildings were destroyed and twenty-one damaged. Ten trucks were destroyed and nineteen damaged as the evening hecklers reported heavy traffic converging on WONSAN.

15 March - No flight operations - replenishment.

16 March - The hecklers destroyed six trucks and damaged fourteen between HANHUNG and SONGJIN. One rail cut was scored and the entrance to a tunnel was caved in north of HUNGNAM. A locomotive and three cars, though damaged, managed to gain its protection. Panther jets attacked a large truck convoy heading west out of WONSAN, destroying eight and damaging thirty others. Jet reccos damaged a highway bridge near YONGSIN-NI and a radar installation in WONSAN. Other F9F's covered seventy-five percent of their assigned personnel and supply area targets near the bomb line. The props,






in two close air support missions, observed several large secondary explosions as they damaged thirty—one personnel shelters, five mortar positions, and demolished one hundred fifty yards of trenches. With jets flying flak suppression, the major prop efforts were directed against supply build—up areas just behind the enemy's main line of resistance. Damage assessment was hampered by poor visibility. Sixty—three tons of bombs were dropped and one hundred seven sorties were flown.

17 March — Seventy—six sorties were flown and fifty—seven tons of bombs were dropped before weather forced cancellation of the remaining events. The jets conducted an early strike against an enemy supply stockpile area near the bomb line at TANGNYON—NI. Despite poor visibility, sixty percent of the assigned target was covered. Other Panther jets destroyed twenty—one supply shelters and damaged fourteen others near CHUNGSAN—NI. A jet recco mission damaged five storage buildings at PALP—YONG and another damaged three ware—houses west of UIHO—RI. The Corsairs and Skyraiders, diverted because of poor weather from close air support, bombed camouflaged supply buildings south of TONGCH—ON. Eighteen fires and two large secondary explosions were seen in the area.


18 March - Skyraiders and Corsairs flew close air support. The AD's were credited with five personnel shelters, two mortar positions, seventy-five yards of trenches destroyed and two caves damaged. The Fuuts scored five artillery positions and four bunkers destroyed, three bunkers and one hundred yards of trenches damaged. Two secondary explosions were observed. A jet strike covere one hundred percent of an assigned personnel and supply shelter area near the eastern terminus of the bomb line. Meanwhile, other F9F's, searching the recco routes west of WONSAN, stopped a supply truck convoy near MAJON-NI. Five vehicles were destroyed and at least eight others were damaged. A late morning Panther jet flight destroyed two and damaged two camouflaged vehicles west of MAJON-NI. Other F9F's bombed a supply build-up area near the bomb line and an estimated eighty percent of the target area was covered. When the props attacked supplies and military equipment behind the enemy's main line of resistance, extremely intense and accurate enemy anti-aircraft firing was encountered, despite the efforts of flak suppressing jets. The Skyraiders. hitting a target near the east coast, observed a large secondary explosion as they destroyed six buildings and damaged seven others. All the Corsairs' ordnance was dropped into the target area, but the damage assessment was hamperaid because of the intense flak. The total sorties were one hundred seven and a total of seventy-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

19 March - No flight operations - replenishment.

20 March - No flight operations - weather.




III



21 March - The entire task force conducted attacks throughout the day on CHONGJIN, the important east coast industrial complex, land transportation hub and sea port. Air Group TWELVE planes, flying from the U.S.S. ORISKANY, dropped sixty-nine tons of bombs in one hundred eight sorties. After flying TARCAP for the early prop strikes, the jets covered ninety-five percent of a troop billeting compound south of the main target area. The AD's and Fhu's destroyed six buildings in an explosive storage area. A large secondary explosion was observed. With Panther jet TARCAP, the props attacked CHONGJIN again in the afternoon. The Corsairs covered seventy-five percent of a supply storage area, causing two secondary explosions and many fires. The Skyraiders, by photographic damage assessment, destroyed fourteen buildings. damaged nine others, including a transformer at an ore processing plant, and destroyed a bridge. The night hecklers, reporting much activity, destroyed fourteen trucks and damaged twenty-two others between KYONG SONG and CHONGJIN. They also stopped a train south of POHWABO, damaging the locomotive and two boxcars.

22 March - Both jets and props attacked enemy supply and equipment build-up areas along the eastern section of the bomb line. The F9F's covered sixty percent of their assigned areas. The Skyraiders and Corsairs, with jet flak suppression, covered ninety-five percent of the target areas, destroying at least three buildings and damaging many more. Several fires were left burning at the target. The controller credited the prop close air support missions with ten mortar positions, two automatic weapon positions and four bunkers destroyed. The afternoon jet reccos destroyed a large truck and six horse carts near UHUNG-NI. The F9F's also destroyed a camouflaged military barracks south of YONDONG-NI, damaging two others. One hundred percent coverage and "excellent hop" was the evaluation by the afternoon close air support controller to the F4U's and AD's. The props continued their attacks on supply storage facilities near the bomb line, reporting fifty percent coverage of assigned target areas. Total sorties, one hundred two. Total tonnage of bombs dropped seventy-six. F9F-5, BuNo. 126219, hit the water and burst into flames just after being catapulted. Casse of the accident is unknown. There was no chance of survival for the pilot, LTJG Ralph N. MEW, 394627, USNR, VF-122.

23 March - Harassing vehicular traffic south and west of WONSAN, the early morning hecklers destroyed eight trucks and damaged eighteen more. A coastal radar station south of WONSAN was also damaged and two supply stockpiles were destroyed. The F4U's and AD's, with jet flak suppression, attacked their weather alternate targets. The AD's attacked a mining area northwest of SINPO, destroying nine buildings and damaging four, with two secondary explosions being observed. The F4U's bombed and strafed supply shelters near P'ACH-CHON-NI destroying three buildings and leaving many long-delay fuzed bombs in the area. A jet strike attacked a water power site below the FUSEN Reservoir which



resulted in four cuts in the penstocks and damage to two buildings housing generators. The F9F's, on reconnaissance, destroyed five storage buildings, started several fires and caused a secondary explosion in an attack south of PANGCH'ON. They scored six rail cuts southwest of YONCHUNG. In the afternoon, the F4U's attacked a billeting area south of MAJON-NI. An estimated fifteen barracks buildings were destroyed or damaged. The AD's bembed the coastal railroad south of TANCH'ON. Several direct hits above the tunnel entrances caused landslides which blocked them. In addition, the rails were cut twice. They attacked coastal gun positions south of SONGJIN, but no damage was observed. The afternoon jet recco mission heavily aamaged the northern approaches to the railroad bridge above P'ACH'UNJANG. After destroying seven supply shelters in a target area northwest of YONCHUNG, the late jet strike observed many large groups of marching personnel on the road from CH'OWON to HAMHUNG. Several strafing runs were made. The day's total sorties were one hundred ten and eighty-one tons of bombs were dropped.


24 March - No flight operations - replanishment.

25 March - Ten defensive sorties were flown. All other flight operations were cancelled because of weather.

26 March - No flight operations - rough seas.


27 March - The propeller aircraft conducted strikes against troop shelters near HARRANG-NI. Panther jets flow flak suppression for them. An estimated eighty-five percent of the ordnance hit in the target area. Poor visibility, because of smoke and debris over the target area, hampered further damage assessment. The Corsairs and Skyraiders combined to strike twice at supply shelters and troop bunkers near SOHSADONG-NI. Sixteen structures were destroyed and seventeen damaged as numerous secondary explosions in the target areas. Three pilots of VC-3, on a volunteer mission, successfully bombed the strategic, intensely flak-protected highway bridge south of HALHUNG. Photo assessment revealed that they demolished about sixty yards of the bridge at its center. VC-35 hecklers attacked a total of four locomotives. The first locomotive, pulling one boxcar, was sighted heading south out of HAMHUNG. It was stopped and heavily damaged. Three stationary locomotives and thirty boxcars were sighted near KOCH!AM-DONG. One locomotive was destroyed and two were probably destroyed. The rails were cut, four of the bexcars were destroyed and the rest sustained strafing damage. One hundred six sorties dropped minety-five tons of bombs.

28 March - The props were provided flak suppression by the jets as they returned to attack the supply shelters and troop bunker targets bombed 27 March. All of the ordnance hit in the disignated areas. At least six buildings were




destroyed and five damaged. A jet strike, prevented by weather from attacking its primary target, heavily damaged three boxcars and two water pumping plants near KCWCN. Cloud cover prevented accurate damage assessment of a jet strike on a truck parking and troop bunker area near HAERANG-NI. The AD's and F4U's, diverted because of weather from their primary target, attacked barracks buildings and loading facilities at HUNCNAM. Fifteen buildings were heavily damaged. The night hecklers again successfully attacked lucrative transportation targets. They bombed and strafed a locomotive and seventeen boxcars heading south toward CHONGJIN. The locomotive was heavily damaged. Three cars were destroyed by secondary explosions and ten cars were damaged. The rails were cut twice in front of the train and once behind it. Another locomotive was stopped by rail cuts and strafing damage near YONGCH'ON-DONG. It was then heavily damaged by bombing. In addition, the hecklers destroyed three trucks and damaged eleven others. Minety-five tons of bombs were dropped during one hundred eleven sortics.

29 March - No flight operations - replenishment. Departed for HOLG KONG, China and end of the reporting period.







### CRDNANCE

- 1. The .50 caliber gun performance during this period was excellent. Only nine stoppages occurred while expending 104,300 rounds. A commendable accomplishment by the ordnance personnel of VF-124.
- 2. Performance of the 20MM guns was considerably below average with a recording of but 920 rounds per stoppage. A thorough investigation disclosed the following:
- a. More than a third of the total stoppages recorded could be directly attributed to a calibration slippage that occurred in the belting machine. This slippage has since been corrected.
- b. Several of the 20MM incendiary rounds, Lot No. KOP 37-71, manufactured by Federal Cartridge Corp. in 1944, were found to have defective primers or propellant charges. Six additional stoppages were attributed to these dud rounds.
- c. Of twenty-six re-worked Cldsmobile feed mechanisms installed, sixteen were found to be defective. The most common defects noted were increased loss of tension on the clutch spring, bent link ejectors and star wheel housings, and sheared rivets. RUDAOE's covering (b) and (c) are being initiated.
- 3. All bomb racks employed by this Air Group have performed well with the exception of the Aero 14A Combination Bomb Rack and Rocket Launcher. Many cases of slow and improper releases were reported while flying at high speeds. This was particularly evident when the rack was loaded with 500# bombs. One bomb dropped off on launching. Three bombs failed to release, of which one dropped off upon recovery from the run. In most cases, investigation of these racks uncovered no apparent malfunction. Adoption of a stronger release solenoid is suggested as a possible aid in alleviating this trouble. It is recommended, however, that an access port be installed on this rack in order to facilitate maintenance checks and inspections. A RUDM on the discrepancies noted in the Aero 14A launcher is being initiated.
- 4. On the 6th of March, a Corsair returned to the ship with a 250# GP bomb hung on an Aero 14A rack. During the arrested landing, the bomb fell from the rack, landed on its nose, flipped over several times onto its tail and nose alternately, then bounded high into the air before landing on its nose and exploding. The arming vanes and discs on the nose fuze shattered and the arming stem on the tail fuze broke off at the firing pin plunger. Facts indicate that a possible cause of detonation was due to the tail fuze. The cause of the bomb rack malfunction was undetermined. A Board of Inquiry has completed an investigation and forwarded its findings through proper channels.







### TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE BY SQUADRONS:

TYPE ORDNANCE		F9F-5 (VF-122)	F4U-4 (VF-124)	AD-3,-4 (VA-125)	F4U-5N (VC-3)	AD-4N (VC-35)	TOTAL
2000# GP 1000# GP 1000# SAP			125	91 361 26	6	2 2	91 494 28
500# GP 500# SAP	150	171	121 15	264	36	23	765 15
350# ADB 260# FRAG	503	434	68	16 128	1 194	22 37	39 1364
250# GP	641	784 20	679	1070	40	111	3325 69
100# GP NAPALM	49		4				14 98
5" ATAR 3.5" AR	32	36	30	43		4	<b>B</b> 7
20 MM •50 CAL•	43170	40879	104300	29320	17050	15050	145470 104300

### HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE ORDHANCE	AERO 14A		
500# GP 250# GP 260# FRAG	10 9 5		
5" ATAR	13		

### DISPOSITION HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE CRDNANCE	REMAINING ON AERO 14A RACK	DROPPED OFF ON LANDING AERO 14A - MK 9 LAUNCH	LATER RELEASED ER FROM AERO 14A
500# GP 250# GP 260# FRAG	1	1	9 7 5
5" ATAR 3.5" AR	13	7*	

<sup>\*</sup> Not considered hung ordnance because launchers had not been energized.





PART IV

DAMAGE

### DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Boats	ī N	. 9
Barracks Buildings	18	
Factory Buildings	21	22
Warehouses	<b>2</b> 6	35
Unidentified Buildings	40	45
Bunkers	24	30 22 35 45 11 3 1 3 56
Highway Bridges		1
Railroad Bridges	2	3
Railroad Bypasses	1 2 1 3 26	ı
Vehicle Cars	3	3
Railroad Cars	<b>2</b> 6	56
Highway Cuts	3 64	
Rail Cuts	64	
Ox Carts	•	6
Gun Emplacements	21	10
Power Installations		
Radio Installations		2 1 6 18
Locomotives	3	6
Storage Buildings	19	18
Personnel Shelters	<u>4</u> 2	36
Supply Shelters	40	41
Trenches (Yards)	<b>2</b> 70	225
Troops (Estimated)	100 KIA	AIW OOL
Trucks	55	118
Railroad Tunnels		4
Snow Shed		1
Caves		1
Penstocks		14
Water Tower		4
Supply Stockpiles		1





		*	• .		
COMBAT I	LOSS OF A	IRCRAFT:		2 <b>5</b> ( )	
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
3/13/53	VA-125	AD-4	129014	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	r
DAMAGE I	NFLICTED	BY ENEMY TO ON	N A/C:		
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
3/6/53	VF-124	F4U—4	82099	Small arms fire	D-3
3/6/53	VF-12h	Fliu	97059	Small arms fire	D-3
3/6/53	VF-124	FLU-L	96836	Small arms fire	D-3
3/9/53	VF-124	F4U-4	96796	Small arms fire	D-3
3/9/53	VF-184	Flu-li	97113	Small arms fire	D3
3/10/53	VF-124	Flul	8209 <b>9</b>	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/14/53	VF-122	F9F-5	126087-	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/14/53	VA-125	AD-3	122811	Small arms fire	D-3
3/16/53	VF-124	FL11-L	82099	Heavy weapons fire	D-3
3/18/53	VF-124	FLU-L	97113	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/18/53	VF-124	F4U—4	97387	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/23/53	VF <b>→1</b> 22	F9F <b></b> 5	125955	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/23/53	VF-122	F9F-5	125963	Automatic weapons fire	D <b>3</b>
3/27/53	VF-124	F4U-4	81006	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
3/28/53	VF-124	FLU-L	82099	Small arms fire	D-3
OPER ATIO	NAL LOSS	OF A IRCRAFT:			
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
3/20/53	VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> -5	125312	Lost overboard in rough seas during re-spot of A/	Ç L
3/22/53	VF-122	F9F5	126219	Crashed into ocean and exploded immediately after catapult launch	r .
			IV-2	ENCLOSURE	(1)



PART V

### PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

### PERFORMANCE:

1. Performance of Air Group personnel during this period is considered excellent. Morale continues to remain at a very high level. Tangible evidence of this is the number of enlisted personnel eligible to be returned to CONUS for discharge who have elected to remain with the Air Group until the current tour is finished.

### CASUALTIES:

- 1. LT E. L. KUMMER, USNR, 403121, Corsair pilot of VF-124, suffered wounds in both legs, left arm and shoulder, and first and second degree burns of the face, when a hung bomb exploded immediately after his landing abourd on 6 March 1953. The following casualties also resulted from the explosion:
- a. BROCKMEYER, R. C., AN, 318 84 87, USN, of VF-122, a missile lacerated his left forearm.
- b. RODGERS, L. A., AD1, 386 04 17, USN, of VC-3 Det. GEORGE, a missile penetrated his chest.
- c. DUNION, H. J., AN, 417 79 49, USN, of VC-3 Det. GEORGE, suffered a blow on his chest.
- 2. On 22 March 1953, while taking off from the ship in an F9F-5, BuNo 126219, LTJG Ralph E. MEW, 394627, USNR, of VF-122, was observed to make a normal right turn immediately after being catapulted. Following this, the aircraft went into a steep, nose high, left turn and crashed into the water in an almost inverted attitude near the port bow of the ship. The aircraft exploded on impact and sank immediately leaving burning gasoline over a large area of water. A search by helicopter and a destroyer failed to find any indication that the pilot survived.





#### PART VT

### **OPERATIONS**

- 1. During this fourth period with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, Carrier Air Group TWELVE completed a total of 1,694 flights and flew 3,601.4 hours during 16.5 scheduled operational days. Approximately 3.5 days! operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 102.5 flights per operating day. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 13.4 and for the jet pilots was 16.1. The average total flight time per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 36.8 hours and for the jet pilots was 25.2 hours.
  - 2. During the final days of this period, a Cherokee target was selected for repeated attacks on consecutive days. Pilots who made successive attacks on the same target were enthusiastic in their advocacy of such strategy. It afforded familiarity with the target which greatly facilitated planning and executing the attack with respect to the terrain and intense enemy flak, locating and identifying the target, and accomplishing a safer withdrawal.
  - 3. The night fighters of VC-3, Detachment "GEORGE", volunteered for and accomplished a most effective night strike on the intensely flak-protected highway bridge at HAMHUNG. During bright moonlight, the three Fhu-5N's approached the bridge from the mountains at 10,000 feet altitude. They attacked singly in forty degree dives commenced at 8,000 feet and maintained an interval between planes of about ½ mile by use of intercept radar. Just before the leader started his dive, the last plane released a 3,000 feet delay flare as a deceptive measure to divert the enemy gunners! attention. Photographic damage assessment established their results as one direct hit and two damaging near misses. A section of the bridge's center (about sixty yards in length)was completely destroyed. Enemy anti-aircraft guns did not fire until after the attack and then they were inaccurate.





### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS:

MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE:									
Strike Recco Flak Suppressi	117 37	122 38 57	206	196					641 <b>#3</b> 122
NGF ECM Photo		<i>)</i> (	7	2	5		2 3 56		16 և
Photo Escort CAS TAR CAP	29 12	28 4 11	30	50			<b>J</b> C		56 57 84
RESCAP Heckler	<b>V</b> erification	-	7	2	41	*****	30		23 9 71
TOTAL OFFSENSION DEFENSIVE:	VE 260	260	250	250	47		35	56	1158
CAP ASP	127	124			5	43			256 43
ASP Escort TOTAL DEFENSIV	E 127	124	-	2l1 5l1	5	47	16 16	Secretaria de la compansión de la compan	343
MISCEPLANEOUS:									
Survivor Scare Refresher Slow time or t	21	17	20 4	<b>21</b> 9	6	2 14	3	6	2 98 13
Ferry TOTAL MISC.	21	17	<u>11</u> 35	<u>15</u> 45	$\frac{6}{12}$	$\frac{1}{7}$	15 18	6	<u>48</u> 161
ABORTS:	2	<u> </u>	<u></u>	7	elementario per conspiratorio	_2	1	_2	32
TOTALS	410	415	289	326	64	<b>5</b> 6	70	64	1694
Average Flights Per Pilot	16.4	16.6	12	14.8	12.8	11.2	14	12,8	14.6
Average Flight hours per pile	ot 25.5	26.1	32.6	h1.9	34.6	31.8	35.6	20.2	31.1





### AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Anti-aircraft fire encountered on bomb line Cherokee missions has steadily increased and has become more difficult to suppress effectively. When a Cherokee target was scheduled for attacks on consecutive days, an attempt was made to provide the jet pilots furnishing flak suppression with photo blow-ups of all enemy gun positions in the target area which could be brought to bear on attacking aircraft. These photos, although not all inclusive, were exceedingly helpful to the jet pilots in locating an exact position by physical appearance; rather than just a general position marked on a map. The flak was more effectively suppressed because the pilots were briefed from these photographs and were actually able to see some of their assigned gun positions on their attacks, a relatively rare occurrence previously. These pilots believe that continuation and improvement of this intelligence, in the form of more coverage by large scale, photo-interpreted photographs of enemy gun positions, would enhance the effectiveness of their flak-suppression efforts.



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





PART VIII

### SURVIVAL

- 1. Fourteen Mk-4 Anti-Exposure suits were tested by VF-124 after four months of use and all were leaking around the crotch. These leaks were apparently caused by chafing of the high spots of wrinkles against the innerliner. The majority of these holes were minor, but several were of such magnitude that, in case of complete immersion, it is estimated the suits would have filled with water within forty-five minutes. The remaining suits in the Air Group were checked and all showed wear and chafing in the same area.
- 2. Only one pilot was forced to make use of survival gear during this tour on the line. The pilot, wearing a Mk-l Anti-Exposure Suit, ditched near WONSAN. His aircraft sank in eight seconds. The pilot left the cockpit with his parachute strapped on and experienced no difficulty in leaving the plane or in moving around in the water. He utilized his Mac West and pararaft and was picked up in approximately fifteen minutes. Due to a worn and stretched nick seal, which the pilot had not had repaired, water sceped into the suit. Aside from being wet, he felt comfortable at all times. All pilots that have had to use the Mk-l Anti-Exposure Suit gloves have been impressed by the warmth they provided. A letter report on leaks in the Mk-l Anti-Exposure Suit after 125 hours of combat use is being submitted.








#### PART IX

#### AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

- 1. Fuel system components of the F9F-5 aircraft continue to be the major maintenance problem. During this period sixteen Holley Fuel Controls, R85-H0-A7008C, nine high pressure fuel pumps, R85-BPD-185018-1, and nine pressurizing valves, PN/185018-1, were replaced. All components appeared to be extremely corroded, and it is strongly believed that the alcohol additive furthers this corrosion. The foregoing is based upon the following conditions, experiments, and tests:
- a. On ground turn-up during a recent case, idle speeds greater than 60% and maximum attainable primary RPM of less than 80% required the change of the Holley Fuel Control, high pressure pump, and the pressurizing valve. The removed components were found to be extremely corroded.
  - b. Corrosion problems followed the use of alcohol as an additive.
- c. Fifteen aircraft discontinued the alcohol additive but continued the use of 3% 1100 oil additive. Of the total fuel system components used, only eleven were by this group of aircraft, while twenty-three were required by the other group of fifteen aircraft in which alcohol continued to be used.
- d. In view of (a) and (b) above, all F9F aircraft discontinued the use of alcohol and a reduction of maintenance problems due to fuel system components was experienced.
- e. In regard to corrosion, simple tests were performed by the Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Engines Representative, Mr. McMAKEN, to determine the effect of various gasoline—alcohol mixtures. These tests indicated that alcohol does not mix completely with gasoline. Although most of the alcohol settled to the bottom, some alcohol dispersed throughout the gasoline. When gasoline and alcohol were agitated together, a sort of emulsion was formed which had a tendency to finally settle out, but adhered to any surface. Further tests revealed the following:
  - (1) Gasoline and alcohol (95%) was not corrosive.
- (2) Gasoline and alcohol with a very small quantity of water present, particularly salt water, was very corrosive.
- 2. Fourteen cases of F9F-5 auto-acceleration occurred during the period covered by this report, all under similar conditions as previously reported.
- 3. Additional J48-P-6A engine malfunctioning experienced during this period follows:
- a. The high pressure cock, P/N 185018-1, was replaced when the pressurizing valve plunger was found rusted and stuck at a partially open position.





It appears feasible to test one or two aircraft by applying heat to the control body just below the altitude valve. This could be done by using warm air from the engine compressor. The Pratt and Whitney Representative was impressed with the knowledge that the information supplied by the pilot was positive indication that auto-acceleration is not caused by restriction of the serve line at the filter or at the isolation valve.


- 4. One dock flame-out was experienced during this period. Letter report in accordance with COMAIRPAC J48 Engine Technical Bulletin No. 10 is pending.
- 5. Material support during this period was considered satisfactory. A total of four cases of ACOG were experienced. Two of these ACOG's were down less than two days. Items causing aircraft to be down for more than two days were F9F-5 landing gear emergency air bottle elbows, R45E266-60. This item was manufactured aboard and also exchanged with dud aircraft.
- 6. During the last in-port period, a method of coordinating aircraft maintenance schedules with the Air Department was implemented. An outline of all squadrons' maintenance schedules covering a three day period was submitted in advance to the Air Department. Each evening of the third day, a similar outline was submitted covering the next such period, thus providing the Air Department with a means of anticipating the daily requirements for the moving of aircraft. These outlines also showed the relative order in which various jobs were to be accomplished. This procedure was most effective.

### AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON BOARD EXCLUSIVE OF "DUD" AIRCRAFT	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE	P.RCENTAGE AVAILABLE
VF-121 VF-122 VF-124 VA-125 VC-3"G" VC-11"G" VC-35"G" VC-61"G"	F9F-5 F9F-5 F4U-4 /D-3 ,4 F4U-5N /D-4W /D-4N F2H-2P	14.3 13.7 12.4 14.9 4.0 3.0 3.3	12.7 11.2 11.9 13.5 3.7 2.5 3.0 2.9	89% 82% 96% 91% 90% 83% 91% 93%
AIR GROUP	>	68.7	61.4	89%



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET ~ CVG-12/REW:rr
AIR FORCE A16-13
COMMANDER CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE (CVG-12) Ser: 07
23 Apr 1953



From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWELVE

To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480-4


(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with references (a) and (b).

Plohase





ACTION REPORT

CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE FOR THE PERIOD 8 APRIL THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953

#### CONTENTS

PART I	MISSION AND COMPOSITION
PART II	CHRONOLOGY
PART III	ORDNANCE
PART IV	DAMAGE
PART V	PER SONNEL FERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VI	OPERATIONS
PART VII	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

#### PART I

### MISSION AND COMPOSITION

### MISSION:

1. The mission, upon returning to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the area off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces, was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program of interdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities, power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces to be furnished upon request.

#### COMPOSITION:

		OPERATI	ONAL A/C	PIL	OTS
UNIT	TYPE A/C	8 APR	22 APR	8 APR	22 APR
CVG-12 CDR G. P. CHASE Commanding	NONE	NONE	NONE	7	7
VF-121 LCDR S. R. HOLM Commanding	<b>F9F-</b> 5	15	13*	25	24
VF-122 ICDR J. W. WYRICK Commanding	F9F-5	12	12**	5]†	23



ENCLOSURE (1)

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATI 8 APR	ONAL A/C 22 APR	PIL 8 APR	OTS 22 ÁPR
VF-124 LCDR M. D. CARMODY Commanding	FLU-L	12	1 <b>#</b>	24	24
VA-125 LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON Commanding	AD-3/AD-4	15	15	21	21
VC-3 (Det "G") LCDR G. W. STAEHELI Officer-in-Charge	F4U-5N	<b>4</b>	o##	5	5
VC-ll (Det "G") LT H. F. GERNERT Officer-in-Charge	AD-HM	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (Det "G") LT W. P. KISER Officer-in-Charge	AD-4N	4	3%	5	5
VC-61 (Det "G") LT J. F. CROSSER Officer-in-Charge	F2H-2P	4	5 <b>%%</b>	5	5
TOTALS		69	52	121	119

\* VF-121 Transferred one aircraft during this period.


\*\* VF-122 Received two replacement aircraft on board and transferred one during this period. .


# VF-124 Transferred eleven aircraft during this period.

## VC-3 Transferred four aircraft during this period. % VC-35 Transferred one aircraft during this period.

% VC-61 Received one additional aircraft on board during this period.

The Air Group Commander flies with VF-121 and VA-125. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flies with VF-122. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator, the Electronics Officer and three L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining five pilots on the Staff and they do not fly from the ship.





PART II


#### CHRONOLOGY

ll April - Air Group TWELVE planes, flying from the U.S.S. ORISKANY, commenced their fifth tour on the line. The jets attacked camouflaged troop shelters south of MAJON-NI. They destroyed four shelters, damaged six, started two large fires and caused two secondary explosions. Panther jets also bombed a billeting and supply shelter area southwest of WONSAN. Six shelters were destroyed and eight damaged. A sudden storm forced cancellation of the day's remaining events, except for the night necklers. They destroyed three trucks north of HAMHUNG then proceeded to stop and wreck a train which was attempting to reach a tunnel south of CH'AHO. The rails ahead were cut, the locomotive was overturned and destroyed, six boxcars were demolished and eight others were damaged. Eighteen tons of bombs were dropped during the day's thirty-four sorties.

12 April - The Panther jets, in two strikes on personnel and supply build-up areas near the bomb line, destroyed five shelters, damaged eleven and started seven fires. AD's flew close air support for the FIRST ROK Corps, bombing bunkers and caves. Poor visibility made damage assessment difficult. Fuu's napalmed camouflaged coastal defense gun positions at the southern tip of HODO PANDO. Large fires were started at the reported positions. The Corsairs and Skyraiders combined to bomb a truck parking and troop area north of KOSAN-NI. All ordnance fell in the assigned target area. Two large fires were started. Jets. providing flak suppression, strafed three gun positions in the vicinity of the target. They also damaged four buildings by strafing. An afternoon jet reconnaissance flight heavily damaged two storage buildings near TANCH'ON. A Corsair close air support flight destroyed six buildings and started ten fires in a troop housing area southwest of YONPO. A combined AD-F4U flight destroyed three storage buildings, four industrial buildings and one reveted ammunition dump in the vicinity of HUNGNAM. They also heavily damaged six barracks buildings and four industrial buildings in the same area. Total sorties flown, one hundred two. Fifty-five tons of bombs were dropped.

13 April - Air Group TWELVE dropped sixty-six tons of bombs during the day's ninety-seven sorties. The entire effort was directed against a variety of targets in and about CHONGJIN, an important transportation center and industrial site. The early prop hop was a Skyraider strike against a shop and warehouse area and a supply vehicle parking compound. Heavy smoke over the area hindered complete damage assessment, but at least one building was seen to be destroyed and three were damaged. In addition to flying TARCAP for our propeller aircraft and for surface units shelling targets in the city, the Panther jets attacked an area consisting of small industrial buildings. Three were destroyed and ten






damaged. A division of Corsairs, before providing TARCAP, bombed a manufacturing complex, destroying six buildings, heavily damaging another and leaving eight others ablaze. A jet recco spotted loaded railroad cars northwest of CHONGJIN. They destroyed one car and damaged five. Prior to furnishing additional TARCAP and naval gunfire spot for surface units, the Corsairs bombed and strafed a large group of storage buildings. Smoke covering the area prevented damage assessment. The afternoon's combined prop strike hit the morning Skyraider target again. Five more buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. A division of AD's was diverted from the combined strike, to attack a vital communications conter. The target was demolished.

LTJG Roy TAYLOR, 401295, USNR, VF-122, is presumed to have been killed while attempting to ditch his F9F-5 because of a flame-out. A thorough search of the ditching position and surrounding area by aircraft and surface units failed to disclose any evidence that he was able to get out of the plane.

14 April - No flight operations - replenishment.

15 April - The early morning hecklers attacked a truck convoy heading into WONSAN. Four trucks were destroyed and five damaged. Another truck was destroyed and one damaged west of HAMHUNG. A locomotive and twenty cars were sighted just as they were entering a tunnel west of CH'AHO. An attack on the train could not be made but the rails were cut. The morning jet strike bombed a target consisting of thirty-five buildings in a valley southwest of WONSAN. Ninety-five percent of the ordnance fell into the target area. The early combined prop strike hit an industrial site at HUNGNAM. Two factories were damaged and many fires were started in the area. A section of Corsairs scored a direct hit on a radar facility in CHONGJIN, causing heavy damage. A Skyraider flight damaged three barracks buildings near HAMHUNG. The jets, attacking personnel and supply shelters near P'YONGANG, reported five large fires left burning in the target area. Corsairs, flying close air support for the X Corps. were credited with destroying twentytwo shelters and causing two secondary explosions. A combined AD-F4U attack on five specific buildings in CHONGJIN resulted in the destruction of two and heavy damage to the remaining three. Although intense flak prevented accurate damage assessment, the afternoon jet strike on the shelters near P'YONGANG reported sixty percent of the ordnance in the target area. Minety-one tons of bombs were dropped during the day's one hundred seven sorties.

16 April - The Corsairs and Skyraiders combined to strike a truck parking area in HUNGNAM. Three buildings were destroyed and thirteen damaged. A division of AD's attacked an explosive storage area near SANSO-RI, destroying four storage buildings and inflicting heavy damage





on four others. Intense flak and dense smoke prevented accurate assessment as the jets attacked personnel and supply shelters northeast of P'YONGANG three times during the day. Props, attacking artillery positions near the bomb line, destroyed three bunkers, one hundred yards of trenches and sealed three caves. Corsairs, flying close air support for the IX Corps, were credited with the destruction of ten bunkers. One hundred nine sorties were flown and eighty-five tons of bombs were dropped.

17 April - CVG-12 pilots continued their attacks on the enemy's personnel and supply shelters and artillery positions along the bomb line. One hundred eleven sorties were flown and ninety-one tons of bombs were dropped. The early morning hecklers, working the coastal recco routes north from HUNGNAM, damaged a locomotive and three boxcars near CHONG-Three boxcars were destroyed and two rail cuts were made. Eight buildings were destroyed and two were left burning in an attack south of HAMHUNG. In addition, the hecklers destroyed three trucks and damaged eight between HUNGNAM and CHONGJIN. A division of AD's, flying close air support for the X Corps, destroyed two mortars, three bunkers, one hundred yards of trenches and sixteen personnel shelters. early prop strike on artillery positions near the bomb line placed seventy percent of their bombs in the assigned area. The first of three jet strikes scheduled for shelter targets near P'YONGANG reported all ordnance in the target area, but damage assessment was hampered by a heavy pall of black smoke. The Panther jets attacked another section of the same target later in the morning. They reported many fires as seventy percent of their ordnance was dropped into the designated section. Effective artillery flak suppression was provided by the IX Corps as the Skyraiders and Corsairs bombed enemy artillery tunnels. Several bombs fell very close to these difficult targets and it is estimated that two of the tunnels suffered probable damage. One hundred yards of trenches were damaged. A division of Fhu's destroyed four mortar positions as they flew close air support for the X Corps. The F9F's attacked their weather alternate, a group of forty-four storage buildings south of YONGHUNG. An estimated twenty buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged.

18 April - No flight operations - replemishment.

19 April - Strikes were conducted against a critical personnel and supply build-up area near the center of the bomb line. The jets were first to attack the target, reporting four fires left burning in the area. The Corsairs and Skyraiders combined in the largest strike of the day on this important target. Although one hundred percent of the ordnance fell in the assigned area, the damage could not be assessed because of the smoke and dust over the target area. The props credited the jets with excellent flak supression. The early afternoon jet recco







flight damaged five oxcarts west of HAMHUNG, bombed supply shelters near YONGHUNG and strafed reported troop concentrations north of WONSAN. Results on the latter two targets were unobserved. The late jet reconnaissance flight bombed large metal warehouses near HAMHUNG. Two were destroyed, one damaged and a large secondary explosion was observed. The second jet strike near the bomb line reported ninety percent of their ordnance in the assigned area. Many fires were observed throughout the build-up site. The late jet strike, diverted by the controller because of weather, bombed a storage area near SINP'UNG. Six buildings were damaged. The F4U's, on close air support, were credited by the controller with destroying ten shelters out of the ten assigned. They also damaged two caves and destroyed two hundred yards of trenches. Two divisions of AD's attacked separate coastal gun positions. Long delay fuzed bombs were dropped on the installations near KOJO. One gun and a gun control position were destroyed at SONGHUNG-NI. A bomb burst touched off many land mines guarding beach approaches to the gun positions. The hecklers, searching the coastal recco routes north of HUNGNAM, heavily damaged a locomotive and destroyed a boxcar north of PUNGO-RI. The rails were cut in three places ahead of the train and in two spots behind it. Two trucks were destroyed and one damaged near HACH ON-DONG. Two direct hits were scored near the center of a highway bridge north of SONGJIN. Ninety-six tons of bombs were dropped during the day's one hundred nine sorties.

20 April - The day's first Panther jet reconnaissance flight damaged four trucks and eight boxcars west of WONSAN. The Corsairs bombed underground storage facilities north of SONGJIN. Two buildings were destroyed and one was damaged. They also attacked a billeting area near UNHUNG-NI, destroying five buildings. The Skyraiders attacked a large group of storage buildings near SANSO-RI. Large fires, visible twenty-five miles, were started as an estimated sixty buildings were destroyed. They also damaged a tunnel entrance and scored three rail cuts near TONG-NI. An F9F strike set a billeting area ablaze near HUNGNAM. The afternoon jet recco mission, in the vicinity of HUNGNAM, restricted by low overcast, accounted for one building and two boxcars destroyed, five buildings damaged and two rail cuts. Corsairs and Skyraiders bombed a factory site north of HUNGNAM. All ordnance went into the target area. Two large buildings were destroyed, two were damaged and two large fires were left burning in the area. A division of AD's reported damage to a coastal defense gun position on the northern tip of KAIMA-PANDO. Eighty-one tons of bombs were dropped by ninety-nine sorties.

The day's remaining events were diverted to search for a downed pilot. ENS Randolph SCOGGAN, 551739, USNR, VF-121, radioed that he intended to bail out of his flak-damaged F9F. He is thought to have done so approximately ten miles east of HODO-PANDO Peninsula. His




ENCLOSURE (1)



parachute was not observed nor was he seen in the water. A thorough day and night surface and air search was conducted with negative results. ENS SCOGGAN is listed as missing in action.

21 April - Today was "Boy-san Day", a day when the pilots selected their own targets. Seventy-one tons of bombs were dropped during the day's one hundred nine sorties. The first jet strike attacked billeting and supply buildings. Post strike photo coverage confirmed twentyone buildings destroyed and six damaged. The second Panther jet effort against a storage area northwest of PUKCH ONG resulted in the destruction of two warehouses and two others being damaged. The Corsairs, attacking coastal defense gun positions on KALMA PANDO, started seven intense fires in the area. Supply facilities for the gun crews were destroyed. The Skyraiders destroyed six warehouses and damaged six others in an attack on storage facilities in the HUNGNAM area. The afternoon F9F strike attacked a troop billeting area near IWON and bombed the vital HAMHUNG highway bridge. Fourteen billeting buildings were destroyed and eleven damaged. Four F9F-5's with two 1000 pound bombs each dropped with fine precision upon the bridge and scored six bomb hits out of a possible eight. Three complete cuts were made with the center span completely demolished, as was another span near the southern terminus. A third span close to the northern approach was heavily damaged. The AD's again bombed storage buildings in the vicinity of HUNGNAM. This strike accounted for seven buildings destroyed and six damaged. A Panther jet strike, with aid from flame spreading winds, destroyed or damaged an estimated fifty percent of a gamouflaged truck parking area, consisting of 177 buildings.

22 April - No flight operations - replenishment. End of the reporting period.





### PART III

#### AVIATION ORDNANCE

l. There was one accidental firing of a 20M gun during this period. While clearing the guns of an F9F-5 aircraft, an empty cartridge case was found wedged between the breechblock and chamber, making a visual inspection of the chamber impossible. All attempts to recharge the gun and to remove the empty case, which held the breechblock 3/4 out of battery, failed. During removal of the gun from the plane, the case dislodged, allowing the breechblock to go home, firing an HEI that had been concealed in the chamber. The gun stoppage was caused by an extractor failure. The reason for the charger failure is unknown.

### TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE:


TYPE ORDNANCE	VF-121 (F9F-5)	VF-122 (F9F-5)	VF-124 (F4U-4)	VA-125 (AD-3,4)	vc-3 (F4u-5N)	VC-35 (AD-4N)	TOTALS
2000# GP 1000# GP 1000# SAP	2	8	<b>7</b> 6	72 295 23	<b>,</b>	1	72 382 28
500# GP 260# FRAG	142 43	714 94	37 48	32 46	17 42	17	309 323
250# GP <b>1</b> 00# GP	711 16	616 1 <b>6</b>	270	292	52	102	2043 <b>3</b> 2
350# ADB 5" ATAR	8			8		8	16 8
5° HVAR 3.5 A.R.	16			30	!		16 30
MK5 Mod 9 NAPALM			14		42	73	115 4
20mm 50 cal	23660	36495	54700	174580	11450	7200	93085 54700

### HUNG ORDNANCE:

TYPE ORDNANCE	AERO 14A	MK9 LAUNCHER	TOTALS
500# GP 250# GP	1 2		1 2
5" ATAR 5" HVAR 3.5 A.R.	1	5	i 5

All hung ordnance remained on the racks.






PART IV

DAMAGE

### DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY:

TARGE	T		DE	STROYED		DAMAGED	
Barracks Factory E Storage a Unidentif Bunkers Highway E Railroad Highway C Rail Cuts Oxen Cart Gun Empla	buildings and Wareho ied Build bridges Cars buts cements tallation es Shelters (Yards) Tunnels tions Cen lters epair Sho	ouse Buildi lings s s ters	ngs	47 8 247 28 6 7 2 7 2 43 400 14 15		1 29 19 49 36 4 23 13 56 1 11 6 100 27 2 41 9 2	
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO		CAUSE		CODE
4/20/53	VF-121	F9F-5	125461	Enemy	Anti-Aircr	aft Fire	L
DAMAGE IN	FLICTED B	Y ENEMY TO	OWN A/G	;			
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO		CAUSE		CODE
4/13/53	VF-124	F4U-4	81913	Small	Arms Fire		D-3
4/15/53	VC-3	F4U-5N	123167	Small	Arms Fire		D-3
4/17/53	VF-124	FLU-L	97387	Small	Arms Fire		D-3
4/17/53	VF-124	FLU-L	81964	Small	Arms Fire		D-3
					ļ		4- 1

DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
4/17/53	VA-125	AD-3	122837	<b>Gmall</b> Arms Fire	D-3
4/19/53	VF-124	F4U-4	97387	Automatic Weapons Fire	D-3
4/21/53	VA-125	AD-3	122835	Small Arms Fire	D-3
4/21/53	VF-124	F4U-4	96796	Small Arms Fire	D-3
4/21/53	VF-124	FLU-L	81913	Small Arms Fire	D-3
OPERATION	AL LOSS O	F AIRCRAFT			
DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BUNO	CAUSE	CODE
4/13/53	VF-122	F9F-5	125963	Flameout. ditched	L



PART V


### PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

### PERFORMANCE:

1. Performance of Air Group personnel during this period was excellent. Morale remained at a very high level, due in part to less severe weather conditions encountered during this period and the knowledge that this was the last period on the line prior to departure for CONUS.

### CASUALTIES:

- 1. While returning from a Photo Escort mission over North Korea on 13 April 1953, an F9F-5, BuNo 125963, piloted by LTJG Roy (n) TAYLOR, 401295/1325, USNR, VF-122, was observed to crash into the sea. A search by helicopter and destroyer failed to find any indication that the pilot survived. LTJG TAYLOR is listed as killed in action.
- 2. An F9F-5, BuNo 125461, piloted by ENS Randolph T. SCOGGAN, 551739/1325, USNR, VF-121, on 20 April 1953, started an uncontrolled climb after apparently being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire over North Korea. ENS SCOGGAN radioed his section leader that he would parachute from the aircraft at 25,000 feet, if unable to regain control. The aircraft was observed to spin and crash into the sea, however no parachute was sighted and an intensive search by air and surface units failed to locate the pilot. ENS SCOGGAN is listed as missing in action.







#### PART VI

#### **OPERATIONS**

l. During this fifth and last period with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, Carrier Air Group TWELVE completed a total of 926 flights and flew 1,903 hours during nine scheduled operational days. Only a portion of one day's operations was cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 103 flights per operating day, completing 99 percent of its scheduled commitments. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 6.9 and for the jet pilots was 9.3. The average total flight time per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 18.6 hours and for the jet pilots was 11.3 hours.

### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS:

MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE:				•	j				
Strike Recco Flak Suppressi	120 12 ion 8	107 16 11	92	114	<i>!</i>				433 28 19
NGF ECM Photo		<b></b>	5	٠	5	i	2	39	10
Photo Escort CAS TAR CAP	17 16	15 4	24 6	5/1					2 39 32 48 26 27 664
Hockler TOTAL OFFENSIVE	<u> 173</u>	153	127	138	$\sqrt{\frac{13}{18}}$	-	16	39	<u>27</u> 664
<u>DEFENSIVE</u> :									
CAP ASP	69	<b>7</b> 5		7.0	•	29	•		58 1717
ASP Escort TOTAL DEFENSIVE	E 69	75		17		32	9	diredje opiniga	29 29 202
MISCELIANEOUS:									
Survivor Searce Slow time or to Ferry TOTAL MISC.		1	14 3 13 20	2 5 7	6	*******	<u> 14</u>	doși de la	149 149



MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 ЛD-ЦW	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
ABORTS:		2	anton:	. 3	4		1	1	11
TOTAL FLIGHTS	243	231	147	165	<b>2</b> 8	32	40	40	926
Average Flight Per Pilot		9•3	6.1	7•9	5.6	6.4	8.0	8.0	8.0
Average Flight hours per pile	ot 14.8	14.2	16.8	22.2	13.h	16. և	الـ 19	12-1	16.5







### PART VII

#### MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

- 1. Eleven cases of auto-acceleration were experienced. All cases were similar to those previously encountered and reported. Pilots continue to switch to emergency for the completion of assigned missions.
- a. Since the deletion of the alcohol additive, no malfunctionings of fuel system components of the F9F-5 due to corrosion were experienced.
- b. One F9F-5 aircraft was used for tests in the interest of preventing or correcting conditions of auto-acceleration. This was done by the application of heat to the fuel control. Auto-acceleration was not encountered; however, due to the limited time of experimentation, this cannot be considered as conclusive evidence towards a permanent fix.
- 2. One deck flame-out was experienced during this period. Letter report in accordance with COMAIRPAC Ju8 Engine Technical Bulletin No. 10 is pending.
- 3. One flame-out during a descent occurred at approximately 11,000 feet altitude. The pilot and plane were not recovered after ditching. Upon interview by the Fratt and Whitney Aircraft Representative, the pilots who were in company with the subject aircraft when the incident took place, offered the following information:
- a. The last fuel state reported a few minutes before the flameout occurred was 2200 lbs.
- b. The pilot was observed working in the cockpit, apparently attempting a re-light.
- c. At no time during the apparent re-light period was smoke or vapor observed from the tail pipe.
- d. Pilots observing previous cases of air flame-outs and re-lights commented on the appearance of vapor resembling white smoke emitted from the tail pipes during the air starts.
- e. In view of the foregoing, it is believed possible that complete interruption of the fuel flow to the engine caused the flame-out and subsequent failure to air-start.
- 4. An alarming rate of defective R37S-1 owerhauled spark plugs, Stock No. R-86-CK-R-37-S-1, was encountered during this period. Subject spark plugs were tested before installation, and again after malfunctioning in the engine. On one occasion ninety-six R37S-1 overhauled spark






plugs were tested in order to select thirty-six satisfactory plugs for installation. The thirty-six installed plugs malfunctioned after three hours of operation, and were subsequently removed for testing. Testing revealed intermittent and sporadic firing. The foregoing was reported by USS ORISKANY dispatch 1604312 of April, in accordance with General Engine Bulletin No. 136, Revision -A, dated 17 October 1952. In addition, twenty of the subject spark plugs were air shipped to COMAIRPAC and COMFAIRJAP for further tests. Superior service was previously experienced with RB-19 spark plugs. This service continues with RB-19 spark plugs presently installed in a relatively small percentage of aircraft.

- 5. There were four cases of ACOG as follows:
  - a. AD-4W Wingfold Crank Assembly, 526295-6, two days.
- b. F4U-4 Port Stabilizer Assembly, VS 40103, fifteen days. This prolonged delay, however, is attributable to the ship's itinerary to Hong Kong. The stabilizer was received on the first replenishment day following the ship's return to the area of operations.
- c. Two cases of F9F-5 high pressure regulator, P/N 311781, two days during the period of this report and still continuing.

AVERAGE ATROPATT

### Aircraft Availability:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	ON BOARD EX- CLUSIVE OF "DUD" A/C	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE	PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE
VF-121	F9F-5	14.9	14.6	98%
VF-122	F9F <b>-</b> 5	12.1	11.1	92%
VF-124	FLU-L	11.0	10.0	91%
VA-125	AD-3,4	15.0	14.1	95%
VC-3	F4U-5N	4.0	3.2	80%
VC-11	AD-LW	3.0	2.7	90%
VC-35	AD-4N	3•2	3.1	97%
VC-61	F2H-2P	L-I	4.0	97%
		Marine and Augustus	<b></b>	•
AIR GRO	<b>JUP</b>	67.1	62.8	93%



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE (CVG-12)

CVG-12/REW:rr A16-13 Ser: 08 23 Apr 1953



From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWELVE

To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Summary Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480-4

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), this report is forwarded as enclosure (3) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) for the period 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953.

Plo hase



SUMMARY OF ACTION REPORT OF

CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE
FOR THE PERIOD
28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953

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### PART I

### ORDMANCE SUPPLARY

1. During the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953, The Air Group dropped 26,380 bombs totalling 4,604 tons. The jets expended 10,358 bombs (1,311 tons) while the propeller aircraft dropped 16,022 bombs (3,293 tons). The Air Group expended an average of 362 bombs (63.2 tons) per whole operating day. A total of 1,147,326 rounds of ammunition was expended.

### 2. Guns:


- a. The performance of both the 20MM and .50 Calibre guns was considered excellent. The F4U-4's expended 462,320 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition with an average of 6,600 rounds fired per stoppage. The remainder of the Air Group expended 685,006 rounds of 20MM ammunition with an average of 1,100 rounds fired per stoppage. Disconnecting the gun and feed mechanism heaters produced no adverse effects. The majority of stoppages were attributed to link jams, broken belts, feed mechanism jams, and a loss of tension on the drive spring. A very small minority were due to gun part malfunctions or breakages. Guns were pulled and cleaned after every 1000 rounds, whether the guns had developed trouble or not. Daily maintenance consisted of swabbing out chambers and oil spraying guns, using E51 gun oil exclusively. Tompions were used on every flight.
- b. A second safety wire was installed on the sear return nut of the 201M cun in order to prevent the firing solenoid from becoming loose. It was found that one wire was insufficient and was continually breaking. Since these wires were subjected to much vibration, care was taken in their installation in order to prevent them from being overstressed.



e C




- c. After two accidental firings of 20MM guns during the first combat period, a breech blocking tool, invented by G. R. ADDY, AOUI, of VA-125, was employed with much success. This tool fits over the gas cylinder sleeve and barrel behind the yoke and in front of the push rods. The breech block is unable to go home and fire because it is held back by the push rods which are engaged by the tool. Since adopting this tool, only one accidental firing has occurred. This firing happened during the last operating period, while removing a jammed 20MM gun from an F9F-5 aircraft. The gun stoppage was caused by an empty cartridge case that had become wedged between the breech block and chamber due to an extractor failure. Repeated efforts failed to dislodge the empty case which blocked a visual inspection of the chamber. Due to the position of the breech block, the breech blocking tool could not be inserted. While removing the gun from the plane, the case became dislodged, allowing the gun to fire.
- d. Due to the limited space and the work load imposed upon an Air Group while operating off a carrier, it is extremely difficult to accomplish bore sighting properly. It is recommended that deploying Air Groups make every effort to complete bore sighting before embarking. Replacement planes should be bore sighted by the supplying activity before delivery. Bore sighting patterns should be standardized as advised by the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit.
- 2. Bomb Racks and Rocket Launchers: Bomb racks and rocket launchers employed by this Air Group were the Mk 55 Mod I, Douglas Bomb Ejector, Mk 51, Mk 9 rocket launchers, and the Aero 14A combination bomb rack and rocket launcher. Satisfactory results were obtained from all racks, with the exception of the Aero 14A. Of the 122 hung bombs that occurred, 88 were on this rack. In most cases, investigation of these racks uncovered no apparent malfunctions or discrepancies other than the need for a stronger release solenoid and an access port to facilitate maintenance checks and inspections. Although the maintenance manual for this rack states that no lubrication is required, this Air Group has found it necessary to keep sway brace worm gears and arming solenoid plungers well lubricated in order to prevent them from sticking due to corrosion. No adverse effects due to cold weather operations resulted. ComFairJapan was advised and recommends the afore mentioned procedures.
- 3. Bomb Handling Equipment: Bomb handling equipment is still a problem. The Mk I Bomb Skid now being used has proven to be inadequate for flight deck operations. Much time, effort, and energy is wasted in trying to push or pull these skids over arresting cables and barriers without upsetting the skids and bombs, bending the tail fins, or causing personnel injury. This is particularly apparent when the skids are loaded with 260 pound fragmentation bombs or smaller. The main body structure of this skid appears to be quite satisfactory, however, it is believed that the efficiency of this skid would be greatly improved if modified with larger wheels equipped with soft rubber treaded tires.







### 4. Re-arming:

- a. It was found highly impractical to load AD's with the wings folded. After each recovery, the wings were left spread, allowing the wing stations to be loaded before folding the wings and tightening up the spot. This method proved most successful and greatly decreased the loading time for the AD's.
- b. The F4U's and the F9F's were loaded with the wings folded, except when 500 pound and 1000 pound bombs were loaded on the F9F-5's.
- c. Maintaining a bomb stockpile throughout the day forward of the island was mandatory to permit meeting all ordnance commitments.
- 5. The Mk 2 Mod 0 station selector switch used in the F9F-5 aircraft restricts the pilot as to the type of selective bombing that he may do. A seventh station for salvo was installed on this switch in one aircraft, using a modification conceived by F. A. ALBERSON, AOAN, of VF-122. Number six station selector was modified to energize only the two inboard racks, which prior to this, could be released first on salvo only. Plans for the modification of the selector switch and junction box are being forwarded by letter through the proper channels.
- 6. Aero 2C Controllers: The polarized relays contained in the Aero 2C and 2B controllers are unsatisfactory for prolonged usage. The majority of these relays have repeatedly failed to test properly.
- 7. Bomb Rack Testing: In order to facilitate bench checking the Mk 55 bomb rack, Mk 9 rocket launchers, and the Aero lhA combination bomb rack and rocket launchers before installing them on aircraft, R. A. LITTLE, AEAN, of VA-125, designed and built a rack testing set that would check both the mechanical and electrical operation of these racks. This device contributed directly to the saving of many man hours and much material while making the task of repairing these racks more simple. The plans and details describing this testing apparatus are being forwarded through proper channels.
- 8. Personal Equipment: From experience, the following items have been found to be essential to every ordnanceman:
  - a. Red filtered head lamp.
- b. Proper foul weather clothing, including leather fingered gloves with suitable inner liners.





- c. Tool belt kit equipped with electricians' pliers (8-10 inches) for fuzing instead of diagonals, a 5/8 inch socket wrench with 3/8 inch drive for winding in 20MM feed mechanisms, screw driver, rack cocking tools.
- 9. Ordnance Personnel: All ordnance loading commitments were met in time for every launch, except on four occasions. This achievement was accomplished despite fatigue and thoroughly unpleasant weather and because the ordnancemen exhibited the most industrious, driving will to meet a real challenge. These men were well trained and with experience, soon became proficient in their respective duties and in working as a team wherever and whenever the need arose, regardless of squadron affiliations. However, the complement of one ordnanceman per plane was barely adequate to perform all the ordnance work required and allowed no margin for sickness, accident, or emergency.






### TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES (28 OCTOBER 1952 - 22 APRIL 1953)


TYPE ORDINANCE	VF-121 (F9F-5)	VF=1.22 (F9F=5)	VF-124 (F4U-4)	VA-125 (AD-3,4)	VC-3 (F4U-5N)	VC-35 (AD-4N)	TOTALS
2000∯ GP				268			268
1000# GP	2	8	243	1701	6	2	1962
100# SAP			5	49		2	56
500# GP	351	350	823	1155	154	97	2930
50x 34P			15				15
250# ∃RAG	1618	1555	374	961	765	143	5416
250# GP	2531	2659	3148	4084	104	372	12898
100% GB	733	551	148	856	62	346	2696
<b>3</b> 50€ 700B			1	49	l	88	139
5" ATAR	485	557	427	215			1684
5" HVAR	16						16
3.5 AR			10	300		28	338
	EN CLUS			24			24
NAPALM			17	20			37
MK5 MOD 9	FLARES				323	<b>7</b> 69	1092
20MM	232193	5590111		87974	70100	65695	685006
•50 CAL			462320				462320

### TOTAL HUNG ORDNANCE

TYPE ORDNANCE	AERO 114A	MK 55 MOD 1	MK 51	MK 9 LAUNCHER	DOUGLAS BOMB EJECTOR	TOTALS
100# GP 500# GP 250# GP 260# FRAG 100# GP 5" ATAR 5" HVAR 3.5 AR	14 42 12 20 98 1 3	12 8 4	2	15 4	1	1 21 54 20 26 113 1









### DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE

TYPE ORDNANCE	RELEASED BY MANEUVERING	REMAINING ON RACK	DROP OFFS	TOTALS
1000# GP 500# GP 250# GP 260# FRLG 100# GP 5" ATAR 5" HVAR 3.5 AR	9 7 5	1 12 15 11 26 102 1	2 1 11 2	1 21 54 20 26 113 1

ACCIDENTAL FIRINGS: 20 MM - 3 LAUNCH DROP OFFS: 250% GP - 1 (AERO 1LA)





### PART II

### DAMAGE SUMARY

### DAMANGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY 28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953:

TARGET	DESTRUYED	D.M.GED
Ammo Stockpiles	1	3
Bridges, Highway	1 1 2 7	28
Bridges, Railroad	2	. 8
Boats	7	83
Buildin's, Barracks	105	106
Buildings, Factory	30	49
Buildings, Storage or Warehouse	307	127
Buildings, Unidentified	480	855
Bunkers	49	88
Bypasses, Railroad	ì	1
Carts, Ox	57	68
Cars, Railroad	79	204
Cars, Vehicle	6	
Caves		<b>3</b> 6
Communications Conter	1	
Cuts, Highway		25
Cuts, Railroad		166
Docks		
Fuel Facilities	5	2
Gun Emplacements	48	<b>3</b> 9
Installations, Radar	5 48 <b>2</b>	1 2 3 5 1 18 13 3 1
Installations, Radio		í
Installations, Power	2	18
Locomotives	2 6	13
Marshalling Yards		3
MIG-15 Aircraft	2	ĺ
Penstocks		4
Roundhouses	1	•
Shelters, Personnel	85	47
Shelters, Supply	1 85 64 45	47
Shelters, Vehicle	45	41
Shops, Vehicle Repair		9
Snow Shed	1	
Supply stockpiles	27	43
Tanks	i	ĺ
Trenches (In yards) Controllers! est.	1130	475
Troops Controllers est.	224 KI.	130 WIA
Trucks	299	589
Tunnels, Highway		í
Tunnels, Railroad		10
Water Tower		ĩ

II-l

ANCLOSURE (3)



### DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRIFT 28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953:

<u>CAUSES</u>	F9F-5	<u> </u>	<u>.D-3,4</u>	<u> F4U-5N</u>	<u>.D-LV</u>	<u>.D-4N</u>	F2H-2P	TOTL
Lost, enemy action	3	2	6	0	0	0	0	11
Lost, operational	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	5
Lost, other	1	0	0	0	0	0	. 0	1
Damaged, enemy action	28	29	5	1	0	3	0	66
Damaged, operational	18	7	ı	4	2	2	3	37
Damaged, other	52	20	21	4	4	· 11	2	11/1







#### PERT III

#### PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES SUMMARY

#### PERFORMINGE:

1. The performance of Air Group personnel is considered excellent. Morale remained at a very high level throughout the entire deployment period, in spite of severe weather conditions and a heavy work load. It is believed that four week periods on the line during the winter months should be considered maximum because the fatigue resulting from long strenuous hours then becomes quite noticeable. Bingo games sponsored by the ship's Welfare and Recreation organization, movies, the ship's band, news broadcasts by the ship's AIO office, boxing smokers, happy hours, the hobby shop, library, and religious services all contributed their part in maintaining morale at a high level while at sea. Squadron and division parties were held during in-port periods and reservations at Rest and Recreation hotels, operated by Army Special Services in Japan, were obtained for all officers and men desiring them.

2. The personnel availability by squadrons and detachments was as follows:

		oard 1-52 Men		oard -53 Men	Aver Availa Off		fer	ns- red Men		ived Men
		11011			<u> </u>	11011		11011	<u> </u>	11011
CAG-12, Staff VF-121	12 27	18 119	11 26	17 118	12 26.5	17.5 118.5	3 *1	3 10	2	2
VF-122	26	119	24	117	25	118	#2	13	Õ	ıí
VF-124	26	122	26	115	26	118.5	26	12	26	5
VA-125	27	138	23	136	25	137	*44	10	0	8
VC-3 Dot "G"	5	34	5	30	5	32	O	7	0	3
VC-11 Dot "G"	7	28	7	26	7	22	0	2	0	0
VC-35 Det "G"	9	44	8	35	8.5	39•5	1	10	0	1
VC-61 Dot "G"	5	25	5	22	5	23.5	0	3	0	0
***VC-3 Dot "GD	fT .						3	23	3	23
***VC-35 Dot "W	t)						3	16	3	16


\* Killed or missing in action.

\*\* These detachments reported to CVG-12 prior to deployment to WESTPAC and were based ashore at NAS, Atsugi, Japan.

3. The following average number of personnel were assigned to ship's divisions from the Air Group:

Mess Cooks	25
Ship's Cooks	4
Stewards	13
Ship Servicemen	3







Corpsmen	4
MAA Force	4
Disbursing Clerks	2
Compartment Cleaners	13
Flight Surgeon	1
TOTAL	69

#### 4. Summary of Pilot Man Days Lost:

a.	(1)	Planes lost; enemy action; pilot killed, not recovered	3
	(2)	Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing, not recovered	2
	(3)	Planes lost, operational, pilot killed, not recovered	2
	(4)	Planes lost; enemy action; pilot recovered; minor injuries	3
	(5)	Planes lost; enemy action, pilot recovered, uninjured	3
	(6)	Planes lost; operational; pilot recovered; injured	2
	(7)	Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured	1
b.	(1)	Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons	50
- •	(2)	Pilots permanently grounded for medical evaluation	0.
	(3)	Average number days pilots grounded	7.9
	<u>(L)</u>		395

- c. The above statistical summary does not reflect the true state of health of the Air Group pilots, as several were grounded over protracted periods as a result of incapacitating ailments as follows:
- (1) EGAN, Henry William, LTJG, USN, 521417, VF-122, grounded from 2/2/53 until 2/14/53 when he was transferred to U.S.N.H. at Yokosuka, for FFT to U.S.A. because of fractured patella (12 days)
- (2) GUNDERSON, Allen Herbert, ICDR, USN, 130123, VA=125, grounded from 1/15/53 to 3/2/53 for a fractured right ankle (46 days)
- (3) KUMMER, Edwin Lawrence, LT, USNR, 403121, VF-124, grounded from 3/6/53 to 3/13/53 when he was transferred to U.S.N.H. Yokosuka for FFT to U.S.A. because of multiple injuries sustained during a bomb explosion aboard carrier (7 days)
- (4) MICHEEL, John Carl, CDR, USN, 85362, VA-125, grounded from 12/4/52 to 1/20/53 for palliative treatment and excision of inflammed hemorrhoids (47 days)
- (5) MOORE, William Vincent, LTJG, USN, 513169, VF-121, grounded from 2/14/53 to 4/18/53 for treatment and excision of inflammed hemor-rhoids (63 days)






- (6) TALBOTT, Rodger Albert, LT, USAR, 337765, VF-124, grounded from 2/19/53 to 3/17/53 for an elective circumcision complicated by an ethmoid sinusitis (26 days)
- (7) The six pilots listed, were responsible for a loss of 201 man days of flying, over half the days lost for the entire hir Group. From this, it is evident that the health of the remainder of the Air Group pilots was excellent during the period of this cruise, with the majority being grounded for minor upper respiratory infections.
- 5. Enlisted personnel allowances were adequate, however, the ordnance, plane captains and electronics technician rates assigned are considered the absolute minimum, with ne margin for sickness, accident, or emergence. A small increase in such rates, particularly ordnance men and plane captains, would result in apparent increased operating efficiency and safety.
- 6. Pilot allowances for the jet squadrons were adequate, however, several pilots in the propeller aircraft squadrons were required, on various occasions early in the period, to fly two missions in one day, which was considered excessive. Two missions per day in jet aircraft was not considered a hardship on the pilots and was rarely required. A pilot allowance for a jet squadron of a minimum of 1.25 and a maximum of 1.5 pilots per aircraft is considered adequate, whereas the propeller aircraft allowance should be 1.75 minimum and 2.0 maximum per plane. The pilot utilization will vary according to many factors, but the major factors are type operations, plane availability and length of combat tour.


#### CASUALTIES:

1. The following is a breakdown of the casualties sustained during the entire combat period:

#### a. VA-125 (923) (D-3/AD-4 Aircraft)

- 11-4-52: EMS. J. L. RIKER III, 558337, USNR Probably Enemy Action. Parachuted from aircraft. Missing in action.
- 11-15-52: LT G. A. GLUDETTE, Jr., 453144, USNR Probably Enemy Action. Killed in Action.
- 12-22-52: LTJG J. A. HUDSON, 532903, USN Probably Enemy Action.
  Killed in Action.





2-1-53: CDR J. C. MICHEEL, 85362, USN - Probably Enomy Action.
Killed in Action.

#### b. VF-122 (783) (F9F-5 /ircreft)

3-22-53: LTJG R. E. MEW, 394627, USNR - Operational. Crashed at sea. Killed in Action.

4-13-53: LTJG R. (n) TAYLOR, 401295, USNR - Operational. Crashed at sea. Killed in Action.

#### c. <u>VF-121 (781) (F9F-5 Aircraft)</u>

4-20-53: ENS R. T. SCOGGAN, 551739, USNR - Probably Enemy Action. Crashed at sec. Missing in Action.


d. The following Air Group casualties resulted when an F4U-4 landed aboard on 6 March with a hung bomb which exploded:

LT E. L. KUM ER, 403121, USER, of VF-124 - wounds in both legs, left arm and shoulder, and first and second degree burns of the face.


BRCCKMEYAR, R. C., AN, 318 84 87, USN, of VF-122 - left forearm lacerated by a missile.

RODGERS, L. A., AD1, 386 O4 17, USN, of VC-3 Det "G" - Chest penetrated by a missile.

DUNION, H. J., AN, 417 79 49, USN, of VC-3 Det "G" - suffered a blow on his chest.









#### PART IV

#### OPERATIONS SUMMARY

- 1. Resume: During the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953, Air Group TWELVE completed a total of 7,001 flights and flew 14,948 hours during seventy-three scheduled operational days. The ship was in the combat operating area one hundred eleven days. Approximately seventeen days! operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged ninety-six flights per whole operating day and completed ninety-seven percent of all its scheduled commitments. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was fifty-five and for the jet pilots was sixty-six. The average total flight time per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 152 hours and for the jet pilots was 104 hours.
- 2. Aerial Combat: On 18 November 1952, three VF-121 (781) F9F-5's were engaged by four MTG-15's. LT Royce WILLIAMS and LTJG John MMDDLETON were each credited with one MIG-15 kill and LTJG David ROWANDS with damaging one. Sound defensive tactics and an alert look-out doctrine were employed. In spite of the MIG-15's obvious performance advantages, aggressive pilots, fighting their aircraft to the maximum of their combat potential and taking full advantage of mistakes made by enemy pilots, demonstrated the superiority of the best fighting man when he is opposed by an inferior opponent with better equipment.
- 3. Flak-Suppression: Jet flak-suppression for propeller aircraft strikes against the most heavily flak protected enemy targets was tremendously effective. Well coordinated, aggressive flak-suppression flights that had been jointly briefed with the propeller aircraft pilots, particularly when pin-point photographic coverage of known enemy gun positions near the target was available, invariably succeeded in greatly reducing the enemy anti-aircraft firing and denied it any accuracy.
- 4. Night Strike: The use of the night fighters as pre-briefed strike aircraft against a vital and heavily defended target during favorable moonlight and weather conditions was most successful. Experience indicates the enemy's anti-aircraft fire control systems are rarely effective at night and it is believed that the use of night strike aircraft against vital, clearly-defined targets would gain much that might be very costly if accomplished by propeller aircraft in daylight.
- 5. Rescap: The rescue of a pilot shot down in enemy territory is largely dependent upon the alertness, aggressiveness, and the exercise of most skillful judgment and accepted doctrine by the members of his own flight. They must keep the distressed pilot in sight until he is able to conceal himself on the ground and that location noted for easy identification with reference to an outstanding topographical feature. The Task Force





Commander must be kept informed by the Rescap flight leader. Relief of the Rescap must be on station by either Navy or Air Force aircraft. Time is paramount and every possible effort should be made to effect the helicopter pick-up before dark, knowing that the chances for a rescue the following day are slim.

- 6. Jet Bombers: The F9F-5 type aircraft utilized as a bomber on many occasions proved to be a potent weapon. The bomb load carried was as much as 2500 pounds of bombs per airplane, using the Mk-8 catapult for launching. Four F9F-5 airplanes of VF-122, carrying two one thousand pound bombs, attacked the heavily defended HMHHUNG Bridge and scored six hits out of a total of eight bombs dropped, making three large, complete cuts in the bridge.
- 7. Landing Signal Officer: Early in the period, it was found that reliable and readily available voice radio communication on various frequencies between the L. S. O. and landing pilots was highly desirable. On an experimental basis, an AN/ARC-1 was installed in radio eight, with the control box and antenna located near the L.S.O. platform. The channels available in Primary Fly were duplicated. The L.S.O. wore a headset with attached lip microphone and had the transmitter key in the handle of one paddle. This arrangement was repeatedly demonstrated to be exceedingly desirable. The L.S.O. was continually aware of the status of all emergency landings in the fleet and he was able to give helpful, confidence inspiring instructions and assurance to the pilots. In addition, the L.S.O.'s verbal instructions to the pilots were most helpful during landings under the following, not infrequent, conditions:
  - a. Rough seas causing a badly pitching deck.
  - b. Aircraft landing with obscured wirdshields.
  - c. Night landings under extreme conditions of darkness, pitching deck or material failures
  - d. When the L.S.O. was between the sun and the landing aircraft.







#### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS

#### 28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953

MISSION	VF <b>-</b> 121 F9F <b>-</b> 5		VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 ID-3,4			VC <b>-</b> 35 <u>ЛD-Ц</u> N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE: Strike Recco Flak Suppression	479 307 on 152	463 314 157	829	846					2617 621 309
NGF ECM Photo Photo Escort	115	105	75 22	12 16	19 1		4 51	239	110 90 239 220
CAS TAR CAP Hockler	61	105 4 51	17 <del>9</del> 6	223	1)42		125		406 118 267
RES CAP SWEEP Strike Escort	8 4	7 <u>1</u> 4	11	6	1		2		20 15 8
TOTAL OFFENSIVE	1126	1105	1122	1103	163		182	239	5040
DEFENSIVE: CAP ASP ASP Escort AEW	509	524	4	1 103	6 6	186 10 3	5 72		1039 192 195 3
NEW Escort Mine Coverage TOTAL DEFENSIVE	509	524	<u>2</u>	2 106	<u> 1</u> / <sub>1</sub>	199	1 78		1436 1436
MISCELL MEOUS: Survivor Search Test Ferry Refresher	5 <u>41</u>	2 <u>36</u>	6 18 30 <u>14</u>	2 22 26 14	14 36 10	2 2 8	2 47 8	1 _9	10 46 149 200
TOTAL MISC. ABORTS:	46 21	38	98	94	50	12	57	10 6	405
TOTAL FLIGHTS	1702	<u>35</u> 1702	1235	<u>27</u> 1330	13 240	<u>5</u> 216	<u>4</u> 321	255	120. 7001
lvorage Flights Per Pilot	68	58	52.5	58	48	42	64	51	60.5
Average Flight hours per pilot	104	105	ווְע	162	<b>1</b> 55	117	177	80	129





#### PART V

#### AIR INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

- 1. When a well defended target was scheduled for two or more days consecutively, interpreted photographs of all known defending anti-aircraft gun positions were made available to the flak-suppression pilots. The flak suppressors were then able to locate and pin-point the guns with the result, reported by the propeller pilots, as highly effective flak suppression.
- 2. The Task Force depended a great deal upon its own intelligence sources and emphasized this fact to all concerned. Air Intelligence Officers and pilots were impressed with the necessity of supplying the Task Force Commander with accurate, immediate, evaluated reports. Repeated stress was placed on the importance of contact reports and immediate voice radio transmissions by pilots to the Task Force of all militarily significant sightings of enemy activities. The debriefing of returning pilots by the A.I.O.'s was devoted to extracting all the accurate, pertinent intelligence possible, with the object of obtaining sufficient intelligence to permit effective evaluation of the data.






PART VI

#### SURVIVAL SUMMARY

#### 1. MK-4 Anti-Exposure Suit:

- a. This Air Group has used the Mk-4 Anti-Exposure Suit since the last of October 1952. All pilots are convinced it is an excellent item of cold weather survival equipment. At present, all suits have had approximately 150 hours of wear and are in need of extensive renovation before being used again. There have been several suggestions for improving the suit as follows:
- (1) A better connection should be devised for making the "G" suit fitting watertight. The present method of connecting a rubber tube over the "G" suit hose and around the hole in the Mk-4 suit is awkward and hard on the fingers when installing it. Many pilots have stopped wearing "G" suits because of this. There have also been several incidents of the "G" suit hose, the hole in the innerliner, and the hole in the Mk-4 suit not liming up. The trouble seems to be that the hole in the innerliner is too far forward.
- (2) The pockets appear to be very weak and tear easily. It is suggested that a better material be used and the stitching around the pockets be doubled or strengthened. There have been several comments on the advisability of using zippers instead of the present snaps to secure the pocket flaps.
- (3) Provide larger ankle openings in the innerliner for pilots with a high instep.
- (4) Elastic, cloth cuffs used at the wrists and ankles are not well secured to the innerliner, tearing loose easily. It is recommended that they be reinforced.
- (5) The neck seals are stiff and have too steep a gradient. Mk-3 neck seals are preferred by the pilots. The Mk-4 seals chafe and irritate the neck and will not twist like the Mk-3 when the pilot turns his head from side to side. It is recommended that the neck seals be made longer and of softer rubber.
- (6) The wrist seals split along the fiber cords in the rubber and should be made of soft pliable rubber as indicated for the neck seals.
- (7) All fittings for Mk-4 suits should be conducted before leaving the U.S. and by experienced personnel. Over twenty neck scals had to be replaced due to improper cutting by inexperienced men.




74

- (8) The front of the netherline innerliner should be lowered about two inches. When a pilot sits down, the front of the innerliner moves up and causes the zipper to dig into his neck. The zipper should extend about three or four inches lower at the crotch of the innerliner.
- (9) Boot straps should be provided at the back of each boot to facilitate pulling them on. A smooth, slick innerlining around the ankle of the boots would make for greater ease in slipping them on and off.
- (10) The plastic strips on the chest roll would stay together longer if fused instead of glued.

#### 2. Parachute Harness:

- a. It is impossible to sit back in the parachute barness with a Mk-h inti-Emposure Suit on after a bailout. A pilot hanging in the harness cannot undo the leg straps until after hitting the ground or water. During this tour, some squadrons put cloth tabs approximately six inches long on each of the friction locks of the leg straps. These tabs are much easier to grasp and when pulled, release the locking action of the leg strap hardware. Because of the bulkiness of the winter flight clothing, if a form of quick release for the leg straps could be provided, it would be a great asset during cold weather operations.
- b. There were five successful ditchings in this Air Group, two F9F, two F4U, and one AD. All of these pilots evacuated the aircraft with their parachutes strapped on tightly and experienced no difficulty in getting out of the airplanes.
- 3. ADSK-1 Droppable Survival Bomb: A separate switch was installed in the AD aircraft of this Air Group to prevent inadvertent dropping of the "Survival Bomb". Prior to installation of this switch, three kits were inadvertantly dropped during bombing runs. The contents of the ADSK-1 were packed into a cloth bag with two shoulder straps for greater ease in carrying. The calorie content of the food provided (est. 3,000 calories) was deemed inadequate for winter survival and was increased by 12,000 calories by using twelve cans of beef, pork, etc. from C rations.
- 4. PSK-1 Survival Kit: All pilots liked the PSK-1, but very few carried the whole kit in its plastic container. The majority of the pilots salected a minimum of the items they desired and distributed them throughout the various pockets of their Mk-4 suits.
- 5. RC-17 and CRC-7 Portable Transceivers: In the five ditchings this Air Group experienced, only three radios were recovered; all were PRC-17's. Two of these contained sea water and were useless. The third had balloons





over both ends and was found to be dry and usable. Due to the constant disassembly of the radios to check the batteries, it is hard to keep them water-tight. It is recommended that all PRC-17 radios be sealed in a plastic bag or that the ends be covered by some form of easily detachable rubber balloons. A RUDM is in process.







#### P.RT VII

#### MAINTENLINCE AND MATERIAL SUMMARY

#### MAINTENANCE:


- 1. Aircraft moving and spotting requirements for maintenance:
- a. During flight operations in the early stages of deployment, adverse effects on aircraft availability were apparent because of the lack of a satisfactory integrated system of immediate aircraft status reporting to a central control point. Much time was lost in moving and spotting downed aircraft, particularly jets, for maintenance work and test turn-ups. Through experimentation a most effective system was devised and implemented and aircraft availability progressively improved. This system of constantly gathering, displaying, evaluating, and disseminating aircraft status information to responsible maintenance and handling personnel consisted of:
- (1) The installation of a 6! X 8! plexi-glass master aircraft status board in hangar bay two, manned by a talker on the 2JG circuit.
- (2) The installation of a 4' X 5' aircraft status board and 12" X 16" individual squadron aircraft movement boards in flight deck control, manned by a 2JG talker (CPO-ADC).
- (3) Only responsible, specifically designated squadron troubleshooters were authorized to transmit aircraft change of status information to the personnel tending the master aircraft status board in hangar bay two and the movement and up-down boards in flight deck control.
- (4) All aircraft discrepancies, movements from the flight deck to the hangar deck for maintenance work, etc. were entered in a permanent log by the master aircraft status board talker.
- b. During in-port periods, ship maintenance requirements such as elevator servicing, flight deck repairs, etc. inhibited the expeditious completion of aircraft maintenance work. A coordinated system of planning and scheduling in-port squadron maintenance greatly alleviated the foregoing problem. All in-port maintenance was carefully planned and schedules of proposed work were prepared every three days. The first squadron work schedules were submitted to the Air Group Maintenance Officer by 1600 on the day prior to entering port. Schedules showed the relative order in which various jobs were to be performed and noted requirements for the moving of aircraft by side numbers. Similar work lists were submitted prior to 1600 each third day, and all squadron work lists were compiled by the Air Group Maintenance Officer into one master work schedule and delivered every three days to the Air Officer, with copies to the aircraft



Handling Officer. On this work schedule basis, coordination through personal contact and liaison between the squadron maintenance officers and the ship's air department was carried out by the Air Group Haintenance Officer throughout the entire in-port period. The plexiglass master board in hangar bay two, and the individual squadron movement boards in flight deck control were adjusted to reflect aircraft status changes.

#### 2. Engine Changes:


•	1111	tine ousing es:			
	a.	J48-P-61.		NUMBER	AVERAGE TIME
		High time		3	300
		Cracks in combustion chamber supports	S	6	270
		Cracked and nicked cooling impeller 1	plades	2	234
		Sheared compressor stress bolt	OT AL	12	87
1	b.	J34-WE-34			
		Fire inside of engine on shut down du	ring flight	1	33
(	C#	R2800-18W			
		Stuck in blower		3	267
		Metal particles in strainer	OTL	1/4	415
(	d.	R3350-26W.			
		5 Cracked cylinders and poor engine of general	ondition	1	294
		Motal in oil strainers		7	213
		Damaged impoller		1	169
		Oil leak in impeller section		3	409
		Excessive oil consumption	OTAL .	1 13	648




- 3. Squadron work benches, tool kit stowages, and tool rooms: In order to facilitate aircraft maintenance work and eliminate hazards from tool kits and loose gear adrift, the following facilities, in the proximity of aircraft concerned, were erected and/or provided and utilized:
- a. A metal work bench with a vise was erected on the port side between frames 135-138 adjacent to number three elevator. This bench was used by all squadrons.
- b. A tool box rack was constructed on the port side between the stanchions of elevator three. This rack was used by propeller squadrons and detachments.
- c. The small cage located forward on the port side of hangar bay one, adjacent to number one elevator, was utilized as a jet squadron tool box stowage. The space afforded therein was not adequate, however.
- d. The large cage, B-0102-LE, divided into three sections, was utilized for tool box stowage, maintenance literature, and miscellaneous maintenance gear by three squadrons. The space thus afforded was also inadequate.

#### 4. Aviation Electronics:

- adequate for the type of operations experienced. Satisfactory mainstenance was achieved only through the excellent cooperation of the hir Group technicians working as a team instead of separate units. At the start of the cruise, a night and day maintenance crew was organized to maintain the common electronics equipments of the entire hir Group. The men thus assigned were the most experienced on the equipments involved. Spare equipments were borrowed from supply so that bench-tested replacement units were always immediately available. As a result, the only aircraft out of commission for radio discrepancies were down because of antenna, cable, and corrosion difficulties. The number of such downed aircraft did not exceed eight or ten for the period of this report. Planning should include two experienced technicians in each squadron for maintenance of APG-30. The personnel allowance for electricians was found to be adequate.
- b. Winterization of all aircraft was necessary during this period. However, no repeated discrepancies were noted with either electrical or electronic equipment due to cold weather operations.





#### APG-30:


c. The APG-30 required more maintenance hours than all other electronics equipments combined. The primary problem was the instability and drifting of calibration. In some cases a normal carrier landing would disrupt the calibration. Calibration would also vary greatly after the aircraft had been idle during in-port periods. It was further observed that the APG-30 was very sensitive to noise pulses, with the unit locking on the noise voltage rather than on the target. The new modifications recently published have not been incorporated yet due to the lack of available parts.

#### <u>APX-6:</u>

- d. APX-6 test equipment, UPM-8, became inoperative after the first three months' operations and after having been on requisition for four months, it is still unavailable. To check out APX-6 in the planes on the hangar deck, an antenna was hung just below the hangar overhead and connected by coax to an operating set in the ship. The APX-6 has given little trouble.
- e. During flight operations it was not unusual to find the APX-6 antenna filled with gasoline, water, and trash, causing corrosion. In a few cases acceptable antenna operation was regained by cleaning. It was further observed that the three ampere fuse for the APX-6 antenna, under operating conditions, was not adequate. The use of a five ampere fuse eliminated such failures.

#### ARC-1:

- f. Corroding and shorting of AN/ARC-1 cable plugs was experienced late in the cruise. The cause is believed to be due to salt water spray entering the forward wheel compartment and draining down the ARC-1 cables.
- g. In many cases the tail cap antenna shunting strap became partially insulated by corrosion. This condition was remedied by sanding and cleaning.
- h. Breakages of nine UG83-U's were experienced. Replacements are not handled through regular supply channels (no stock number assigned). It is suggested that hir Groups provision with spare adapters prior to deployment.



enclosure (3)



#### ARP-9:

i. When bench testing the ARR-9 with the PP-336 400-800 cycle switch in the 800 cycle position, the tuner unit selsyn burned out when the power was applied, if the ID-226 selsyn was burned out. The testing technique was corrected to provide for checking the ID-226 selsyn prior to trouble shooting.

#### ΛPS-31B:


- j. Some difficulty was experienced with the mixer-duplexer bushing which insulates the Klystron probe from the wave guide of the APS-31B. The bushing deteriorated and arcing resulted, which burned the 330 ohm resistor that supplies B plus voltage to the shell of the Klystron. Frequent checking of the bushing reduced such failures.
- k. Radomes for both APS-31 and APS-20 were not carried by supply nor were they available in WestPac. Considering the time necessary to obtain one from the U.S., consideration should be given to carrying one of each type on board deploying carriers.

#### TUBES:

l. New 6AK5 tubes were extremely defective. Approximately 50% of the tubes had hot shorts when received. Of the remainder, practically all shorted after the first carrier landing. However, the last order of tubes received was marked as being screened in 1952. These tubes have been exceptionally good with none showing hot shorts.

#### MATHRIAL:

- 5. The supply of aviation material has been satisfactory throughout the WestPac deployment period. Following is a summary of aviation electronics items in short supply and ACOG's:
- a. The availability of Section "R" allowance items such as fuses, small resistors and condensors, relays, switches and cannon plugs was inadequate. This was particularly true of items peculiar to individual equipments.
- b. Replacements for components of G-2 compasses, fluxgate compasses, and AD wing tank fuel gages were not readily available in supply channels.
- c. There was a shortage of Section "G" allowance items carried in supply as replacements for the Electronics "A" Kits. The "A" Kits were complete at the time of deployment to the forward area, but were depleted about twenty-five percent due to breakage and normal losses.



d. A0	DEOLASSIFIED			
TYPE A/C	PART DESCRIPTION	PART NO.	NO. Cases	NO.
F9F-5	Door Assembly	R82GR143220-2L	1	3
F9F <b>-</b> 5	Nose Section	132001	2	4
<b>F9</b> F-5	Hook, Tail	GR-140705-1	1	6
F9F <b>-</b> 5	Fuel Control	R85H0-A7008A	1	1
F9F-5	Emergency Air Bottle Elbow	R-45E266-60	2	4
F9F <b>-</b> 5	Valve	R83BTP-HLV4-01	ı	13
F9F <b>-</b> 5	High Pressure Regulator	PN/311781	2	4
F9F <b>-</b> 5	Seal	R82GR131958	1	13
F4U-4	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013-2	1	13
Fl <sub>1</sub> U-l <sub>1</sub>	Voltage Regulator	N.F-1204-3	1	2
FLU-L	Switch	R17-S-25109-166	1	6
F4-4	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013-2	1	11
Fl <sub>4</sub> U-l <sub>4</sub>	Panel Assembly	R82CVVS40624R	1	3
F4U-4	Panel Assembly	R82CVVSL0626R	ı	3
F4U-4	Key Assembly	R82CVV846208-R	1	3
Fl <sub>1</sub> U-l <sub>1</sub>	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013	1	6
F4U-4	Enclosure Assembly	R82CVVS40296	1	4
FLU-L	Control Assembly	R82CVVSL48660	1	7
F4U-4	Strut Assembly	R82CVVS13853	1	8
F4U-4	Control Box	R86EC1002-5A	1	8
FLU-L	Elevator	R82CVVS33109	1	4

Horn


F4U-4

1

2

R82CVVS12188

OBOURSE SERVE				
TYPE A/C	PART DESCRIPTION	PART NO	NO. CASES	NO. DAYS
F4u-4	Link	R82CVVS16848	1	2
F4U-4	Bolt	R82CVV318221-2	1	2
F4U-4	Stabilizer	R82CVVS40103	1	5
F4U-4	Elevator	R82CVV <b>S</b> 33109	1	12
AD-3	Control	R86STC100620	1	1
D <del>-</del> 3	Nose Assembly	R82-GR14200-1	1	21
AD-3	Section Assembly	R82-GSR403-4	2	21
AD-3	Propeller	R87HSP100005	1	2
AD-3	Cylinder	R85 <b>FW</b> 144319	1	2
AD-3	Cylinder	R83DG-5255155-10	1	8
.\D <b>-</b> L₁W	Wing Fold Crank Assembly	526279 <b>-</b> 6	1	2
AD-4W	Unit	R88U1058-25	1	2
$\Delta D - LW$	Fuel Quantity Gauge	R88-I-2003-25	1	1
F4u-5n	Valve	R83.1P13802	1	1/4
F4u-5N	Support	R82CVVS53682	1	7
F4U-5N	Manifold	R83CVVS11429OR	1	31
F2H-2P	Nose Landing Gear Emergency Extention Cylinder-End Assembly	15-45167	1/43	$\frac{12}{273}$





### 6. Statistics:

a.	Maint enance:	F9F-5	F2H-2 P	<u> F4U-4</u>	FLU-5N	<u> 10-3</u>	<u>.D-lı</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	AD-LW	TOTAL
	Aircraft repaire on board	d 112	4	40	7	ᅫ	22	15	7	221
	Aircraft not repairable on board	16	0	6	3	1	2	2	2	32
	Engines Changed	12	1	4	0	10	3	0	0	30

#### b. Average Availability:

UNIT TYPE A/C	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ONBOARD EXCLUSIVE OF "DUD" AIRCRAFT	AVERAGE AIR CRAFT AVAILABLE	PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE
VF-121 F9F-5	13.8	12.1	87%
VF-122 F9F-5	13.7	11.6	85%
VF-124 F4U-4	12.9	11.9	92%
VA-125 AD-3,4	14.7	13.0	88%
VC-3 F4U-5N	3.8	3.2	84%
VC-11 /D-4W	2•9	2.4	82%
VC-35 .\D-4N	3.8	3•3	87%
VC-61 F2H-2P	3.2	2.7	84%
AIR GROUP	68.8	60•2	86%