


UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP THREE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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29 July 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group THREE
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group THREE for period of
15 July 1953 to 27 July 1953
Ref: (a) OPNAV INST. 3580.4 of 1 July 1951
Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), subject action report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47).

T. D. Harris
T. D. HARRIS

COMMENTS ON ACTION REPORT

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COMPOSITION OF FORCES

15-27 JULY 1953

UNIT	OPERATIONAL A/C		PILOTS ABOARD	
	7-15	7-27	7-15	7-27
VF-91 F9F-2 LCDR A. JOHNSON, USN	13	10	19*	19*
VF-93 F9F-2 LCDR W.E. CARVER, USN	13	10	21	21
VF-94 F4U-4 CDR A. T. HOLDERMAN, USN	16	11	23**	20**
VA-95 AD-4/NA/L CDR S. B. BERREY, USN	16	15	23***	23***
VC-3 (MIKE) F4U-5N LT C. Z. STEVENS, USNR	4	4	4	4
VC-11 (MIKE) AD-4W LT M. E. WORMAN, USNR	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (MIKE) AD-4N LCDR F. E. WARD, USN	4	4	6	6
VC-61 (MIKE) F9F-5P LCDR S. N. MAY, USNR	3	3	5	5

- * Includes LCDR J. C. HAYNIE, Jr., USN, ComCVG-9 Staff Admin. Ass't.
- ** Includes LT G. L. GRAY, Jr., USN, and LT J. J. WRIGHT, USNR, ComCVG-9 Staff Operations Officer and ISO, respectively.
- *** Includes CDR T. D. HARRIS, USN, ComCVG-9

MISSION

The mission of Carrier Air Group NINE, as set forth in CTF 77 OP Order No. 2-52, is to perform close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment missions in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Nations Forces.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 15 July 1953 Departed Yokosuka for operating area. Refresher air operations were conducted, consisting of group exercises and BCI hops. LT E. K. GROSS, VA-95, was forced to land wheels-up at Tateyama Airfield, Japan, due to oil failure. The pilot was uninjured.
- 16 July 1953 No flight operations. Enroute to operating area.
- 17 July 1953 First day of combat operations for Air Group (MIA) this period. Operations consisted of strikes along the bomblines, BCI missions, and interdiction sorties along the main enemy supply routes south of Wonsan. LT W. C. FLEMING of VF-94 was forced to ditch his aircraft on take-off and was rescued by helicopter. The pilot received internal injuries.
- 18 July 1953 Combat operations were limited because of poor weather. Strikes were conducted against coastal defense gun positions, enemy supply routes, and power installations north of Hungnam.
- 19 July 1953 Air operations continued in support of front line troops with maximum effort on Cherokee and close air support strikes. Interdiction and BCI sorties were also flown with effect.
- 20 July 1953 Sorties were limited due to inclement weather conditions. Strikes consisted of interdiction, BCI, Cherokee, and CAS hops. ENS V. P. CHAMBERLAIN of VF-93 ditched his F9F aircraft on take-off. He was recovered uninjured by helicopter.
- 21 July 1953 No Air Operations. Inclement weather.
- 22 July 1953 Air operations were resumed over North Korea with maximum effort directed against the enemy rail and road networks. MPJ drops were made as the weather along the bomblines was non-operational for close air support missions.
- 23 July 1953 Air operations were intensified as weather conditions improved. Interdiction strikes from the bomblines north to Songjin accounted for the destruction of trucks, rail cars, and bridges. Tanks were attacked, coastal defense guns near Wonsan were hit, and Sondok Airfield was bombed with effect. Close air support sorties were limited by adverse weather conditions at the bomblines. LCDR HOLMES of VF-94 was rescued by helicopter after his aircraft went over the side during launching operations. The pilot was injured internally.

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CHRONOLOGY (CONT)

- 24 July 1953 Weather again diverted aircraft from Cherokee and close air support to HPO and Recco hops. Interdiction strikes were successful in damaging two locomotives west of Kowan and a troop billeting area near Kojo was bombed with effect. LTJG CROSS of VF-94 was forced to ditch his aircraft off Yodo Island. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjured.
- 25 July 1953 Combat operations were again conducted to the North because of inclement weather along the bombline. Interdiction strikes against the enemy supply routes were carried out successfully; highway bridges and vehicles were destroyed. The marshalling yards at Hungnam were also attacked.
- 26 July 1953 Full scale air operations over all North Korea were resumed as the weather over the bombline became operational. Interdiction strikes accounted for the majority of damage to the enemy as box-cars were destroyed and supply buildings were bombed, causing violent secondary explosions. LTJG WAKELAND of VF-91 was forced to bail out when his aircraft caught fire over Korea. He was picked up by friendly forces uninjured.
- 27 July 1953 Today brought to an end the hostilities between the United Nations forces and the Communist forces. A cease fire was signed at 1000, effective at 2200. Air operations were limited to morning events. Commander Seventh Fleet presented awards to the ship and Air Group NINE personnel in the afternoon.
- 28 July 1953 Today marked the last day of air operations for Air Group NINE in WestPac. Aircraft were transferred to the USS BOXER and USS PRINCETON. Departed Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan, and COMUS.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II OPERATIONS

a. Statistics

15-27 JULY 1953

DAY SORTIES	VF-91 F9F-2	VF-93 F9F-2	VF-94 F4U-4	VA-95 AD-4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F9F-5P	TO- TALS
PHOTO (1V1)								20	20
PHOTO ESC (1V9)	5	9						1	15
CAP (1V2)	41	36			4				81
RADAR BOIB. (1S2)			23	29					52
RECCO (1T2)	124	144	57	55					380
CHEROKEE (1S1)	83	74							157
STRIKE (1T1)			1		9		9		19
CAS (1S2)			93	95					188
NGF (1V3)					2				2
ASP (1Z1)						18			18
GATOR (1Z1)			4	4	4		6		18
ECM & ESC (1V2)					10		18		28
TOTALS	253	263	178	183	29	18	33	21	978
NIGHT SORTIES	F9F-2	F9F-2	F4U-4	AD-4	F4U-5N	AD-4W	AD-4N	F9F-5P	TOTALS
NCAP (3V2)					3		1		4
TOTAL NIGHT					3		1		4
MISC. FLIGHTS	F9F-2	F9F-2	F4U-4	AD-4	F4U-5N	AD-4W	AD-4N	F9F-5P	TOTALS
FERRY (1J)	15	8	1	1			10		35
TEST & SLO TIE (1L)			1	3	5				9
FAN (1A)	10	10	11	14	2	3		2	52
ECM (1A)							4		4
ABORTS	5	2	5	2	1			1	16
TOTAL MISC.	30	20	18	20	8	3	14	3	116
15-27 JULY									
TOTALS	283	283	196	203	40	21	48	24	1098

SECURITY INFORMATION

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30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

COMBAT SORTIES	VF-91 F9F-2	VF-93 F9F-2	VF-94 F4U-4	VA-95 AD-4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F9F-5P	TO- TALS
PHOTO (1V1)								224	224
PHOTO ESC (1V9)	88	87						1	176
CAP (1W2)	554	550	4		6				1114
TARCAP (1U2)	27	31	8						66
RECCO (1T2)	404	404	73	62					943
FLAK SUP (1T1)	67	82							149
CHEROKEE (1S1)	418	407	153	161					1139
STRIKE (1T1)	266	262	468	390	9		9		1404
CAS (1S2)	15	16	435	520	8		11		1005
NGF (1V3)			55	1	12		2		70
ASP (1Z1)							144		144
GATOR (1Z1)			39	42	11		52		144
ECM & ESC (1V2)				4	14	2	62		82
RADAR BOMB (1S2)	28	30	56	72					186
HECKLER (3T1-2)					125		95		220
NCAP (3W2)					25		1		26
DASP (3Z1)						39			39
GATOR (3Z1)							38		38
DAEW (3X1)						4			4
ESCORT (3X1)							4		4
RECCO FAM (1V3)			1		11		12		24
WEA RECCO (1Q1)	6	8		1	2	1			18
RESCAP (1X3)	4		12	8					24
TOTAL COMBAT	1877	1877	1304	1261	223	190	286	225	7243

MISC. FLIGHTS	F9F-2	F9F-2	F4U-4	AD-4	F4U-5N	AD-4W	AD-4N	F9F-5P	TOTALS
FAM (1A)	65	69	73	82	14	14	17	18	352
ECM (1A)	3						4		7
INSTRUMENTS (1B)					4		2		6
FERRY (1J)	67	50	48	64	22	3	67	4	325
TEST & SLO TIME (1L)			16	24	13		7		60
ABORTS	32	36	31	32	5	1	9	5	151
TOTAL MISC. FLIGHTS	167	155	168	202	58	18	106	27	901
TOTAL - ALL TYPES MISSIONS	2044	2032	1472	1463	281	208	392	252	8144

30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

	1st TOUR 30 JAN - 4 MAR	2nd TOUR 17 MAR - 17 APR	3rd TOUR 12 MAY - 27 MAY	4th TOUR 2 JUN - 4 JUL	5th TOUR 15 JUL - 27 JUL	TOTAL 30 JAN - 27 JUL
COMBAT SORTIES						
PHOTO (1V1)	62	60	35	47	20	224
PHOTO ESC (1V9)	46	48	30	37	15	176
CAP (1W2)	398	313	136	186	81	1114
TARGAP (1U2)	27	39				66
RECCO (1T2)	208	142	51	162	380	943
FLAK SUP (1T1)		90	59			149
CHEROKEE (1S1)	172	315	32	463	157	1139
STRIKE (1T1)	692	401	231	61	19	1404
GAS (1S2)	75	117	65	560	188	1005
NGF (1V3)	20	17	16	15	2	70
ASP (1Z1)	38	44	17	27	18	144
GATOR (1Z1)	38	43	10	27	18	144
ECM & ESC (1V2)	12	10	14	13	28	82
RADAR BOIB. (1S2)			12	122	52	186
HECKLER (3T1-2)	62	92	21	35		220
NCAP (3W2)	10	2		10	4	26
DASP (3Z1)	10	18	5	6		39
GATOR (3Z1)	10	18	4	6		38
DREW (3L1)	3		1			4
ESCORT (3L1)	3		1			4
RECCO FAN. (1V3)	21	3				24
WEA. RECCO (1Q1)		10	6	2		18
RESCAP (1X3)		4	20			24
TOTAL COMBAT	1907	1786	784	1784	982	7243
MISC. FLIGHTS						
FAN. (1A)	91	50	159		52	352
ECM (1A)			3		4	7
INSTRUMENTS (1B)	6					6
FERRY (1J)	30	112	64	84	35	325
TEST & SLO TIME (1L)	12	21	6	12	9	60
ABORTS	50	45	20	20	16	151
TOTAL MISC. FLIGHTS	189	228	252	116	116	901
TOTAL - ALL TYPES MISSIONS	2096	2014	1036	1900	1098	8144

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PER PILOT DATA

<u>15-27 JULY 1953</u>	<u>FLIGHTS/PILOT</u>	<u>FLIGHT HOURS/PILOT</u>	<u>CV LANDINGS/PILOT</u>
VF-91, F9F-2	14.9	21.5	13.4
VF-93, F9F-2	13.5	21.4	13.3
VF-94, F4U-4	9.2	25.0	9.1
VA-95, AD-4	8.8	23.6	8.7
VC-3, F4U-5N	10.0	24.5	10.1
VC-11, AD-4W	4.2	8.4	4.2
VC-35, AD-4W	8.0	19.1	7.5
VC-61, F9F-5P	4.8	8.2	4.8

AIR GROUP FLIGHT HOURS

<u>JULY</u>		
JULY	15	110.1 (FAM)
	17	273.0
	18	60.3
	19	105.7
	20	87.2
	22	180.4
	23	323.3
	24	373.4
	25	335.3
	26	289.6
	27	85.5
15-27 JULY TOTAL		<u>2223.8</u>

SECURITY INFORMATION

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30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

PER PILOT DATA

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AVER. NO. PILOTS AVAIL. FOR FLT</u>	<u>FLTS/PILOT (ALL TYPES)</u>	<u>COMBAT FLTS PER PILOT</u>	<u>CV LDGS PER PILOT</u>	<u>HRS PER PILOT</u>
VF-91, F9F-2	21.1	96.9	88.9	94.4	147.9
VF-93, F9F-2	21.3	95.4	88.1	92.4	148.5
VF-94, F4U-4	23.2	63.4	56.2	60.7	183.0
VA-95, AD-4	23.2	63.1	54.4	59.9	177.8
VC-3, F4U-5N	4.7	59.8	47.4	52.6	168.7
VC-11, AD-4W	5.0	41.6	38.0	41.0	116.2
VC-35, AD-4N	5.6	70.0	51.1	57.7	188.1
VC-61, F9F-5P	4.8	52.5	46.9	51.3	83.0

AIR GROUP FLIGHT HOURS

1st TOUR:	30 JAN - 4 MAR	4279.6
2nd TOUR:	17 MAR - 17 APR	4287.2
3rd TOUR:	12 MAY - 27 MAY	2043.5
4th TOUR:	2 JUN - 4 JUL	4007.6
5th TOUR:	15 JUL - 27 JUL	<u>2223.8</u>
TOTAL HOURS	30 JAN - 27 JUL	16,841.7

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DAMAGE INFLECTED ON ENEMY

	<u>DESTROYED</u>		<u>DAMAGED</u>	
	<u>17-27 JUL</u>	<u>30 JAN - 27 JUL</u>	<u>17-27 JUL</u>	<u>30 JAN - 27 JUL</u>
Oxcarts		39		5
Trucks	91	330	38	263
Troops (KIA)	40	299		
RR Cars	62	252	48	166
Boats			5	6
Supply & Storage Buildings	6	669	2	463
RR Bridges			7	25
Highway Bridges	9	13	12	46
Vehicles		2	1	3
Warehouses		34-		49
Gun Positions	15	66	3	66
Supply Dumps	5	10	5	22
RR Cuts	75	267		
Storage Tanks		1		
Locomotives	2	6	3	12
Barracks	30	305	3	295
Tanks	2	3		2
Ammo Dumps		1		5
RR Round Houses		6		2
Transformer Stations		49		77
Factory			6	6
Lumber Stock Piles		174		39
Bunkers	5	22		17
Mining Facilities		7		13
Truck Shelters		1		1
Concrete Hangars		1		1
Vehicle Revetments		1		
Trenches (yards)	645	8094		
RR Tunnels		5	3	11
Fuel Dumps				1
Cranes		80		
Road Cuts	14	1	3	8
CD Positions	1	74	3	39
Mortar Postions	4	14		2
Caves		12		
Air Fields (cratered)	3	27		4
AW Position				1
Oil Storage Tanks		2		
Bulldozers			1	1
Water Tower				

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SECURITY INFORMATION

15-27 JULY 1953

DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ENEMY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BU.NO.</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
7-17	VF-93	F9F-2	123072	AA	37MM exploded under nose.	D-2
7-17	VF-91	F9F-2	123035	AA	Small frag in nose.	D-3
7-19	VA-95	AD-4	129013	AA	Frag hole in elevator and vertical fin.	D-3
7-22	VF-91	F9F-2	125130	AA	Frag in fuselage.	D-3
7-22	VF-91	F9F-2	123049	AA	20MM exploded inside nose.	D-3
7-23	VF-91	F9F-2	123587	AA	2 frag holes in horizontal stabilizer	D-3
7-24	VF-91	F9F-2	123585	AA	Frag through tail pipe and shroud.	D-3
7-24	VF-94	F4U-4	97181	(?)	Engine failure. Probably the result of enemy fire.	L
7-25	VC-3	F4U-5N	123193	SA	30 cal. in drop tank.	D-3
7-25	VF-94	F4U-4	81652	AA	Believe 37MM exploded near wing tip. Aircraft and pilot crashed.	L

15-27 JULY 1953 AIRCRAFT LOST OR DAMAGED BEYOND SHIPBOARD REPAIR

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BU.NO.</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
7-15	VA-95	AD-4	129015	Lost oil pressure emerg. ldg.	D-2
7-15	VF-94	F4U-4	96807	Tail wheel cyl. mounting bracket failed on CV landing.	D-2
7-17	VF-93	F9F-2	123072	AA damage to nose & nose wheel.	D-2
7-17	VF-94	F4U-4	82025	Crashed on CV take-off.	L
7-20	VF-91	F9F-2	127150	Crashed on catapult shot.	L
7-23	VF-94	F4U-4	81815	Blown over side by wind & prop wash.	L
7-24	VF-94	F4U-4	97181	Engine failure, probably result of enemy damage. Ditched at Wonsan.	L
7-25	VF-94	F4U-4	81652	Crashed in North Korea (AA).	L
7-26	VF-91	F9F-2	123422	Engine fire. Pilot ejected.	L

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AIRCRAFT LOST OR DAMAGED BEYOND SHIPBOARD REPAIR (ENEMY AID OPERATIONAL)

30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

	30 JAN to 4 MAR 1st Tour		17 MAR to 17 APR 2nd Tour		12 MAY to 27 MAY 3rd Tour		2 JUN to 4 JUL 4th Tour		15 JUL to 29 JUL 5th Tour		30 JAN - 29 JUL TOTALS
	ENEMY	OPER	ENEMY	OPER	ENEMY	OPER	ENEMY	OPER	ENEMY	OPER	
<u>LOST</u>											
F9F-2	1	2					1	2		2	8
F9F-5P											
F4U-4				1			1	2	2	2	8
F4U-5N							1				1
AD-4		1	1	2	1			1			6
AD-4N											
AD-4W								1			1
<u>D-1 DAMAGE</u>											
F9F-2				1							1
F9F-5P											
F4U-4			1				1				2
F4U-5N		1									1
AD-4	2	1		1							4
AD-4N											
AD-4W											
<u>D-2 DAMAGE</u>											
F9F-2		5		6			1	3	1		16
F9F-5P						1					1
F4U-4		1			1		1	2		1	6
F4U-5N											
AD-4				2				2		1	5
AD-4N			1								1
AD-4W		1									1
TOTALS	3	12	3	13	2	1	6	13	3	6	62

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PART II OPERATIONS

b. GENERAL.

(1) Employment. During this period of combat operations, the majority of the scheduled sorties have been flown in direct support of United Nations ground forces. The prop squadrons' effort was devoted exclusively to close air support, with the exception of the relatively few ECM, ASP, and AEW flights. The jets concentrated on Cherokee, Recco, CLP, photo, and photo escort sorties. Several jet Cherokee flights were diverted to urgently needed close air support targets by the tactical air control center.

(2) Weather. Fog, low ceilings and reduced visibility were encountered during a large portion of this period. IFR climb-outs and let-downs around the task force were executed as a matter of routine.

(3) Opposition. Since the beginning of the Communist offensive in early June, the intensity and accuracy of enemy anti-aircraft fire has increased considerably, particularly along the bomb line and in the Cherokee area.

c. JET OPERATIONS. Each jet squadron departed Yokosuka with 13 F9F-2 aircraft. No new operating procedures were devised nor were there any new operating difficulties encountered.

d. PROP OPERATIONS.

(1) Close Air Support Missions. Because of the large numbers of aircraft employed on close air support mission during this tour and the few joint Army/Navy/Air Force radio frequencies available, long delays in obtaining airborne controllers and poor communications were experienced by the majority of flights. Solid overcasts along the bomblines necessitated resort to MFQ drops on many of the close air support missions. Although quality of controllers was uniformly excellent, the results on MFQ drops could rarely be observed.

e. PHOTO. Inclement weather was responsible for the cancellation of the majority of the aerial photographic flights.

f. NIGHT ATTACK AND NIGHT FIGHTER OPERATIONS. The day flight schedule with night replenishments, plus poor weather conditions during early morning hours, practically curtailed night heckler operations.

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PART III ORDNANCE

a. Statistics
17-27 July 1953

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

TYPE ORDNANCE	AD-4	F4U-4	F9F-2	AD-4N	F4U-5N	TOTAL
2000# GP	164					164
1000# GP	357	158				515
500# GP		14		18	7	39
250# GP		344	680	54	42	1120
100# GP			1304			1304
260 FRAG					16	16
ATAR	6					6
HVAR					80	80
20MM	7015		47,575	8635	5470	68,695
50 Cal.		71,555				71,555
TOTAL						
LES.	685,000	145,000	300,400	21,500	17,160	1,169,060
TOTAL						
TONS	341.0	72.1	150.2	10.7	8.5	584.5

HUNG ORDNANCE

	HK-55	AERO 14A
250# GP	3	2

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES 30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

TYPE ORDNANCE	AD-4	F4U-4	F2F-2	AD-4N	F4U-5N	TOTAL
2000# GP	649					649
1000# GP	1837	545		5	1	2388
500# GP	781	549	66	163	134	1693
250# GP	2090	2924	5596	391	469	11170
100# GP	232		4259	192	6	4689
260 FRAG	898	334	1249	11	100	2592
ATAR	18	312	856		24	1210
HVAR	83	148	669		80	980
3.5 AR	11			4		15
2.75 FFAR	245			1143		1388
NAPAH		60			7	67
FLARES				418	340	758
20MM	161,820		344,862	56,090	56,125	618897
50 Cal.		385,989				385989
TOTAL						
LBS.	4770030	1549340	2194180	211310	216170	8941030
TOTAL						
TONS	2383.5	774.2	1097.0	105.6	98.0	4475.0

PART IV MAINTENANCE

1. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY.

a. During the eighty-eight days of this WestPac tour on which combat flight operations were conducted, aircraft availability, computed in accordance with the Naval Air Warfare Reporting Manual, averaged as follows:

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
F9F-2	95.3
F9F-5P	91.5
F4U-4	94.5
F4U-5N	90.0
AD-4, 4L, 4NA	90.7
AD-4N	93.4
AD-4W	93.3

b. Average availability for the period 17 July to 27 July was as follows:

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
F9F-2	97.80
F9F-5P	100.00
F4U-4	97.70
F4U-5N	95.00
AD-4, 4L, 4NA	95.30
AD-4N	100.00
AD-4W	100.00

2. GENERAL MAINTENANCE.

a. JETS.

(1) Some difficulty throughout the cruise was experienced with arresting hook points. Early in the tour, there were ten hook point (P/N NMF-603410-1) failures on F9F-2 aircraft; eight resulted in barrier crashes. No failures were encountered with re-annealed hook points.(P/N NMF-603410-LXX). However, the re-annealed points exhibited a tendency to deform along the slot side after off-center landings.

(2) Contaminated fuel was a major cause of maintenance difficulties with jet aircraft. Rust-like substances adhering to plungers and sleeves in TJC's (P/N R85-BPD-119545-2) and high pressure cock assemblies (P/N R85-BPD-116417-5), caused numerous engine malfunctions.

(3) Considerable malfunctioning of the aileron boost system on F9F-2 aircraft occurred during the last operating period. The

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MAINTENANCE (CONT)

increase of failures over the previous periods was approximately 300 percent. Since this increase was not anticipated, the supply of aileron boost valve assemblies (P/N R83-AP-25400-20) was soon depleted. To prevent prolonged grounding of the aircraft, repair of forty (40) of the forty-six (46) malfunctioning assemblies, was accomplished by the ship's accessory shop. Electrical failures, shorting of the coils and burning of contact points in the solenoid, accounted for approximately 75 percent of the discrepancies. The remainder experienced "O" ring seals and packing failures, six of which were beyond repair.

b. PROPS.

(1) RE-19 spark plugs proved inadequate for more than 60 hours of operation on AD's, or more than 90 hours on FLU's.

(2) The majority of carburetor changes were caused by contaminated fuel. In many cases, rust-like deposits caused sticking of poppet valves.

(3) Many failures of the AD wing-fold cylinder (P/N R83-DG-5255155) occurred during this cruise. Kits for incorporation of AD Service Change No. 332, designed to correct this condition, were not received until July.

3. ELECTRONICS (Summary)

a. General. Tube failures were a constant source of electronic equipment malfunctioning during all tours on the line. Almost all of the VHF transceivers in use have been overhauled and the mechanical parts, especially tuning heads, drive motors, and selector motor drive chains, have worn excessively, causing numerous failures and many man-hours of maintenance.

b. AN/APX-6. More failures of the AN/APX-6 equipment were encountered during this tour than on all previous tours combined. Tube failures and almost continuous interrogation of the strike-leader's aircraft were the contributing factors. Because of constant interrogation by ship and shore station radars, with the resultant heavy current drain on the tubes of a single IFF unit, it is considered that a doctrine should be inaugurated to rotate the IFF guard between the flight leader and other aircraft of the flight.

c. VHF Transmission Line Dielectric Failures. No other coaxial dielectric failures have occurred in F9F VHF transmission lines since the 17 failures previously reported in the 2 June to 6 July action report.

d. AN/CRC-7 and AN/PRC-17 Survival Radios. All survival radios were checked immediately after the last combat flight of this ten day period. Five AN/CRC-7 and nine AN/PRC-17 units were defective.

MAINTENANCE (CON'T)

4. MATERIAL (Summary)

a. In general, the material support received by Carrier Air Group NINE was excellent throughout the period of deployment in WestPac. Shortages of allowance list material occurred; the scope of such shortages increasing progressively with successive operating tours on the line. However, this situation was not unusual in view of the maintenance requirements resulting from the heavy operating schedule and abnormally high usage of certain aircraft maintenance items.

b. Since the air group has provided statistics to supplement the quarterly and final usage data reports submitted by the ship to the Aircraft Material Officer, Oakland, no recommendations for changes to the allowance lists are offered herein.

c. Of the 36 ACOG's experienced during the WestPac deployment, 11 occurred during the last operating tour on the line. The majority of ACOG items were obtained from other carriers in Task Force 77 and from "dud" aircraft aboard. "Dud" aircraft provided an invaluable emergency source of spare parts which were not available in stock aboard ship, but which were urgently required to maintain aircraft operational availability.

d. The following ACOG's occurred during the period 17-27 July:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PART NUMBER</u>	<u>DAYS ACOG</u>
1. AD-4W	Amplifier, compass	R88-A-525-050	4
2. F4U-5N	Valve, defueling	R83-SVL-5368	3
3. F9F-2	Valve Assy, Aileron boost	R83-AP-25400-20	2
4. F4U-4	Indicator, airspeed	R88-I-0350-025-000	4
5. F4U-4	Valve, defueling	R83-PA-413-6-1M4	3
6. F9F-2	Valve, fuel selector	R83-AS-848109-1	2
7. AD-4	Mechanism Assy, rudder tab	R82-DB-3252241-510	7
8. F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R82-BPD-119545-3	2
9. F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R82-BPD-119545-3	2
10. F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R82-BPD-119545-3	2
11. F9F-2	Valve, drain	R83-KCE-K2500D	2

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PART V MEDICAL1. FLIGHT SAFETY EQUIPMENT

a. During the six months combat tour in WestPac, there have been twenty-one ditchings and crash water landings, eight of the latter. The majority of injuries sustained as a result of these accidents have been received by pilots of jet type aircraft. Four pilots received compression fractures of lumbar vertebrae, one pilot received severe prolonged coccalgia, and five pilots received severely wrenched and contused backs which necessitated bed rest for several days. There were no fractures encountered characterized by a "shearing" of the vertebral transverse processes. However, this type of injury has been reported by other air groups. The tendency apparently has been for the shoulder harness to protect the chest and thoracic vertebrae securely and the safety belt to secure the thighs and to afford some protection to the pelvis. However, it is considered that there is not ample protection for the lower trunk and lumbar vertebrae. As a result, there exists a yielding of the bony structures in either a vertical (downward) direction or transverse (forward) direction upon impact of the plane with the water, resulting frequently in a compression or transverse vertebral fracture or other back injury. With the advent of more jet aircraft in fleet carrier air groups, it is recommended that some type of safety belt be devised and adopted for protecting the lower trunk from the lumbar vertebral injuries. Some form of hydraulic seat, acting similar to aircraft oleo struts, may lessen the vertical forces subjected to pilots in crash landings.

b. By separate correspondence, recommended improvements to the parachute harness and safety belt have been submitted to higher authority.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART VI PERSONNEL

1. During the eleven days of combat operations this tour, the shortage of pilots was keenly felt. The air group was scheduled for 1828 combat sorties, averaging 171 daily. Since current operating doctrine requires spare aircraft to be manned on the basis of 25 percent of scheduled sorties, an average of 43 pilots were required for briefing and manning of aircraft, in addition to those regularly scheduled to fly the sorties. Even though not subsequently launched, pilots scheduled as spares spent an average of $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours performing this function.

2. Listed below is a tabulation of the average flight hours and sorties flown by each squadrons' pilots on an average operating day:

<u>Squad</u>	<u>PILOTS</u>		<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>*Sorties</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Aver. flt.</u>
	<u>On Board</u>	<u>Av. Avail</u>	<u>Sched</u>	<u>Plus Spares</u>	<u>Sched/Pilot</u>	<u>Flown/Pilot</u>	<u>hrs./pilot</u>
VF-91	19	17.9	50	63	3.5	2.4	3.89
VF-93	21	18.2	50	63	3.5	2.3	3.87
VF-94	22	18.0	30	38	2.1	1.55	3.88
VA-95	23	22.0	30	38	1.7	1.32	3.91
Comprons	20	20.0	11	14	.7	.66	1.89

* Includes pilots scheduled as spares.

3. Since invariably some pilots were unavailable because of injuries and sickness, pilots of some squadrons were required to fly more than the average flights indicated above. For example, on one day's operation three F4U pilots were required to fly three combat missions, totaling seven to eight flight hours. Adding time required for briefing, manning aircraft, and debriefing, the three pilots were involved in flight operations for a period of from thirteen to fifteen hours.

4. Based on the above data, jet pilots were required to spend on the average 3.88 hours in actual combat flying, with an additional 5.25 hours for flight preparation for a total average of 9.13 hours per day. Prop pilots were required to spend an average of 6.74 hours per day involved in flight operations. The hours involved for all pilots is considered to be excessive for prolonged continuous combat flight operations without the rest previously provided during replenishment days. Without adequate rest, pilots become careless and efficiency decreases rapidly, resulting in an increased number of operational accidents.

5. The allowance of 1.5 pilots per aircraft during combat operations is considered to be sufficient. However, it is considered imperative that a full allowance be maintained at all times. It is therefore recommended that a pool of replacement pilots be available to operational commanders during future naval air combat operations.

PART VII SURVIVAL1. Crashes, Ditchings and Ejections.

a. During the period of this report, seven air group pilots crashed or ditched and one ejected.

- 15 JULY: Loss of oil pressure off the coast of Japan while on a refresher flight from the carrier, caused an AD pilot to make a wheels-up emergency landing on a small field in Japan. He sustained no injuries.
- 17 JULY: An F4U-4 crashed on take-off immediately after leaving the bow. The pilot was rescued by helicopter, but sustained minor internal injuries.
- 20 JULY: An F9F-2 loaded with 900 pounds of bombs and full fuel tanks flew into the water in a flat attitude immediately after a port catapult shot. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjured.
- 23 JULY: An F4U-4, taxiing into position behind another F4U-4 in the take-off position, slid on a slippery deck and was blown over the port side. The pilot received back injuries and almost drowned before the helicopter crewman jumped into the water and placed him into the helo hoisting sling.
- 24 JULY: An F4U-4 engine failed (probably due to enemy fire) near Wonsan and was ditched. The pilot was recovered immediately by helicopter uninjured.
- 25 JULY: On 25 July, Ensign SELMS, VF-94, flying an F4U-4, was hit by anti-aircraft fire near Tanchon. The plane crashed and burned. The pilot did not survive.
- 26 JULY: An F9F-2 caught fire above an overcast near the bomblines. When the cockpit filled with smoke, the pilot jettisoned his canopy with the air bottle and then ejected, using normal "pre-pos-ox-pull" procedure. The ejection was accomplished at 220K in level flight at 17,000 feet. After leaving the seat at the top of its trajectory, the pilot fell about 2000 feet before opening his parachute. He landed uninjured except for a slightly stiff back received during the ejection.

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PART VIII AIR INTELLIGENCE


1. CHARTS. Originally, during the air group's first tour on the line, each pilot was furnished with 1:50,000 scale chart coverage of the area in which the mission's target was located. It was believed that 1:50,000 scale charts would help pilots most in becoming familiar with the terrain. The plan met with some success. It was not altogether practical, however, since pilots engaged in maintaining tight division formation seldom had ample opportunity to study large scale charts. For the remainder of the air group's tour of duty, 1:50,000 scale charts were issued to division and section leaders only. The reasons for this change were that as the pilots became more familiar with the terrain the need for large scale coverage diminished; and secondly, the ship's supply was limited.

2. READY ROOM. Squadron Air Intelligence Officers standardized ready room displays so that maximum available facilities would be on hand for briefings regardless of which ready room might be used. Each ready room contained one of the following: 1:250,000 terrain charts (AMS series L-552 and series L-542), 1:250,000 USAF Approach Charts both of bomblines and target areas, a status board displaying identification, sea-air rescue, and escape and evasion measures. A daily plot of all necessary information was maintained on these charts. Each ready room was either oriented in its entirety around A.I. briefing displays or contained a separate area devoted completely to Air Intelligence. In addition to the regular briefing displays, each ready room had space for supplemental material of significance.

3. BRIEFING. On those flights which involved enemy targets in the North Korean terrain that were extremely difficult to locate, considerable time was spent by the AIOs in studying the terrain and diagramming the most prominent points. The AIOs diagrammed such identifying landmarks as road turns and intersections, bridges, streams and rivers, railroads, and most important of all - the ridges and valleys which usually are not readily distinguishable by glancing at the terrain charts.

As pilots became more familiar with the terrain, there was less need for detailed and lengthy briefings. In addition, the interval between briefing and launch was reduced considerably with the coming of warmer weather and subsequent shedding of exposure suits.

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
a.	V-1, a.	Provide an improved safety belt to afford more protection to pilots.
b.	VI-1, 5.	Maintain full allowance of pilots in combat squadrons. Maintain pool of replacement pilots in theatre of combat operations.