UNITED STATES PACKFIC FLUST AUX FORCE CARRIER AIR GROUP HIND c/o Floot Post Office San Francisco, California F712 CAC-9/TDH/bd A16-3 Ser: O12 29 July 1953

### DECLASSIFIED

SCORITY HUCHATION

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group HIHE

To: Commanding Officer, USB PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group PEED for period of

15 July 1953 to 27 July 1953

Ref: (a) OFMAY INST. 3580.4 of 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), subject action report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the USB PHILIPPHING CEA (CVA-47).

T. D. HARRIS

4/11/16

### CONTENTS OF LOTEOF RUPORT

· PART I

a. Mission and Composition

b. Chronology

PART II

OP RITIONS

a. Statistics

b. Comments and Recommendations

PART III

ORDINALICE

a. Statistics

PART IV

HAINT MARCO

a. Comments and Recommendations

PERT V

TIDIME

a. Comments and Recommendations

PAT VI

PR OTTL

a. Comments and Recommendations

PER VII

SURVIVIL


a. Comments.

FIRT VIII

ALL DITELLICENSE

a. Commonts.





### COMPOSITION OF FORCES

15-27 JULY 1953 - UNIT	OPERATI	ONAL A/C	PILOTS AE	
VF-91 F9F-2 LCDR A. JOHNSON, USN	<u>7<b>-</b>15</u> 13	<u>727</u> 10	.715 19*	7 <u>-27</u> 19*
VF-93 F9F-2 LCDR W.E. CARVER, USN	13	<b>1</b> C	21	21
VF-94 F4U-4 CDR A. T. HOLDERMAN, USN	16	11	23***	20 <del>%*</del>
VA-95 AD-4/NA/L CDR S. B. BERREY, USN	<b>1</b> 6	<b>1</b> 5	23***	23****
VC-3 (MIKE) F4U-5N LT C. Z. STEVENS, USNR	1;	14	14	l <sub>1</sub>
VC-11 (MIKE) AD-LW LT M. E. WORTMAN, USHR	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (NIKE) AD-4N LCDR F. E. WARD, USN	14	<u>L</u>	6	6
VC-61 (MIKE) F9F-5P LCDR S. N. MAY, USNR	3	3	5	5

<sup>\*</sup> Includes LCDR J. C. HAYNIE, Jr., USN, ComCVG-9 Staff Admin. Assit.

\*\* Includes LT G. L. GRAY, Jr., USN, and LT J. J. WRIGHT, USNR, ComCVG-9

Staff Operations Officer and LSO, respectively.

\*\* Includes CDR T. D. HARRIS, USN, ComCVG-9

#### MISSION

The mission of Carrier Air Group NIME, as set forth in CTF 77 OP Order No. 2-52, is to perform close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment missions in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Mations Forces.



15 July 1953

## DECLASSIFIED

Departed Yokosuka for operating area. Refresher air operations

### CIRCHOLOGY

- were conducted, consisting of group exercises and BCI hops. LT 3. K. GROS, VA-95, was forced to land wheels-up at Tateyama Airfield, Japan, due to oil failure. The pilot was uninjured. No flight operations. Erroute to operating area. 16 July 1953 First day of combat operations for Air Group HIII) this period. 17 July 1953 Operations consisted of strikes along the bombline, CCM missions, and interdiction sorties along the main enemy supply routes south of Wonsan. LT W. C. FINNEY R of VF-9h was forced to ditch his aircraft on take-off and was rescued by helicopter. The pilot received internal injuries. Combat operations were limited because of poor weather. Strikes 18 July 1953 were conducted against coastal defense gun positions, enemy supply routes, and power installations north of Hungman. Air operations continued in support of front line troops with 19 July 1953
  - diction and ECR sorties were also flow with effect.

    20 July 1953 Sorties were limited due to inclement weather conditions. Strikes consisted of interdiction, ECM, Cherokee, and CAS hops. EMS V. P. CHAMMAR of VF-93 ditched his F9F aircraft on take-off. He was


maximum effort on Cherokee and close air support strikes. Inter-


21 July 1953 Ho Air Operations. Inclement weather.

recovered uninjured by helicoster.

- 22 July 1953 dir operations were resumed over North Korea with maximum effort directed against the enemy rail and road networks. MP) drops were made as the weather along the bombline was non-operational for close air support missions.
- Air operations were intensified as weather conditions improved.

  Interdiction strikes from the bombline north to Songjin accounted for the destruction of trucks, rail cars, and bridges. Tanks were attacked, coastal defense puns near lonson were hit, and Sondok Airfield was bombed with effect. Close air support sortics were limited by adverse weather conditions at the bombline. ICDR HOIMES of VT-9h was rescued by helicopter after his aircraft went over the side during launching operations. The pilot was injured internally.





### CHROHOLOGY (CON'T)

- 24 July 1953 Mather again diverted aircraft from Cherokee and close air support to HTPQ and Recco hops. Interdiction strikes were successful in damageing two locomotives west of Kowan and a troop billeting area near Kojo was bombed with effect. INS CROSS of VF-9h was forced to ditch his aircraft off Yodo Island. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjured.
- 25 July 1953 Combat operations were again conducted to the Morth because of inclement weather along the bombline. Interdiction strikes against the enemy supply routes were carried out successfully; highway bridges and vehicles were destroyed. The marshalling yards at Hungnam were also attacked.
- 26 July 1953 Full scale air operations over all Horth Korea were resumed as the weather over the bombline became operational. Interdiction strikes accounted for the majority of damage to the enemy as box-cars were destroyed and supply buildings were bombed, causing violent secondary emplosions. LTMG LMKERATO of VF-91 was forced to bail out when his aircraft caught fire over Korea. He was picked up by friendly forces uninjured.
- 27 July 1953 Today brought to an end the hostilities between the United Nations forces and the Communist forces. A cease fire was signed at 1000, effective at 2200. Air operations were limited to morning events. Commander Seventh Floot presented awards to the ship and Air Group NIFE personnel in the afternoon.
- 28 July 1953 Today marked the last day of air operations for Air Group NIME in MostPac. Aircraft were transferred to the USS BOXER and USS PRECETOR. Departed Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan, and COMUS.




## DECLASSIFIED

### PART II OPERATIONS

### a. Statistics

15-27 JUIY 1953

$\overline{\mathrm{D}}\overline{\mathrm{A}}$	-	VF-93	VF-54		VC-3	VC-11		VC-61 F9F-5P	TO- TALS
SORTIES	F9F-2	F9F-2	F4U-4	AD-4	FLU-5N	<b>Д№Д</b> [Л	VD-fiN		20
PHOTO (IVI)								20 1	20 15
PHOTO EGG (1V9)	.5	9			١.			ji.	81
CAP (IW2)	41	36	00	200	14				52
RADAR BOLD. (15		144	23 5 <b>7</b>	29 55					380
RECCO (1T2)	124 8 <b>3</b>	74	21	22					157
CHEROKEE (151) STRIKE (171)	رن	14	1		9		9		19
CAS (1S2)			93	95			•		188
NGF (1V3)			/3	//	2				2
ASP (1Z1)						18			18
GATOR (1Z1)			լ	14	4		6		18
ECM & ESC (1V2)			•		10		<b>1</b> 8		28
TOTALS	253	263	178	183	29	18	33	21	978
NIGHT SORTIES	F9F-2	F9F-2	FLU-L	AD-II	FLU-5N	ΛD <b>−</b> Ц₩	ΛD−ЦN	F9F-5P	TOTALS
NCAP (3U2)					3		l		4
				<u>,                                    </u>			1		<u> </u>
TOTAL MIGHT					3		<u>_</u>	-	
			<del></del>	, <del></del> -	TO TE CAT	0.12 15.1	AT LAT	F9F-5P	TOTALS
MISC. FLIGHTS	F9F <b>-2</b>	F9F-2	FLU-l:	AD <b>→</b> 4	F40-5N	AD-LW		r 7r - 7r	
FERRY (LJ)	15	8	1	1			10		35
TEST & SLO THI	E (1L)		1	3 14	5 2	_		0	9
FAM (1A)	10	10	11	14	2	3	1	2	52 1.
ECM (IA)		_		•	-		4	1	հ 16
ABORTS	5	2	5	2	1			٠	10
TOTAL HISC.	30	20	18	20	8	3	311	3	116
					······································		<del></del>	- <del> </del>	
15-27 JULY						_	۱ ۸		2000
TOTALS	283	283	196	203	710	21	148	214	1098



## DECLASSIFIED

30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

ON THAT CORTING	VF-91 F9F-2	VF-93 F9F-2	VF-91: F1:U-1:	VA-95 AD-4	VC <b>-3</b> F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-LW	VC-35 AD-LIN	VC-61 F9F-5P	TO- TALS
COLBAT SORTIES	F 9F - 2	r yr - 2	r tjo-tj	RD-4	F40-JN	V77-Tfv	NDthy	221:	224
PHOTO (1V1)	88	87						1	176
PHOTO ESC (1V9) CAP (1V2)	554	550	<u>)</u> ,		6				1117
TARCAP (1U2)	27	31	8		U				66
RECCO (1T2)	404	404	73	62					943
FIAK SUP (1T1)	67	82	10						149
CHEROKEE (151)	418	407	153	161					1139
STRIKE (1T1)	266	262	1,68	390	9		9		1404
CAS (1S2)	<b>1</b> 5	16	435	520	8		11		1005
NGF (1V3)			<b>55</b>	1	12		2		70
ASP (171)						144			144
GATOR (1Z1)			39	42	11	_	52		गुर्गि
EGI & ESC (1V2)	0.0	20	برمه	4	<b>1</b> )4	2	62		82 186
RADAR BOMB (182)	28	30	56	72	זסר		٥٢		220
HECKLER (3T1-2)					125		95 1		220 26
MCAP (3W2) DASP (3Z1)					25	<b>3</b> 9	1.		26 39
GATOR (3Z1)						27	<b>3</b> 8		38
DAEW (3X1)						<u>)</u> ,	٥,		4
ESCORT (3X1)						4	14		4
RECCO FAM (1V3)			1		11		12		211
WEA RECCO (101)	6	8	_	1	2	1			18
RESCAP (1X3)	14		12	8					24
TOTAL CORBAT	1877	1877	130l;	1261	223	190	286	225	7243
MISC. FLIGHTS	F9F-2	F9F-2	FLU-L	AD-4	F4U-5N	ΛD-LW	Л <b>D-</b> 4N	F9F-5P	TOTALS
FAM (1A)	65	69	73	82	1),	14	17	18	<b>3</b> 52
ECM (IA)	ź	•,	10	Ů.		****	-14		7
INSTRUMENTS (1B)					4		ż		6
FERRY (1J)	67	50	$l_{4}8$	6L,	22	3	67	14	325
TEST & SLO TIME	(1L)	_	16	24	13		7	·	60
ABORTS	32	36	31	32	5	1	9	5	151
TOTAL MISC.			- 40						
FLIGHTS	167	155	168	202	<u>58</u>	18	1.06	27	901
TOTAL - ALL									
TYPES HISSIONS	50ftf	2032	11,72	11,63	281	208	<b>3</b> 92	252	8 <b>1</b> 1/4

## DECLASSIFIED

### 30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

	1st TOUR 30 JAN -	2nd TOUR 17 HER - 17 APR	3rd TOUR 12 MAY - 27 MAY	hth Tour 2 Jun - 4 Jul	5th TOUR 15 JUL - 27 JUL	TOTAL 30 JAN - 27 JUL
COMBAT SORTIES	4 MAR	<u> </u>	35	47	20	224
PHOTO (1V1)	62	60 <b>4</b> 8	<b>3</b> 0	37	15	176
PHOTO ESC (1V9)	46	313	135	136	81	1114
CAP (11/2)	398 07	39	<b>4</b> 99		÷ :	66
TARCAP (1U2)	27 208	142	51	162	<b>3</b> 80	943
RECCO (1T2)	200	90	59 59			149
FLAK SUP (1T1)	172	315	32	<u>4</u> 53	15 <b>7</b>	1139
CHEROKER (1S1)	692	401	231	61	19	11 <sup>†</sup> 01 <sup>†</sup>
STRIFE (1T1)	<b>7</b> 5	117	<del>(5</del>	560	188	1005
CLS (1S2)	20	17	16	15	2	70
NGF (1V3)	38	1,4	17	27	18	1/1/4
ASP (1Z1)	ენ 38	143	iò	27	18	144
GATOR (1Z1)	12	10	524	13	<b>2</b> 8	82
ECII & ESC (1V2)	- <del></del>	0	1.2	122	52	186
RADAR BOLB. (182)	62	9 <b>2</b>	21	35		2 20
HECKLER (3T1-2)	10	2	- 1	10	$l_{4}$	· <b>2</b> 6
NCVL (3MS)	10	ıā	5	6 6		<b>3</b> 9
DASP (3Z1)	10	1.0	5 1 <sub>1</sub>	Ó		<b>3</b> 8
GATOR (3Z1)		3.0	i			$\mathcal{V}_{4}$
DAEN (311)	3 3		1			4
ESCORT (311)	21	ž				2lı
NECCO FALL (1V3)	کی ملد	3 10	5	2		<b>1</b> 3
WEA. RECCO (101)		1,	20			24
RESCAP (1X3)	<b>1</b> 907	1786	784	178l;	982	7243
TOTAL COMBAT	1/01	2100				
HISC. FLIGHTS						353
FARI. (1A)	91	50	159		52	352 7
ECH (1A)	•		3		1†	- 6
INSTRUIENTS (1B)	G			2)	אר	325
FERRY (1J)	30	112	Slj	84	35	325 60
TEST & SLO TIME (11	_	21 45	6	12	9 16	151
ABORTS	50	45	50	20	TO	エフエ
				116	116	901
TOTAL HISC. FLIGHTS	189	220	252	TEO	120	
					7.000	Qn1.1.
TOTAL - ALL	2096	50771	1036	1500	1098	8144
TYPES HISSIONS						



### PER PILOT DATA

15 <b>-27</b> JULY 1953	FLIGHTS/PILOT	FLICHT HOURS/PILOT	CV LANDINGS/PILOT
VF-91, F9F-2	14,9	21.5	13-4
VF-93, F9F-2	13.5	21.4	13,3
VF-94, FLU-4	9•2	25•0	9.1
VA-95, AD-L	8.8	23•6	8.7
VC-3, F4U-5N	10.0	24.5	10.1
VC-11, AD-411	4.2	8•4	4.2
VC-35, AD-4N	8•0	19.1	7.5
VC-61, F9F-5P	4.8	8•2	<u>4.8</u>

### AIR GROUP FLIGHT HOURS

		JULY	
	JUIY	15	110.1 (FAM)
		17	273•0
		18	60•3
		19	105.7
		20	87.2
		2 <b>2</b>	180.l;
		23	323•3
		21,	373•4
		25	335 <b>•3</b>
		26	289.6
		27	85.5
15-27	JULY	TOTAL	2223.8

### SECULITI INFORMATION

## DECLASSIFIED


30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

### PLR PILOT DATA

UNIT	AVER. NO. PILOTS AVAIL. FOR FLT	FLTS/PILOT (ALL TYPES)	COMBAT FLTS PER PILOT	CV LDGS PER PILOT	HRS PER PILOT
		96.9	88.9	94.4	11:7.9
VF-91, F9F-2	21.1			00.1	11:8.5
VF-93, F9F-2	21.3	95.4	88.1	92.4	##0 <b>4</b> 2
VF-94, F4U-l	23•2	63.11	56.2	60.7	183.0
VA-95, AD-4		63.1	54.4	59•9	177.8
VC-3, Flu-51		59.8	47.4	52.6	168.7
VC-11, AD-la		1:1.6	38.0	h1.0	116.2
vc-35, AD-4		70.0	51.1	57 <b>•7</b>	188.1
VC-61, F9F-		52.5	1,6.9	51.3	83.0


### AIR GROUL FLIGHT HOURS

1st TOUR:	30 JAN - 1: IMR	4279.6
2nd TOUR:	17 MAR - 17 APR	4287.2
3rd TOUR:	12 MAY - 27 MAY	2043.5
4th TOUR:	2 JUN - 1: JUL	4007.6
5th TOUR:	15 JUL - 27 JUL	2223.8
TOTAT. HOUT	RS 30 JAN - 27 JUL	16.841.7



### DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENERY

	DESTE	ROYED	DAIIAGED	30 JAN -
	17-27 JUL	30 JAN 27 JUL	17-27 JUL	27 JUL
	71-21 001	39		5
Oxcarts	91	330	<b>3</b> 8	263
Trucks	91 1,0	299		
Troops (KLL)	62	252	48	<b>1</b> 66
RR Cars		-	5	6
Boats Supply & Storage Buildings	6	669	2	463
20 Day quar			5 2 7 12	25 46 <b>3</b> 49 66
RR Bridges Highway Bridges	9	13		710
Vehicles	•	2	1	3
Venicies Warehouses		34- 66	^	49
Gun Positions	15	<b>6</b> 6	3 5	22
Supply Dumps	5 75	10 2 <b>67</b>	>	44
M Cuts	75	2 <b>67</b>		
Storage Tanks		1 6	2	12
Locomotives	2	6	3 3	295
Barracks	30	305	)	2
Tanks	2	3 1		€-
Ammo Dumps		1		<b>٢</b>
RR Round Houses		,		2
Transformor Stations		,6		77
Factory		110	6	6
Lumber Stock Piles		7 O.	J	5 2 77 6 39 17 13
Bunkers	5	<b>17</b> 4 22		17
Mining Facilities		7		13
Truck Shelters		i 1		ĩ
Concrete Hangars		1		ī
Vehicle Revetments	۷۱.۳	8094		
Trenches (yards)	645	0074	3	11
M. Tunnels		5		
Fuel Dumps		,		1
<b>Cr</b> anes	1.1.	80	· ·	
Road Cuts	⊒T J≀J†	Ĭ	3	8
CD Positions	)† T	74	3	39
Mortar Postions	41	ili		2
Caves	3	12		
Air Fields (cratered)	)	27		4
AW Position		-1		l
Oil Storage Tanks		2		
Eulldozers		-	1	1
Water Tower				



15-27	JUIY <b>1</b> 9	53	DAMAGE	INFLICTED	BY ENEMY	
DATE 7-17	UNIT VF-93	TYPE A/C F9F-2	BU.NO. 123072	CAUSE AA	DAMAGE 37NM exploded under nose.	CODE D-2
7-17	VF <b>-</b> 91	F9F-2	123035	$A\Lambda$	Small frag in nose.	D <b>-3</b>
7-19	VA <b>-</b> 95	AD <b>-</b> 4	129013	$\Lambda\Lambda$	Frag hole in elevator and vertical fin.	D <b>-3</b>
7-22	VF-91	F9F-2	125130	$\Lambda\Lambda$	Frag in fuselage.	D-3
7-22	VF <b>-</b> 91	F9F-2	123049	$\Lambda \Lambda$	20MM exploded inside nose	D <b>→3</b>
7-23	VF-91	F9F-2	123587	$\Lambda \Lambda$ .	2 frag holes in horizon- tal stabilizer	D-3
<b>7–</b> 24	VF <b>-</b> 91	<b>F</b> 9 <b>F-</b> 2	123585	$\Lambda\Lambda$	Frag through tail pipe and shroud.	D-3
7-2l;	V <b>F-</b> 9L	F4 <b>U-</b> 4	97181	(?)	Engine failure. Probably the result of enemy fire.	
7 <del>-</del> 25	VC⊷3	Flu-5N	123193	SA	30 cale in drop tank.	D-3
7-25	VF—Sli	FLU-L	81652	Ti	Believe 37MM exploded near wing tip. Aircraft and pilot crashed.	# L

### 15-27 JULY 1953 AIRCRAFT LOST OR DAMAGED BEYOND SHIPBOARD REPAIR

DATE	UNIT	TYPE A/C	BU.NO.	CAUSE	CODE
<b>7–</b> 15	VA-95	AD <b>-l</b> ;	129015	Lost oil pressure emerg. ldg.	D <b></b> 2
7-15	VF-94	FLu-L	96807	Tail wheel cyl. mounting bracket failed on CV landing.	D <b>-</b> 2
7-17	VF93	F9F-2	123072	AA damage to nose & nose wheel.	D <b>-2</b>
7-17	VF-94	F4U-4	82025	Crashed on CV take-off.	L
<b>7-</b> 20	VF <b>→</b> 91	F9F-2	127150	Crashed on catapult shot.	L
7-23	VF-91;	FLU-L	81815	Blown over side by wind & prop wash.	L
7-24	VF-94	Fl <sub>1</sub> U-l <sub>4</sub>	97181	Engine failure, probably result-	
<b>7-</b> 25	VF <b>-</b> 94	FLU-L	81652	ing of enemy damage. Ditched at Crashed in North Korea (AA).	L L
<b>7-</b> 26	VF-91	F9F-2	123422	Engine fire. Pilot ejected.	L





AIRCRAFT LOST OR DAMAGED BEYOND SHIPBOARD REPAIR (ENEMY AND OPERATIONAL)

### 30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

	lı III 1st I		17 MAR 17 APR 2nd To ENEMY	ur	12 MAY 27 MAY 3rd Tot ENLAY		2 JUN 4 JUI 4th To ENEMY		15 JU 29 JU 5th T ENELY	our	30 JAN - 29 JUL TOTAIS
LOST FSF-2	- 1	2					1	2		2	8
F9F-5P F4U-4 F4U-5N				1			1	2	2	2	8
AD-4N		1	1	2	1		•	1			1 6
AD-410		,						1			1
D-1 DAI F9F-2	<u>A</u> GE			ı							1
F9F-5P F4U-4 F4U-5N AD-4	2	1	1	1			1				2 1 4
Л <b>D—</b> ЦИ Л <b>D—</b> ЦИ											
D-2 DAI F9F-2	AGE	5		6			1	3	1		16
F9F-5P F4U-4		1			1	1	1	2		1	1 6
Fl <sub>4</sub> U-5N AD-l <sub>4</sub> AD-l <sub>4</sub> N AD-l <sub>4</sub> N		1	ı	2				2		1.	5 1 1
TOTALS	3	12	3	13	2	1	6	13	3	6	62




### PART: IT OPERATIONS

#### b. GEHERAL.

- (1) Employment. During this period of combat operations, the majority of the scheduled sorties have been flown in direct support of United Nations ground forces. The prop squadrons' effort was devoted exclusively to close air support, with the exception of the relatively few ECN, ASP, and AEN flights. The jets concentrated on Cherokee, Recco, CIP, photo, and photo escort sorties. Several jet Cherokee flights were diverted to urgently needed close air support targets by the tactical air control center.
- (2) Weather. Fog, low ceilings and reduced visibility were encountered during a large portion of this period. IFR climb-outs and let-downs around the task force were executed as a matter of routine.
- (3) Opposition. Since the beginning of the Communist offensive in early June, the intensity and accuracy of enemy anti-aircraft fire has increased considerably, particularly along the bomb line and in the Cherokee area.
- c. <u>JET OPERATIONS</u>. Each jet squadron departed Yokosuka with 13 F9F-2 aircraft. No new operating procedures were devised nor were there any new operating difficulties encountered.

#### d. PRCP OPERATIONS.

- (1) Close Air Support Missions. Because of the large numbers of aircraft employed on close air support mission during this tour and the few joint Army/Navy/Air Force radio frequencies available, long delays in obtaining airborne controllers and poor communications were experienced by the majority of flights. Solid overcasts along the bombline necessitated resort to MPQ drops on many of the close air support missions. Although quality of controllers was uniformily excellent, the results on MPQ drops could rarely be observed.
- e. PHOTO. Inclement weath r was responsible for the cancellation of the majority of the aerial photographic flights.
- f. MIGHT ATTACK AND MIGHT FIGHTER OFFRATIONS. The day flight schedule with night replenishments, plus poor weather conditions during early morning hours, practically curtailed night heckler operations.



#### PART III ORDNANCE

a. Statistics 17-27 July 1953

17-27 July 1953 ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

TYPE ORDNAMCE	AD-4	F4U <b>-</b> 4	F9F-2	AD-l <sub>!</sub> N	F4U <b>-</b> 5N	TOTAL
2000# GP 1000# GP 500# GP 250# GP	16lı 357	158 14 <b>3</b> 44	680	18 54	7 <b>L</b> i2	164 515 39 1120
100% GP 260 FRAG ATAR HVAR	6		130l <sub>4</sub>		16 80	1304 16 6 80
20MM . 50 Cal.	7015	<b>71,55</b> 5	47,575	8635	51,70	68,695 71,555
TOTAL LES.	685 <b>,00</b> 0	145,000	300,1100	21,500	17,160	1,169,060
TOTAL TOMS	31;1.0	72.1	150.2	10.7	8.5	584.5

### HUNG ORDNINCE

	11K <b>-55</b>	AERO 11A	
250# GP	3	2	






### ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES 30 JAN - 27 JUL 1953

TYPE ORDIWNCE	ΛD <b>-</b> 4	<b>F4U-</b> L	F9F-2	AD-4N	F4U-5N	TOTAL
2000% GP 1000% GP 500% GP 250% GP 100% GP 260 FRAG ATAR HVAR 3.5 AR 2.75 FFAR MAPAIN FIARES 20MI 50 Cal.	649 1837 781 2090 232 898 18 83 11 245	545 549 2924 334 312 148 60	66 5596 4259 1249 856 669	5 163 391 192 11 14 1143 418 56,090	1 13l <sub>4</sub> l <sub>4</sub> 69 6 100 2l <sub>4</sub> 80 7 3l <sub>4</sub> 0 56,125	649 2388 1693 11470 4689 2592 1210 980 15 1388 67 758 618897 385989
TOTAL LBS.	<b>4770</b> с <b>3</b> 0	15և93և0	2154180	211310	216170	8941030
TONS	2383 <b>4</b>	774.2	1097.0	105.6	98•0	4475.0





### PART IV MAINTENANCE

### 1. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY.

a. During the eighty-eight days of this WestPac tour on which combat flight operations were conducted, aircraft availability, computed in accordance with the Naval Air Warfare Reporting Manual, averaged as follows:

TYPE A/C	PERCENT
F9F-2	95.3
F9F-5P	91.5
Fhu-h	94.5
Fhu-5N	90.0
AD-h, hl, hna	90.7
AD-hn	93.4
AD-hw	93.3


b. Average availability for the period 17 July to 27 July was as follows:


TYPE A/C	PERCENT
F9F-2 F9F-5P F4U-4 F4U-5N AD-4, 44, 44A AD-4N AD-4N	97.80 100.00 97.70 95.00 95.30 100.00

### 2. GENERAL MAINTENANCE.

#### a. JETS.

- (1) Some difficulty throughout the cruise was experienced with arresting hook points. Early in the tour, there were ten hook point (P/N MMF-603410-1) failures on F9F-2 aircraft; eight resulted in barrier crashes. No failures were encountered with re-annealed hook points.(P/N NMF-603410-1MM). However, the re-annealed points exhibited a tendency to deform along the slot side after off-center landings.
- (2) Contaminated fuel was a major cause of maintenance difficulties with jet aircraft. Rust-like substances adhering to plungers and sleeves in TJC's (P/N R85-BFD-119545-2) and high pressure cock assemblies (P/N R85-BPD-116417-5), caused numerous engine malfunctions.
- (3) Considerable malfunctioning of the aileron boost system on F9F-2 aircraft occurred during the last operating period. The





### MAINTENANCE (CON'T)

increase of failures over the previous periods was approximately 300 percent. Since this increase was not anticipated, the supply of aileron boost valve assemblies (P/N R83-AP-25400-20) was soon depleted. To prevent prolonged grounding of the aircraft, repair of forty (40) of the forty-six (46) malfunctioning assemblies, was accomplished by the ship's accessory shop. Electrical failures, shorting of the coils and burning of contact points in the solenoid, accounted for approximately 75 percent of the discrepancies. The remainder experienced "O" ring seals and packing failures, six of which were beyond repair.

#### b. PROPS.

- (1) RB-19 spark plugs proved inadequate for more than 60 hours of operation on AD's, or more than 90 hours on FhU's.
- (2) The majority of carburctor changes were caused by contaminated fuel. In many cases, rust-like deposits caused sticking of poppet valves.
- (3) Hany failures of the AD wing-fold cylinder (P/N R83-DG-5255155) occurred during this cruise. Kits for incorporation of AD Service Change No. 332, designed to correct this condition, were not received until July.

### 3. ELECTRONICS (Summary)

- a. General. Tube failures were a constant source of electronic equipment malfunctioning during all tours on the line. Almost all of the VHF transceivers in use have been overhauled and the mechanical parts, especially tuning heads, drive motors, and selector motor drive chains, have worn excessively, causing numerous failures and many man-hours of maintenance.
- b. AN/APX-6. More failures of the AN/APX-6 equipment were encountered during this tour than on all previous tours combined. Tube failures and almost continuous interrogation of the strike-leader's aircraft were the contributing factors. Because of constant interrogation by ship and shore station radars, with the resultant heavy current drain on the tubes of a single IFT unit, it is considered that a doctrine should be inaugurated to rotate the IFF guard between the flight leader and other aircraft of the flight.
- c. VIF Transmission Line Dialectric Failures. No other coaxial dialectric failures have occurred in FOF THE transmission lines since the 17 failures previously reported in the 2 June to 6 July action report.
- d. AN/CRC-7 and AN/PRC-17 Survival Radios. All survival radios were checked immediately after the last combat flight of this ten day period. Five AN/CRC-7 and nine AN/PRC-17 units were defective.





### MILITENINCE (CCN. T)

### 4. IMTERIAL (Summary)

- a. In general, the material support received by Carrier Air Group NINE was excellent throughout the period of deployment in WestPac. Shortages of allowance list material occurred; the scope of such shortages increasing progressively with successive operating tours on the line. However, this situation was not unusual in view of the maintenance requirements resulting from the heavy operating schedule and abnormally high usage of certain aircraft maintenance items.
- b. Since the air group has provided statistics to supplement the quarterly and final usage data reports submitted by the ship to the Aircraft Haterial Officer, Oakland, no recommendations for changes to the allowance lists are offered herein.
- c. Of the 36 ACOG's experienced during the WestPac deployment, 11 occurred during the last operating tour on the line. The majority of ACOG items were obtained from other carriers in Task Force 77 and from "dud" aircraft aboard. "Dud" aircraft provided an invaluable emergency source of spare parts which were not available in stock aboard ship, but which were urgently required to maintain aircraft operational availability.
  - d. The following ACOG's occurred during the period 17-27 July:

TYP	E AIRCRAFT	NOMENCL: TURE	FART NUMBER	DAYS ACOG
1.	AD-LW	Amplifier, compass	R88-A-525-050	14
2.	F4U <b>-</b> 5N	Valve, defueling	R8 <b>3-</b> SV <b>L-536</b> 8	3
3.	F9F-2	Valve Assy, Mileron boost	R83-AP-25400-20	2
	Fl <sub>i</sub> U-l <sub>i</sub>	Indicator, airspeed	R88-I-0350-025-000	L <sub>t</sub>
5.	$\mathbf{F}_{l_1}\mathbf{U}-\mathbf{l}_1$	Valve, defueling	R83-PA-413-6-1M4	3
6.	F9F-2	Valve, fuel selector	R83-1.S-848109-1	2
7.	D-l;	Mechanism Assy, rudder tab	R82-DB-3252241-510	7
8.	F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R82-BPD-119545-3	2
9.€	F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R62-BPD-119545-3	2
10.	F9F-2	Control Assy, fuel	R82-DPD-119545-3	2
11.	F9F-2	Valve, drain	R83-KOE-K2500D	2



### PART V LEDICAL

#### 1. FLICHT SAFETY EQUIPMENT

a. During the six months combat tour in WestPac, there have been twenty-one ditchings and crash water landings, eight of the latter. The majority of injuries sustained as a result of these accidents have been received by pilots of jet type aircraft. Four pilots received compression fractures of lumbar vertebrae, one pilot received severe prolonged coccalgia, and five pilots received severely wrenched and contused backs which necessitated bed rest for several days. There were no fractures encountered characterized by a "shearing" of the vertebral transverse processes. However, this type of injury has been reported by other air groups. The tendency apparently has been for the shoulder harness to protect the chest and thoracic vertebrae securely and the safety belt to secure the thighs and to afford some protection to the pelvis. However, it is considered that there is not ample protection for the lower trunk and lumbar vertebrae. As a result, there exists a yielding of the bony structures in either a vertical (downward) direction or transverse (forward) direction upon impact of the plane with the water, resulting frequently in a compression or transverse vertebral fracture or other back injury. With the advent of more jet aircraft in fleet carrier air groups, it is recommended that some type of safety belt be devised and adopted for protecting the lower trunk from the lumbar vertebral injuries. Some form of hydraulic seat, acting similar to aircraft oldo struts, may lessen the vertical forces subjected to pilots in crash landings.

b. Dy seperate correspondence, recommended improvements to the parachute harness and safety belt have been submitted to higher authority.



## DECLASSIFIED

#### PART VI PERSONNEL

- 1. During the eleven days of combat operations this tour, the shortage of pilots was keenly felt. The air group was scheduled for 1828 combat sorties, averaging 171 daily. Since current operating doctrine requires spare aircraft to be manned on the basis of 25 percent of scheduled sorties, an average of 43 pilots were required for briefing and manning of aircraft, in addition to those regularly scheduled to fly the sorties. Even though not subsequently launched, pilots scheduled as spares spent an average of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours performing this function.
- 2. Listed below is a tabulation of the average flight hours and serties flown by each squadrons' pilots on an average operating day:

<u>Squd</u>	PILOT On Beard	<u>Nv.Avail</u>	Sortics Schod	Sorties Plus Spares	*Sorties Sched/Pilot	Sorties Flown/Pilot	Aver. flt. hrs./pilot
VF-91	19	17.9	50	63	<b>3</b> •5	2.4	<b>3.</b> 89
VF <b>-</b> 93	21	18.2	50	63	3•5	2•3	3.87
VF-9L	<b>2</b> 2	18•0	30	<b>3</b> 8	2.1	1.55	3 <b>.</b> 88
VA <b>-</b> 95	23	22.0	30	<b>3</b> 8	1.7	1,32	3.91
Compr	ons 20	20,0	11	$1_{l_1}$	•7	<b>•</b> 66	1.89

- \* Includes pilots scheduled as spares.
- 3. Since invariably some pilots were unavailable because of injuries and sickness, pilots of some squadrons were required fo fly more than the average flights indicated above. For example, on one day's operation three FAU pilots were required to fly three combat missions, totaling seven to eight flight hours. Adding time required for briefing, manning aircraft, and debriefing, the three pilots were involved in flight operations for a period of from thirteen to fifteen hours.
- 4. Based on the above data, jet pilots were required to spend on the average 3.88 hours in actual combat flying, with an additional 5.25 hours for flight preparation for a total average of 9.13 hours per day. Prop pilots were required to spend an average of 6.7h hours per day involved in flight operations. The hours involved for all pilots is considered to be excessive for prolonged continuous combat flight operations without the rest previously provided during replemishment days. Without adequate rest, pilots become careless and officiency decreases rapidly, resulting in an increased number of operational accidents.
- 5. The allowance of 1.5 pilots per aircraft during combat operations is considered to be sufficient. However, it is considered imperative that a full allowance be maintained at all times. It is therefore recommended that a pool of replacement pilots be available to operational commanders during future naval air combat operations.



### PART VII SURVIVAL

### 1. Crashes, Ditchings and Ejections.

- a. During the period of this report, seven air group pilots crashed or ditched and one ejected.
- 15 JUIN: Loss of oil pressure off the coast of Japan while on a refresher flight from the carrier, caused an AD pilot to make a wheels-up emergency landing on a small field in Japan. He sustained no injuries.
- 17 JULY: An Fhu-h crashed on take-off immediately after leaving the bow.

  The pilot was rescued by holicopter, but sustained minor internal injuries.
- 20 JULY: An F9F-2 loaded with 900 pounds of bombs and full fuel tanks flew into the water in a flat attitude immediately after a port catapult shot. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjuried.
- 23 JULY: An FAU-4, taxiing into position behind another FAU-4 in the takeoff position, slid on a slippery deck and was blown over the port
  side. The pilot received back injuries and almost drowned before
  the helicopter crewman jumped into the water and placed him into
  the helo hoisting sling.
- 24 JULY: An Flu-4 engine failed (probably due to enemy fire) near Wonsan and was ditched. The pilot was recovered immediately by helicopter uninjuried.
- 25 JULY: On 25 July, Ensign SEL/S, VF-94, flying an F4U-4, was hit by antiaircraft fire near Tanchon. The plane crashed and burned. The pilot did not survive.
- 26 JULY: An F9F-2 caught fire above an overcast near the bombline. When the cockpit filled with smoke, the pilot jettisoned his canopy with the air bottle and then ejected, using normal "pre-pos-ex-pull" procedure. The ejectionwas accomplished at 220K in level flight at 17,000 feet. After leaving the seat at the top of its trajectory, the pilot fell about 2000 feet before opening his parachute. He landed uninjured except for a slightly swiff back received during the ejection.



#### PART VIII AIR INTELLGIENCE

- l. CHARTS. Originally, during the air group's first tour on the line, each pilot was furnished with 1:50,000 scale chart coverage of the area in which the mission's target was located. It was believed that 1:50,000 scale charts would help pilots most in becoming familiar with the terrain. The plan met with some success. It was not altogether practical, however, since pilots engaged in maintaining tight division formation seldom had ample opportunity to study large scale charts. For the remainder of the air group's tour of duty, 1:50,000 scale charts were issued to division and section leaders only. The reasons for this change were that as the pilots became more familiar with the terrain the need for large scale coverage diminished; and secondly, the ship's supply was limited.
- 2. MEADY ROOM. Squadron Air Intelligence Officers standardized ready room displays so that maximum available facilities would be on hand for briefings regardless of which ready room might be used. Each ready room contained one of the following: 1:250,000 terrain charts (AMS series I-552 and series I-542), 1:250,000 USAF Approach Charts both of bombline and target areas, a status board displaying identification, sea-air rescue, and escaps and evasion measures. A daily plot of all necessary information was maintained on these charts. Each ready room was either oriented in its entirety around A.I. briefing displays or contained a seperate area devoted completely to Air Intelligence. In addition to the regular briefing displays, each ready room had space for supplemental material of significance.
- 3. DRIEFING. On those flights which involved enemy targets in the North Korean terrain that were extremely difficult to locate, considerable time was spent by the AIOs in studying the terrain and diagramming the most prominent points. The AIOs diagramed such identifying landmarks as road turns and intersections, bridges, streams and rivers, railroads, and most important of all the ridges and valleys which usually are not readily distinguishable by glancing at the terrain charts.

As pilots became more familiar with the terrain, there was less need for detailed and lengthy briefings. In addition, the interval between briefing and launch was reduced considerably with the coming of warmer weather and subsequent shedding of exposure suits.





### SULLARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

	PAGE	SUBJECT
a.	V⊷l, a.	Provide an improved safety bolt to afford more protection to pilots.
b.	VI-1, 5.	Maintain full allowance of pilots in combat squadrons.  Maintain pool of replacement pilots in theatre of combat operations.