

U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
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San Francisco, Calif.

OPER: BED: JR: pg
CV-32/A4-3/A12
Ser 092-A

9 NOV 1950

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
To : Commander SEVENTH Fleet
Via : Commander Task Force Seventy-Seven

Subj: Report of Operations 9 October through 29 October 1950

1. NARRATIVE:

On 9 October 1950, the LEYTE, with Air Group Three embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and proceeded to the Sea of Japan via Tsushima Straits in accordance with Commander Carrier Division One Operation Order 3-50. At 0430I on 10 October, the Leyte commenced flight operations against the enemy with TARCAP, CAP, ASP and Photo Reconnaissance missions. On 11 October, the first strike by Air Group Three was directed against the SONGJIN area in KOREA. Offensive flights of all types in support of infantry operations during the advance and occupation of WONSAN and CHONGJIN, Korea were flown from 11 through 29 October. On 12, 16, 18, 23, 26, and 29 October the ship replenished at sea. Offensive air operations also were conducted on 12 October. NavSpec and aviation gasoline were replenished on all replenishment days. Ammunition and aviation ordnance was replenished on 12, 16, 23, and 26 October. Provisions were partially replenished, from the USS GRAFFIAS, on 26 October. GSK stores were received from the USS POLLUX on 29 October. The ship fired anti-aircraft gunnery exercises 18 and 23 October.

On completion of replenishment 29 October, the Leyte, with the remaining units of Task Force 77, departed from the operating area for Sasebo. At 300836I the LEYTE entered Sasebo, Japan and moored to buoy #17.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. AIR: During the period 11 October 1950 until 28 October 1950, air operations were conducted in accordance with directives of Commander Task Force 77 against North Korean objectives in support of United Nations Forces in Korea.

Primary objectives for the majority of strike-flights flown by Air Group Three were communications and transportation facilities in the Wonsan-Chongjin area, with penetrations by jet fighter sweeps to targets 20 miles south of the Manchurian-Korean border. Vital communications and transportation facilities were demolished, damaged and disrupted throughout this entire area. Important enemy communications and transportation installations which were rebuilt by North Korean Forces were re-destroyed on a priority target basis.

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On 11 October 1950 the USS LEYTE commenced a sustained strike flight period of five days continuous operations. In five days, 472 offensive sorties were flown against North Korean objectives and 56 defensive sorties for a total of 528 sorties. During this five day period, 61 napalm bombs, 2211 HVAR rockets, 121.5 tons of bombs, 93,009 rounds of .50 calibre machine gun ammunition, 29,204 rounds of 20MM cannon ammunition was hurled at the enemy. The following were the enemy's transportation and communications facilities losses for the period of sustained operations 11 October - 15 October 1950:

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Small boats	9	13
Locomotives	2	3
RR box cars	51	45
Trucks	8	5
Warehouses	12	9
Gun emplacements	4	2
Tunnels	-	1
Floating crane	1	-
Barge	2	-
Tractors	2	-
Ammunition cars	1	-
Electric transformer	1	-
Dredge	-	1

A summary of Naval Air Operations by the USS LEYTE with Air Group Three embarked in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea for the period 10 - 29 October 1950 follows:

Offensive Sorties	1,040
Defensive Sorties	<u>145</u>
Total	1,185

Of the total of 2,956.4 hours flown it is interesting to note that only 633.2 were spent over the target areas.

Ammunition expended on North Korean targets: 61 napalm bombs, 3738 HVAR rockets, 268.5 tons of bombs, 158,874 rounds of .50 calibre machine gun ammunition, 54,267 rounds of 20MM cannon ammunition.

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Enemy losses for period 10 - 29 October 1950:

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locomotives	8	11
RR box cars	62	53
Ammunition cars	1	-
RR turntable	-	1
RR bridge	5	2
Tunnels	-	2
Trucks and other vehicles	37	46
Tractors	2	-
HW bridges	3	1
Small boats	11	15
Barges	2	-
Floating crane	1	-
Dredge	-	1
Minesweeper type	1	-
Warehouses	22	11
Huts and small buildings	29	-
Fuel dumps	1	-
Gun emplacements	5	7
Electric transformers	1	-
Troop casualties - - - - -	50 to 75 estimated - - - - -	- - - - -

2. LOGISTICS:

On 12 October 1950 from 1604I to 1758I the LEYTE replenished ammunition. During the first hour 78.6 tons of ammunition and aviation ordnance were transferred from the USS MOUNT KATMAI (AE-16).

3. SHIPBOARD PLANE HANDLING:

During the period of operations with CTF-77, use was made of the "split deck". This system gave maximum flexibility to deck operations and was especially effective when there were schedule changes which with normal spotting would necessitate a respot or an unacceptably slow launch. This spot is dangerous, however, as a catapult failure or a dud will cause a long delay .

It was found that it is advantageous to keep the special purpose aircraft, such as the F4U-5N and F4U-5P aircraft either on the flight deck or in such a position on the hangar deck that they were readily available for any unscheduled launch. Two AD-5W and two AD-3Q type aircraft were kept on the flight deck, whenever conditions permitted, to meet any tactical changes that might occur.

It is believed that consolidation of CV Air Groups into three operating units by type aircraft and the consolidation of the special purpose units into one administrative unit, or into the three main squadrons, depending upon the type of aircraft, would be more efficient, both administratively and operationally. Aircraft shifting to meet scheduled launches would be reduced to a minimum, administration requirements lessened and overall maintenance and availability improved.

The loading of AD-3 type aircraft for the early morning launch with loads that necessitated a wing spread proved time consuming because of the lack of space and necessity of accomplishing this re-arming during periods of darkness. Subsequent loadings during the day presented no problem because of the number of aircraft airborne.

4. INTELLIGENCE:

At the time the LEYTE commenced operating with CTF-77, intelligence procedures had been well established. The advice and recommendations received from ComAirPac, CinCPac Fleet and 7th Fleet were of great value in preparing this ship for immediate operations upon arrival. Maps, Target Dossier, Janis Publications, and Blood Chits had all been received and were ready for use when operations began.


Maps and charts were furnished this activity by ComAirPac. The most useful charts were found to be the Pilotage and Approach Aeronautical Charts (scale 1/500,000 and 1/250,000 respectively). The AMS L551 series (Scale 1/250,000) were also used to advantage. Twelve copies each of the AMS L751 (scale 1/50,000) series were issued to the ship. These were found to be extremely useful for briefing and generally requested by the pilots for use in the air in locating villages and specific targets such as bridges, RR yards and buildings. It is recommended that in future operations sufficient copies of this series be furnished for issue to each squadron (one per pilot or aircraft). It is recommended that copies of gazeteers of surrounding areas (China East Coast, Japan, Manchuria and Taiwan) be included in the ship's allowance. The terrain model of Korea furnished was found to be of use only for general familiarization of the pilots with the area. After making several strikes into the area the pilots became familiar enough with the terrain so that the model had lost a great deal of its value.

With respect to photography and its use in the operation it was found that invariably photography of a target for pre-strike briefing and familiarization was lacking. Also lacking was a program of damage assessment photography. The latter is considered essential to properly evaluate damage resulting from a strike and to corroborate the pilots estimates of damage. Gun camera film was not suitable for damage assessment in that in the majority of cases the pullout was made prior to the camera's recording of hits resulting in no photography at the time of impact, of bombs and rockets.

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In operation it was found that four officers permanently assigned to intelligence could handle the work load. One officer was assigned the task of keeping records including action reports and war diary. The remaining officers, while contributing to the report effort, were primarily assigned tasks of briefing and de-briefing, handling of strike flash reports and preparation of daily summaries. These officers also kept situation plots and assisted in photo interpretation. No photo interpreters were assigned to this ship at the time of entering the combat area. Subsequent to the commencement of operations, one officer from the staff was ordered aboard for temporary duty to act as photo interpreter.


T. U. SISSON.

Enclosure 1

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18 DEC 1950

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander 7th Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet

Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 5 November through 30 November 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 345/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950
(b) USS LEYTE (CV-32) Action Reports #141 through #276 of Nov 1950
(c) USS LEYTE (CV-32) conf ser 092A of 9 Nov 1950
(d) USS LEYTE (CV-32) Jet Report ser 0110 of 3 Dec 1950

1. The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS

U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) a unit of Task Force 77 sortied from Sasebo, Japan on 5 November 1950. OTC was Rear Admiral J.F. HOSKINS, U.S. Navy, CTG 77.3 (ComCarDivTHREE) until 10 November 1950. (Com7thFleet) in U.S.S. MISSOURI, (ComCarDivTHREE) (CTG 77.3) in U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790), USS JUNEAU (CLAA-119), (ComDesRon 11) in U.S.S. WILTSIE (DD-716), USS KEYES (DD-782), U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759), U.S.S. EVERSOLE (DD-789), U.S.S. HIGBEE (DDR-806), U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760), U.S.S. BOLE (DD-755), U.S.S. MOORE (DD-747), U.S.S. MADDOX (DD-731), U.S.S. HOOD (DD-655), U.S.S. CHANDLER (DD-717), and U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783). On 10 November formation was joined by the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and OTC became Rear Admiral E.C. EWEN, U.S. Navy, CTF-77 (ComCarDivONE)

The U.S.S. LEYTE conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDivONE Op-Order 3-50 and daily dispatch air operations plans. The mission was to support United Nations Forces in Northern Korea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for TF-77.

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PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- (A) 11/5/50: Sortied from Sasebo, Japan with the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63). Commander Seventh Fleet embarked, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119) for west coast of Korea.
- 11/6/50: Commenced strike flights over Chongjin to Hapsu area. Conducted night intruder mission on the Hyesan Railroad. 36 Sorties were flown.
- 11/7/50: Conducted fighter sweeps on Huchang to Hapsu. Close support missions were flown in the Sinanju area. Other strike and Photo reconnaissance missions were carried out over Chongjin Omyonbo and Huchang Tonae area. 91 sorties were flown.
- 11/8/50: Conducted close support, fighter sweeps and night intruder missions over Chongjin area. 96 sorties were flown.
- 11/9/50: Spent entire day for replenishment. Received 369,752 gallons fuel oil; 109,839 gallons of aviation gasoline; 203 tons of ammunition.
- 11/10/50: In company with TF-77, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). Conducted strike flights over Sinuiju area, exerted maximum effort to destroy bridges of the Yalu River. 83 sorties were flown.
- 11/11/50: Conducted strike flight operations in the Chongjin to Namsan-Ni area, against transportation and communications installations. LTJG R.R. BATSON, 0429711, U.S. Navy crash-landed his aircraft AD-3, BUNO. 122817 behind enemy lines. Although LTJG BATSON was seen to walk away from the scene of the crash and again on 12 November by Rescue Combat Air Patrol, his present whereabouts and condition are unknown and is presumed missing in action. 102 total sorties were flown this date.
- 11/12/50: Strike and Reconnaissance flights were flown over Nanami, Chongjin and Sinuiju area on railroad and highway bridges of the Yalu River. Conducted Rescue Combat Air Patrol in search for LTJG BATSON. 71 sorties were flown.

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- 11/13/50: Refueled this date. Air Group THREE Shore based Rescue CAP continued search for LTJG BATSON.
- 11/14/50: Conducted strike flight operations on Hyesanjin and Myong-yonchom area and armed reconnaissance flights in the Chosin Reservoir in close support of ground troops in that area. Continued search for LTJG BATSON. 44 sorties were flown.
- 11/15/50: Conducted close support mission in Myongchon and Kapsan area. Strikes were directed at targets in the Nanam and Sinuiju area. Conducted final Rescue CAP operations for LTJG BATSON. 86 sorties were flown.
- 11/16/50: Refueled and replenished ammunition.
- 11/17/50: Conducted close support missions in the Kapsan area, strikes in Hyesanjin area. 78 sorties were flown.
- 11/18/50: Conducted strike flights over Sinuiju area on Yalu River bridges and encountered enemy jet aircraft (MIG-15). VF-31, F9F-2 Jet Target Air Combat Patrol destroyed one MIG-15 and damaged another. 39 sorties were flown.
- 11/19/50: Close air support missions were flown in the Najin-Dong area. 26 sorties were flown.
- 11/20/50: Refueled and replenished ammunition.
- 11/21/50: Conducted strike flights and close support missions in the Namsan-Ni and Yudanini area. 79 sorties were flown.
- 11/22/50: Flights were in close support of ground troops in the Nanam, Nam Hung Dong area. Strikes were conducted on Communications and transportation targets in the Changjin and Chungjin area. 53 sorties were flown.
- 11/23/50: Refueled and replenished ammunition.
- 11/24/50: Strikes were flown over Changtien-Hoku, Sakchu and North Korean border against communications and transportation facilities. 59 sorties were flown.
- 11/25/50: Flights were cancelled due to heavy seas, high winds and low visibility.

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- 11/26/50: Refueled and replenished stores, provisions and ammunition.
- 11/27/50: Although hampered by a snow storm and inclement weather which forced 19 aircraft to land at Wonsan prior to returning to the ship, strike flights were flown over the Northwestern reaches of Korea against enemy supply columns and communications. 53 sorties were flown.
- 11/28/50: Strikes were flown over Northwestern Korea. ENS, W.G. WAGNER, 301502, U.S. Navy, was forced to crash land in Northern Korea when his aircraft, F4U5P, BUNO: 122169 was hit by enemy AA. He was rescued by a helicopter from Sinanju, Rescue Squadron #3. The rescue helicopter later made a forced landing within friendly lines with ENS WAGNER aboard. Both pilots are missing in action. 58 sorties were flown.
- 11/29/50: Refueled and replenished.
- 11/30/50: Commenced maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir area. This was the first day of five continuous maximum effort close support missions in this area in support of ground troops encircled by Chinese Communist Troops. 90 sorties were flown this date.

(B) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR NOVEMBER 1950:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
11/7	1	8	Chosen Reservoir	Gun Emplacements-Troops
11/7	2	7	Sakchu	Warehouses, Military Bldgs,
11/7	3	8	Yong Byon	Tanks, Military Compound
11/7	4	4	South Chosen Res.	Troops, Trucks
11/7	5	4	Yang Dok	Trucks, Troops, Military Bldgs.
11/8	6	8	Puckchin	Military Buildings
11/8	7	8	Hagaru-Ri	Troops, Barracks, Buildings
11/14	8	7	Myongyon Chom	Oil Storage tanks, Bldgs, Concrete bridge.
11/15	9	8	Pungsan	Troops
11/15	10	8	Kapsan	Warehouse, Highway Bridge, Trp.
11/15	11	4	Myong Chon	Troops, Gun Emplacements
11/15	12	4	Myong Chon	Military Buildings, Troops
11/17	13	2	Kapsan	Troops, Military Compound
11/17	14	2	Kapsan	Military Emplacements
11/19	15	4	Myongyon River	Troops, Trenches
11/19	16	2	Myongyon River	Troops, Buildings
11/19	17	4	Myongyon River	Tanks, Troops, Field Piece

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(B) (Continued)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
11/19	18	2	Hamjong Pori	Troops
11/21	19	4	Yodam-Ni	Troops, Trenches, Buildings
11/21	20	2	Hyesanjin	Supply Command
11/21	21	2	Hapyong-Dong	Troops
11/21	22	2	Naman	Troops
11/22	23	2	Chik Tong	Troops, Trucks, Supplies
11/22	24	4	Namhung Dong	Troops, Trucks, Buildings, Supply Compound
11/22	25	2	Mupyong-Ni	RR Cars, Trucks, Troops.
11/30	26	14	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, Emplacements
11/30	27	4	Chosen Reservoir	Warehouse
11/30	28	2	Hagaru-Ri	Troops, Emplacements
11/30	29	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, Emplacements
11/30	30	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, Emplacements, Bldgs.
11/30	31	3	Chosen Reservoir	Gun Emplacements, Troops
11/30	32	4	Kunu-Ri	Troops, Trenches

(c) TOTAL SORTIES

Total sorties against enemy	734
Total sorties defense TF-77	<u>422</u>
Total sorties for November 1950	1156
Total Flight Time	3355.1
Total days on which air operations were conducted	17

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Ordnance expended during the period:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bombs 100# FRAG	115
200# FRAG	535
200# GP	2
350# GP	41
500# GP	312
1000# GP	194
2000# GP	54
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>306 Tons</u>
Rockets:	
3.5" AR	76
5" HVAR	1975
11.75" "Tiny Tims"	16
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>2067 Rockets</u>
Machine Gun Ammunition:	
.50 Cal.	120,561 rounds
20 MM	24,875 rounds
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>145,436 rounds</u>
NAPALM: MK5 and MK12	133 6% mixture
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>8,512# Napalm</u>

(b) PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

The MK66 practice bomb adapted for Napalm was used when the supply of 150 gallon MK-5 and MK-12 drop tanks was exhausted. The MK-66 was unsatisfactory compared to the other tanks. Some bounces and air burns were observed. Some others skidded on the ground and did not burn. None resulted in wide area fires or in fires of sufficient duration. This is probably caused by the heavy gauge metal construction of the skin which prevents a bursting of the tank and permits the external fuzes to be dislodged before effective ignition can result.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship - None

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(b) Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>				<u>OPERATIONS</u>			
	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost	0	1	2	3	1	0	1	2
Damaged	0	14	47	61	1	1	0	2

(c) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Highway Bridge	14	8
Railroad Tracks	1	1
Railroad Bridge	8	2
Supply Dumps	4	1
Warehouses	3	11
River Ferry	1	0
Small Cargo Ships (Junks)	1	1
Trucks	29	34
Military Vehicles	20	15
Tanks	4	3
Buildings	43	41
Barracks	5	12
Gun Emplacements	4	1
Locomotives	3	2
Ammunition Dumps	1	2
Oil Storage Tanks	0	4
Railroad Cars	3	5
Enemy Aircraft (MIG-15)	1	1
Railroad Depot	0	1
Railroad Tunnel	1	0
Troop Emplacements	(Numerous attacked. No available estimate of damage)	
A.A. Emplacements		

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION

(a) Medical:

The general health of the crew has been good. The incidence of venereal disease has been unusually high due to contacts in Sasebo, Japan. An all out drive against V.D. is being conducted with mandatory attendance for all the crew at V.D. lectures and films.

An average of eighty (80) out patients were treated daily. There were 21 daily patients on the sick list.

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(a) Medical (Continued):

There were 5 major and 30 minor injuries total from other than aircraft causes. Surgery was performed on 18 members of the ship's company and on one patient from another ship in company. Of these 19 patients, 2 underwent major surgery and 17 had minor surgery.

Two pilots were declared missing in action. Nine injuries resulted from aircraft accidents.

(b) Dental:

During the month of November, the Dental Department staffed by three dental officers and four dental technicians completed 963 restorations, surgically extracted 13 teeth, performed 70 uncomplicated extractions and rendered 253 treatments at 549 individual sittings, exceeding all previous monthly administrations.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

(a) Winter Flight Operations:

(1) The first snow of winter weather was experienced in this period. Weather deteriorated to a succession of cold fronts passing through the target and operating areas. Snow storms hampered operations over the target and required several flights to land on Korean airfields until weather in the operating areas had cleared. Planes are not equipped with any deicing equipment but, by judicious avoiding of icing clouds and bad weather areas, no serious plane or propeller icing occurred.

(2) Snow and ice on the flight deck was experienced several times and required extreme caution by pilots and flight deck crews to prevent personnel or aircraft casualties. The F9F aircraft, with wings folded, is very unstable and, on an icy flight deck, must be securely tied to the deck with wire to prevent the plane and chocks from sliding across the deck in a turn or in a cross-wind.

(b) Air Department:

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Three emergency jet landings were made aboard during this period. One jet was brought in with no hook. The approach speed was between 099 and 102 knots. The plane engaged two Davis Barriers and was stopped with minor damage to wheel fairings. The plane was flying again the next day. The second jet was brought aboard with a hood partially extended. The pilot made a tail low landing at the cut, caught a wire and was arrested with damage only to the hook track. The third jet was brought aboard without flaps and made a normal arrested landing.

(c) Communications:

Communications between Naval aircraft and Air Force aircraft or ground controllers have proven the pressing need for standardized VHF multi-channel equipment, crystallization and frequency assignment. At present the Air Force operates on a four channel VHF basis and only two of these channels are standard with the Navy. The primary TAC circuit is so jammed that it is almost impossible to effectively control close air support. The secondary channel available is the emergency channel and it is used continually for Support Air Direction and Tactical Control. This obviates its usage for emergencies.

(d) Logistics:

(1) During this period the LEYTE replenished seven times at sea. Receipts are shown in the following table:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
9 November	Fuel Oil	8,690 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	109,830 gallons
	Ammunition	205.79 tons
13 November	Fuel Oil	4,480 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	82,700 gallons
16 November	Fuel Oil	4,328 gallons
	Av. Gasoline	60,802 gallons
	Ammunition	162 tons
20 November	Fuel Oil	3,720 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	55,470 gallons
	Ammunition	60 tons
23 November	Fuel Oil	3,375 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	65,562 gallons
	Ammunition	75 tons
26 November	Fuel Oil	3,157 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	31,000 gallons
	Ammunition	42 tons
29 November	Fresh, frozen, dry, prov.	128 2/5 tons
	Fuel Oil	3,532 barrels
	Av. Gasoline	69,856 gallons
	Ammunition	35 tons

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(2) During the ammunition loading from the U.S.S. MT KATMAI (AE-16) on 9 November, 285.79 tons of ammunition were received at an average rate of 98.78 short tons per hour, the record for one hour was 117 tons. This excellent rate of transfer reflected a high degree of organization and coordination on both the supplying and receiving ships.

(3) The replenishment of provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF-29) on 29 November, established a record rate of supply replenishment for the LEYTE whether at sea or in port. Most of the transfer was accomplished after dark. 135 tons of provisions (30 days supply) were delivered at a rate of 34.4 tons per hour.

(4) The major deficiency in supply that has been encountered is that no aviation material consigned to the LEYTE on the basis of priority Able requisitions, originated since departure from CONUS, has been delivered to the ship in the operating area. The LEYTE is now critically low in high usage aviation spare parts. It is recommended that allowance lists be prepared and promulgated for both war and peacetime operations, and that war allowance lists be made effective at the proper time.

(5) MK-12 Napalm tanks have been used at a high rate and replacements have not been available. The MK-5 tanks have been so badly rusted and corroded that they would not hold gasoline or Napalm and approximately 40% had to be discarded.

(e) Intelligence:

(1) During the month of November the Air Intelligence Office operated with four permanently assigned officers. The problem of handling and storing the tremendous number of charts needed for this operation was solved by keeping on hand in the A.I.O. store room 15 copies of each chart. Upon receipt of aeronautical charts, immediate distribution was made to all squadrons on a one to a pilot basis. Other chart issues (eg. AMSL-551 and 751 series) were made when necessary or on request. The AMSL-751 charts were issued on close support missions when the area of operations was designated by dispatch from OTC prior to take-off time. The aeronautical pilotage charts series 290 B and D were not available. WAC charts were used extensively throughout the period whenever operations required navigation across the Korean Peninsula as they proved superior to all other for DR navigation.

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(2) The practice of briefing squadron AIO's (all on flying status on this ship) who in turn further brief the squadron pilots was abandoned and is no longer recommended. At present all pilots are briefed simultaneously by the AIO. In this manner positive, accurate briefing of all pilots is assured. In addition the flight leader was able to brief on rendezvous areas, times and other details incident to his particular flight.

(3) Close air support was a primary mission during the latter part of the month and ample opportunity was afforded to study this problem from the Air Intelligence viewpoint. The biggest problem was that of communications. This ship normally lacked sufficient information on movement of ground troops to accurately brief C.A.S. pilots. It is realized that this type of information is of necessity, restricted in distribution and further, that it is not always possible to determine the exact location of scattered ground units. However, an overall daily summary of the ground troop positions with approximate location of divisions and their general direction of movement would be ample information. With this information, pilots could better be made to feel the importance of their mission and pilot interest would mount as a result of participation in a known troop operation. An example is the enthusiasm which the CAS pilots have regarded the recent movements of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosen Reservoir.

(4) The AMSL 750 chart was found to be of extreme value in CAS not only in use in the air for finding target coordinates but in briefing and debriefing. The size of the chart makes it impractical to carry more than 4 sheets (joined) in the A/C. However, when the specific target area is known, it is advisable to issue the map or maps to pilots for a specific CAS mission.

(5) A program for damage assessment photography was put into effect early in the month and is considered to be of great value. Through photo interpretation, damage could be accurately assessed and weak or damaged points in targets detected. These vulnerable areas were pointed out to pilots and made points of aim for subsequent attacks. In addition the target area photography provided information on types and location of enemy A/A defenses. With this information coordinated attacks were effectively executed on primary target and defense positions.


In all of the above mentioned work the K-17 camera with 12" lens was used exclusively. Although this equipment provides excellent photo interpretation photography it lacks sufficiently wide coverage to furnish prints suitable for pilot briefing. It is recommended that the K-18 be used in the initial target photography thus providing wider coverage and more suitable photographs for pilot briefings. The Air Force is currently using the K-18 for area coverage and should be a source of this type of photography.

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(6) The interchange of target photography within the Task Force has proven invaluable and is a step toward the desired coordination required of all available sources of combat photography.

(7) Photographic interpretation can be aided by a system whereby information from ground forces on description or characteristics of typical enemy military installations, buildings, equipment, camouflage, etc., could be disseminated to force photo interpreters. This would materially facilitate the work of the interpreters and solve the mystery of the many unidentified buildings and objects so frequently reported.


T. U. SISSON

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08

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
 To: Chief of Naval Operations
 Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
 (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
 (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
 (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

8 JAN 1951

AR 119/CV

Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 1 December 1950
 through 26 December 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP-345/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950
 (b) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 092A of 9 Nov 1950
 (c) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 0121 of 18 Dec 1950
 (d) U.S.S. LEYTE Action Reports "277 through 438 of Dec 1950

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1. The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action is forwarded here-
 with in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS

U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) a unit of Task Force 77 was operating in the Sea of Japan, OTC was Rear Admiral E.C. EWEN, U. S. Navy, TF-77 (ComCarDivONE) in U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). (Com7thFleet) in U.S.S. MISSOURI, (ComCarDivTHREE) (CTG 77.3) in U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119), ComDesRon 11 in the U.S.S. WILTSIE (DD-716), U.S.S. ROWAN (DD-702), U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759), U.S.S. MOORE (DD-747), U.S.S. MADDOX (DD-731), U.S.S. CHANDLER (DD-717), U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783), U.S.S. KEPLER (DD-765), ComDesRon 2 in the U.S.S. BERRY (DD-858), U.S.S. CAFFERTY (DD-860), U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785), U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869), U.S.S. STICKWELL (DD-888), and U.S.S. BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887).

The U.S.S. LEYTE conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDivONE's Op-Order 3-50 and daily dispatch air operations plans. The mission was to support United Nations Forces in Northern Korea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for TF-77. During the month of December, Air Group THREE was committed primarily to close air support missions in the Chosin Reservoir and Hungnam Area.

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PART II

(a) <u>Total sorties for December 1950:</u>	<u>1124</u>
Sorties over Korea	781
Sorties over TF-77	343
Total hours flown	3210.9 hrs.
Total days operations	25
Days on which air operations conducted	18

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- (b) 12/1/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. This was the second day of maximum effort close support missions in this area in support of ground troops encircled by Chinese Communist Troops. During instrument flight operations along route to and snow storms in the action area 22 sorties including night sorties were flown.
- 12/2/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. Close Support provided for First Marine Division under mass attack by Chinese Communist Troops. Continued support flights until 2038I with night intruder aircraft. 61 sorties were flown.
- 12/3/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir Area. Close support provided directly to First Marine Division. 36 Napalm Bombs were expended on two parallel ridges 1 1/2 miles long cremating Chinese Communist Troops holding these highly strategic high positions along the only usable route to Hamhung. 69 sorties were flown.
- 12/4/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir, (Koto-Ri) Area. F4U, BUNO. 97231 crashed in Koto-Ri Area behind enemy lines. Crash was caused by enemy anti-aircraft hits. Pilot Ensign Jesse L. BROWN, 504477, U. S. Navy sustained severe injuries and was unable to extricate himself from aircraft. LTJG T.J. HUDNER, Jr., 485270, U.S. Navy, landed his F4U, BUNO. 82050 wheels up nearby and endeavored to remove Jesse BROWN who was pinned in the wreckage. HUDNER and rescue helicopter pilot were unable to remove BROWN.

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- Ensign Jesse L. BROWN died of his injuries. His body was not recovered. LTJG HUDNER was returned to this ship. 77 sorties were flown.
- 12/5/50: In company with U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) and U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119) spent entire day in logistics area replenishing. Received 344,652 gallons of fuel oil; 125,000 gallons of aviation gasoline; 205 tons of ammunition.
- 12/6/50: Rejoined TF-77. Recommended close support missions over Chosin Reservoir Area at 0430I with Night Intruder Missions using Mark 6 flares to illuminate enemy troop concentrations. 67 sorties were flown.
- 12/7/50: Commenced flight operations with Jet TARCAP over Chosin Reservoir and continued maximum effort close air support missions throughout the day. 72 sorties were flown.
- 12/8/50: In company with U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) replenished in logistics area. Received 25,296 gallons of fuel oil; 63,156 gallons of aviation gasoline and 75 tons of ammunition.
- 12/9/50: Continued with maximum effort close support missions covering withdrawal of First Marine Division from Chosin Reservoir to Hamhung. 82 sorties were flown.
- 12/10/50: Continued maximum effort close support missions covering final stages of First Marine Division's withdrawal to Hamhung. 61 sorties were flown.
- 12/11/50: In logistics support area. Replenished 117,411 gallons of fuel oil, 68,194 gallons aviation gasoline, 120 tons of ammunition and 99 tons of Fresh, frozen and dry provisions.
- 12/12/50: Strike flights were directed against Huichon, Kanggye and Wonsan, with close support missions in the Omyonbo, Songjin and Pujun-Ni areas. AD4, BUNO. 123883 hit a high tension wire and crashed in Korea behind enemy lines. Pilot LCDR R.M. BAGWELL, 85753, U. S. Navy, Squadron Commander of VA-35 of CVG-3 was captured by enemy troops and is missing in action. 81 sorties were flown.
- 12/13/50: Strike flights were flown in Kilchu and Tokchon areas. Highly effective close support missions were flown in support of troops holding the perimeter at Hamhung. 87 sorties were flown.

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- 12/14/50: Continued close support of troops holding perimeter at Hamhung. Strikes were directed into Fusen Reservoir area against Chinese Red Troops and troop replacements moving into Hamhung area. 56 sorties were flown.
- 12/15/50: Replenished in the logistics area. Received 322,036 gallons of fuel oil, 151,008 gallons of aviation gasoline, 38 tons of ammunition, 37 tons of provisions.
- 12/16/50: Conducted strikes and night intruder missions in the Fusen Reservoir Area. Encountered adverse weather conditions over target. 18 sorties were flown.
- 12/17/50: Commenced close support missions in Hungnam sea port area in support of troops covering evacuation operations. 53 sorties were flown.
- 12/18/50: Delivered 99,832 gallons of fuel oil to U.S.S. HIGBEE (DDR-806).
- 12/19/50: Replenished all day. Received 224,154 gallons of fuel oil, 44,987 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 84 tons of ammunition.
- 12/20/50: Close support missions and TARCAP covered the Hungnam area. Strikes were directed against the Toejo area. 74 sorties were flown.
- 12/21/50: Close support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface naval units in the same area. 77 sorties were flown.
- 12/22/50: Replenished at sea. Received 126,789 gallons of fuel oil, 70,770 gallons of aviation gasoline and 75 tons of ammunition.
- 12/23/50: Close Support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface units in the same area. 74 sorties were flown.
- 12/24/50: Close support missions covered Hungnam perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with surface naval units in the same area. Deep support missions were directed at targets in the Punghori, Chosin Reservoir and Hagaruri areas. 71 sorties were flown.
- 12/26/50: Enroute from Strike area to Sasebo, Japan. 10531 moored to bouy #19 Sasebo-Ko, Japan.

(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR DECEMBER 1950

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/1	33	6	Kunu-Ri	Troop concentrations
12/1	34	8	Kunu-Ri	Troop concentrations
12/2	35	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	36	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	37	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	38	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/2	39	7	Chosen Reservoir	Bivouac area
12/2	40	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/3	41	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troop emplacements
12/3	42	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, ridges
12/3	43	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	44	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	45	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	46	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	47	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/3	48	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	49	4	North of Chosen Res.	Troops, emplacements
12/4	50	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	51	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	52	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	53	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	54	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/4	55	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	56	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	57	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/4	58	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/4	59	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/4	60	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	61	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	62	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	63	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	64	2	Chosen Reservoir	Truck
12/6	65	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	66	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	67	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	68	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/6	69	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, gun emplacement
12/6	70	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/7	71	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	72	11	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	73	11	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/7	74	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	75	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/7	76	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/7	77	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/9	78	12	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements, buildings
12/9	79	8	Chosen Reservoir	Railroad trestle, troops
12/9	80	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/9	81	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/9	82	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/10	83	7	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/11	84	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	85	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	86	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	87	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	88	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	89	3	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/11	90	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/12	91	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	92	12	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	93	17	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	94	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/12	95	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trucks
12/13	96	8	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	97	10	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	98	9	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	99	4	Hungnam	Troops, emplacements
12/13	100	4	Hagaru-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/13	101	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	102	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/13	103	10	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, emplacements
12/14	104	16	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/14	105	14	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/17	106	2	Chuhari	Troops, emplacements
12/17	107	4	Chuhari	Troops, emplacements
12/17	108	8	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
12/17	109	6	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/17	110	10	Koto-Ri	Troops, emplacements
12/20	111	12	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	112	5	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	113	4	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	114	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/20	115	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings
12/21	116	9	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	117	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	118	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	119	3	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	120	5	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	121	6	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	122	4	Hungnam	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	123	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/21	124	2	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings, trenches
12/23	125	6	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	126	3	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	127	6	Yonpo Airfield	Troops, emplacements, supplies
12/23	128	4	Chosen Reservoir	Troops
12/23	129	4	Yonpo Airfield	Fuel storage piles
12/23	130	6	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	131	16	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	132	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	133	5	Chosen Reservoir	Troops, buildings
12/24	134	4	Hanhung	Airfield

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Ordnance expended during the period 1 December to 26 December 1950:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bombs: 100# FRAG	1,496
220# FRAG	360
350 ADB	2
500# GP	63
2000# GP	6
	<u>TOTAL 1,927 bombs</u>
Rockets: 3.5" AR	20
5" HVAR	2,183
11.75" "Tiny Tims"	4
	<u>TOTAL 2,207</u>
Machine Gun Ammunition:	
.50 cal.	317,230 rounds
20 MM	24,875 rounds
	<u>TOTAL 368,940 rounds</u>
Napalm: Mk-5 and MK-12 (6% mixture)	721
	<u>TOTAL 46,144# Napalm</u>
Flares: Mk-6	40

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship - - None

(b) Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>				<u>OPERATIONAL</u>			
	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost:	0	2	3	5	1	0	1	2
Damaged:	0	4	9	13	0	1	0	1

(c) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Buildings	84	338
Railroad Trestle	2	0
Highway bridge	1	0
Towns occupied by enemy forces (50 to 100 percent destroyed)	0	7
Ammunition Dump	0	2
Fuel Dumps	0	9
Supply Dumps	0	4
Tanks	1	0
Armored Cars	1	0
Trucks	17	21
Locomotives	4	2
Railroad Cars	5	1
Oxcarts	4	42
Jeep Type vehicles	3	2
Horses	0	130
Oxen	0	3
Field Pieces	0	3
Mortar positions (silenced)	- - - - 4 - - - -	-
Command Posts	1	0
Artillery Observation Post	1	0
Machine Gun Nests (silenced)	- - - - 4 - - - -	-

Attacked over 152 troop emplacements. It is estimated that 8000 to 10,000 casualties were inflicted. 1824 bodies were counted from the air. In the one check with ground forces in the accuracy of these estimates a count of 250 from the air was checked by a ground count to have actually been 2000 killed. This occurred in a ravine near Hagaru-Ri during a Chosin Reservoir fight.

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION

1. Medical:

(a) Casualties:

- (1) One killed in action.
- (2) Two missing in action.

(b) Injuries:

- (1) Aircraft 4
- (2) Major 3
- (3) Minor 29

1. Medical: (Continued)

(c) Surgery:

- | | |
|----------------------|----|
| (1) Ship's Company | 18 |
| (2) From Other Ships | 0 |
| (3) Major Surgery | 3 |
| (4) Minor Surgery | 15 |

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(d) Average number of patients treated daily - 75- Out patients.

Average number of patients on sick list daily - 14

(e) First Aid Lectures to various divisions - 4

(f) General Health of the crew. Training Films and Lectures.

(1) General health of the crew has been good.

(2) Training films were shown and lectures were given on the problems of survival to the entire ship's company and air group during the period covered by this report.

(3) During the month 17 venereal disease training films and lectures were given to remainder of ship's company and air group personnel who were unable to attend lectures during November, as well as all new personnel upon reporting aboard during this month.

2. Dental:

During the month of December, the Dental Department staffed by two Dental Officers and four dental technicians completed 725 restorations, surgically extracted 15 teeth, performed 66 uncomplicated extractions and rendered 150 treatments at 594 individual sittings. 3,072 restorations were completed since 5 September 1950.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

(a) Aircraft Composition of Air Group:

- (1) During the period 10 October to 25 December 1950, the U.S.S. LEYTE was in the Korean Theater for a total of 76 days. During this period, air operations were conducted on 49 days and a total of

(a) Aircraft composition of Air Group (Continued):

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- (1) Continued):
3369 sorties were flown by CVG-3 aircraft.
- (2) The aircraft complement by type assigned to the ship was as follows:

16 F9F - 34 F4U - 4 F4U5P - 4 F4U5N - 18 AD3 - 4 AD3W - 4 AD3Q
- (3) The following figures represent the average availability of Air Group Three's aircraft by type over the period of 49 days of air operations.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
11.7 F9F's	77.7%
33.7 F4U's	85.1%
20.4 AD's	82.1%

Average availability for all Air Group Three aircraft was 81.6%. This is considered to be a very high continuing standard of aircraft maintenance at sea. The major difficulty was the non-receipt of spare parts. If AOG aircraft were discounted availability would have been about 87%.

- (4) The number of total sorties, and sorties flown over Korea are indicated by type, in the following figures:

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES OVER KOREA</u>
821 F9F	207 F9F
1,586 F4U	1,291 F4U
962 AD	750 AD
<u>TOTAL: 3,369</u>	<u>TOTAL: 2,248</u>

- (5) Ordnance expenditures by offensive sorties over Korea were as follows:

	<u>TOTAL ROUNDS AMMO. EXPENDED</u>	<u>AVERAGE RDS. AMMO. EXPENDED BY SORTIE</u>	<u>AV. ROUNDS EXPENDED PER OPERATING DAY</u>
F9F	31,698	153	646
F4U	610,600	473	12,461
AD	91,575	122	1,869
TOTALS:	<u>733,873</u>	<u>748</u>	<u>14,976</u>

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	<u>TOTAL ROCKETS</u>	<u>TOTAL TINY TBMS</u>	<u>TOTAL BOMBS (TONS)</u>	<u>TOTAL NAPALM (TANKS)</u>
F9F	000	000	000	000
F4U	5,394	000	116.58	496
AD	2,518	20	519.26	402
TOTALS:	<u>7,912</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>635.84</u>	<u>898</u>

(6) Although comparative statistics are not available on the ordnance loads carried by the PHILIPPINE SEA or the VALLEY FORGE, it is considered that plane complement of the LEYTE Air Group provided greater inherent bomb and rocket load carrying capacity for the effective destruction of enemy troops, equipment, shelters, and supply lines.

(a) Jet planes assigned to the ship, although two less than a normal 18 plane squadron, were sufficient to meet scheduled demands of CAP, TARCAP, Sweeps and condition 10 aircraft. It is recommended that the complement of jet aircraft for all CV-9 class carriers be limited to one squadron of 18 jet fighters. This is considered the most effective complement of aircraft for any operations foreseeable in the near future because it allows for the maximum number of attack type aircraft and yet provides an adequate jet defense for the Task Force and strike groups.

(b) The statistics given herein and above seem to confirm the above principle and recommendation. The comparative attack capacity of various possible Air Group compositions follow:

	<u>LEYTE *</u>	<u>PHIL SEA*</u>	<u>CARRIER "X"</u>
F9F	16	24	18
F4U	40	34	
AD	26	24	52
	<u>82</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>70</u>

Bomb Load:

(a) No Rockets	524 Rockets	512 Rockets	576 Rockets
on Jets	168,000# Bombs	148,000# Bombs	192,000# Bombs
(b) Rockets	680 Rockets	656 Rockets	684 Rockets
on Jets	168,000# Bombs	148,000# Bombs	192,000# Bombs

* Approximate present operations complement.
 . "X" Hypothetical Air Group considering no F4U's available.

(b) Aviation Ordnance:

- (1) In operations on board this vessel involving the use of shipboard ordnance handling equipment the following difficulties have been encountered: (See USS LEYTE serial 1513 of 1 December 1950 to ComAirPac):

(A) MK 4 Bomb and Torpedo Truck:

- (1) The MK 4 MOD 0 Bomb and Torpedo Truck is used to move aircraft ammunition from bomb elevators to the respective ready service ammunition lockers. In these operations it has been found that the brake mechanism of the MK4 MOD 0 Bomb and Torpedo Truck is highly unsatisfactory. The "life" of the brake cable is very short, and when the brake cable is broken, passage of the loaded truck over barrier cables sets the brake. To release the brake it is then necessary to unload the truck, turn the brake acuating drum by hand until the wheels are unlocked, reload the truck, and continue passage to ready service locker. The current use of Davis type jet barriers present additional problems in movement of this truck over the flight deck. These difficulties could be eliminated by the use of larger wheels on the truck to raise the carriage of the truck higher from the deck. A stronger manner of securing the brake acuating cable to the brake acuating drum, plus the use of larger cable would eliminate the problem of breakdown in the brake mechanism.

(B) Bomb Skids:

- (1) All bomb skids should be equipped with the chain type securing strap rather than the web straps now generally in use. The web straps have proven to be unsatisfactory due to the deterioration of the straps because of exposure to elements and wear from normal usage.

(C) Bomb Skid Adapter:

- (1) The MK 3 Bomb Skid Adapter currently used to transport HVAR's is not satisfactory due to reasons indicated below:
- (a) Racks for stowage of HVAR's on adapters are constructed of metal which bends.
 - (b) HVAR's are not sufficiently well secured in adapter, and at times during transport over flight deck the HVAR's are tumbled on to the flight deck.

- (c) To remedy condition in regards to adapter racks, bending, the use of stronger metal is recommended.
- (d) To remedy condition in regards to insecurity of HVAR's in adapter it is recommended that a metal securing strap, shaped to contour of HVAR motor be manufactured, and hinged to inboard of adapter. A flange should be added to the HVAR rack and this flange should be slotted, to accommodate a securing pin. The securing pin can be manufactured out of unthreaded metal stock and have a wing type nut, backed by spring pressure to effect locking of metal strap to flange of HVAR adapter stowage rack.

(D) Bomb Skid Stowage:

- (1) At present no allocated stowage space on flight deck exists for the stowage of bomb skids. As a result of this condition bomb skids are stowed where space permits. The need for empty bomb skids on the flight deck is justified by virtue of the need for jettisoning of bombs and rockets being ever present when engaged in combat operations. If stowage racks were constructed, a greater number of bomb skids could be stored on the flight deck without necessity of utilizing actual deck space. Having bomb skids stowed in a definite location will greatly expedite skid procurement by all ordnance personnel when need for jettisoning a deck load of aircraft ammunition becomes necessary.
- (2) The present parachute flare suspension band has proven to be unsatisfactory for use on MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Racks and it is necessary to manufacture metal suspension bands, as well as "cut down" to proper size, excess suspension bands from the 100# Water Filled Bombs. It is recommended that a new type suspension band for all parachute flares be manufactured, using the type used on 100# Water Filled Bombs as a model.
- (3) The T-2 type of gun heater employed on the 20 MM aircraft gun has a service "life" of from 4 to 6 hours. The short "life" is accredited to the fact that the heating element of the T-2 gun heater is too fragile. "Rough" arrested landings by aircraft causes a breakdown of the heating element.
- (4) The firing pin in the T-31 20 MM aircraft gun is subject to what is considered excessive breakage. Due to this high breakage it is often necessary to change firing pins after approximately 50 rounds of ammunition have been fired.

(D) Bomb Skid Stowage: (Continued):

- (5) The electrical (cannon) connection "pins" of the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack are extremely brittle and therefore are subject to excessive breakage in normal service. The electrical connection "pins" on the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack which suffer the greatest mortality are in the bomb release circuit of the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack. Due to operational requirements it is frequently necessary to install and remove the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb Rack from the aircraft, and it is during the installation and removal operations that the "pins" prevent the completion of the electrical bombing circuit and result in "hung" bombs being returned to the carrier.
- (6) The MK 5 MOD 5 Rocket Launcher presently in use on the F4U4 Model aircraft is not constructed well enough to sustain the weight of the HVAR. Numerous cases of MK 5 MOD 4 rocket launchers breaking, when planes are taxiing forward, or are towed into the "spot" have occurred, and the rockets have dropped on deck as a result. It is recommended that a bracing method be devised for the rocket launcher post (front and rear). Due to method of securing MK 5 MOD 4 rocket launcher mounting plate to wing, and employment of the rocket launcher to carry HVAR's the "rivets" of the "skin" on the wing of the aircraft "work" loose and separate from the ribs of the wing.
- (7) Cold weather and high winds across flight deck especially during pre-dawn hours, constitutes a great problem in loading of aircraft wing stations with ordnance material.
- (8) Loading of the wing stations of the AD type aircraft with ordnance material weighing more than the HVAR, is a major problem of ordnance loading. Development of a means to load the wing stations, safely and rapidly, to maximum capacity on the AD type aircraft, is urgently needed.

(c) Communications:

Two tactical circuits are not considered sufficient for even the tactical needs of the Task Force. (See LEYTE serial 098 of 21 November 1950.) Current usage of either or both for administrative traffic adds an excessive burden to an already overloaded system. It is recommended that administrative traffic be removed from the tactical circuits.

(d) Logistics:

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(1) <u>DATE</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
5 December	Fuel Oil	344,652 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	125,000 gallons
	Ammunition	205 tons
8 December	Fuel Oil	35,296 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	63,156 gallons
	Ammunition	75 tons
11 December	Fuel Oil	117,411 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	68,194 gallons
	Ammunition	120 tons
	Fresh, frozen, dry provisions	99 tons
15 December	Fuel Oil	322,036 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	151,008 gallons
	Ammunition	38 tons
	Fresh, frozen, dry provisions	37 tons
19 December	Fuel Oil	224,154 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	44,987 gallons
	Ammunition	84 tons
22 December	Fuel Oil	126,789 gallons
	Aviation Gasoline	70,770 gallons
	Ammunition	75 Tons

(2) The U.S.S. LEYTE's rearming operations 8 December 1950 from the U.S.S. MT KATMAI (AE-16) was conducted during darkness with the aid of cargo lights. Despite the night operations the rearming rate achieved was 80 short tons per hour. This excellent rate of transfer reflected a high degree of organization and coordination on both the supplying and the receiving ships.

(3) On 15 December 1950 the U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) rearmed from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18) under difficult conditions caused by heavy seas. However, a transfer rate of 55.9 short tons per hour was maintained as a result of excellent performance of personnel on both the receiving and supplying ships.


(e) Hull Damage from Jettisoned HVAR:

(1) On 17 December 1950 at 1344I a HVAR rocket that had fallen off a landing airplane was jettisoned from the flight deck level, frame number 126, starboard side. The rocket was seen to travel aft and towards the ship and then finally exploded deep in the water.

(e) Hull Damage from Jettisoned HVAR (Continued):


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- (2) Further investigation proved beyond a doubt that the rocket hit the rolling chock between frames 130 and 131 causing damage to the "G" and "H" straps in fuel oil tank B-79-F. The riveted lap seam joining "G" and "H" straps was badly distorted causing all rivets to leak in this area. Rivets attaching the rolling chock to the turn of the bilge also leaked. The next transverse bulkhead (T.B. #1) was split vertically a distance of 3' 6". Evidence of concussion was evident by bent gussets, slightly warped frame (frame no. 130) and distorted vertical separator bulkheads in fuel oil tank #79. The damaged area of the "G" and "H" straps consisted of a large dished in area. Vertical height 5 feet and horizontal 4 feet in the turn of the bilge.
- (3) This damage was repaired temporarily by welding rivets in the lap seam of "G" and "H" straps and building a small steel cofferdam in the bottom of B-79-F in the damaged area. The split in the bulkhead of T. B. #1 was cut out and a plate patch welded in its place.



T. U. SISSON

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USS PHILIPPINE SEA
USS PRINCETON
USS SICILY
COMCARDIV5
COMAIRLANT
COMAIRPAC

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2 FEB 1951

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 7 January 1951 through 19 January 1951

Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP-345/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950
(b) U.S.S. LEYTE Action Reports "439 through 505 of January 1951"
(c) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 092A of 9 November 1950
(d) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 0121 of 18 December 1950
(e) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 08 of 8 January 1951

1. The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action for January 1951 is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS

The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) sortied from Sasebo-Ko, Japan on 7 January in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE classified dispatch 052345Z of January 1951 as a unit of Task Group 77.3 to join Task Force-77 operating in the strike area, Sea of Japan. Task Force-77 was composed of the following: OTC was rear Admiral E.C. EWEN, CTG-77.3 (ComCarDivONE) in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). SOPA Vice Admiral STRUBLE, U.S. N. Commander Seventh Fleet in the U.S.S. MISSOURI, ComCarDivFIVE and CTF-77 in the U.S.S. PRINCETON, Comdesron11 in the U.S.S. WILTSIE. Ship's included: U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119), U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), U.S.S. ST PAUL (CA-77), U.S.S. BERRY (DDE-858), U.S.S. KAPLER (DDE-765), U.S.S. NORRIS (DDE-859), U.S.S. MC CAFFERY (DDE-860), U.S.S. GURKLE (DD-783), U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785), U.S.S. THOMAS (DD-833), U.S.S. OZBOURN (DD-846), U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790), U.S.S. KYLES (DD-787), U.S.S. HIGBOLD (DDR-806), U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869), U.S.S. BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887), U.S.S. STICKWELL (DD-888) and U.S.S. DUNCAN (DD-874).

The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE's Op-Order #4-50 and air operations plans Z-1, Z-2, Z-3 and Z-4 as modified by daily dispatch orders. The mission was to support United Nations Forces in Korea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for Task Force Seventy Seven.

(a) <u>TOTAL SORTIES FOR JANUARY 1951:</u>	<u>508</u>
Sorties over Korea	300
Sorties over TF-77	162
Days in operating area	12
Days on which flight operations were conducted	7
Total hours flown	1,456.9 hrs.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- (b) 1/8/51: Conducted weather recco over South Central Korea. Further air strikes cancelled by OTC due to poor visibility over target area.
- 1/9/51 No flight operations were conducted on these dates due to low
thru ceiling and poor visibility.
- 1/11/51:
- 1/12/51: In logistics support area. Replenished 44 tons of ammunition, 18,732 gallons aviation gasoline, 8,590 barrels of fuel oil.
- 1/13/51: Commenced flight operations with TARCAP over South Central Korea. Close Air Support Missions and TARCAP were flown over the Suwon and Wonju areas in support of advance patrols engaging the enemy in those areas. 69 sorties were flown.
- 1/14/51: Air operations consisted of concentrated close air support missions in the Wonju and Yongwol areas. A photo reconnaissance mission was directed to Seoul for advance planning purposes. AD-3 BUNR 122797 crashed into sea after takeoff as a result of complete engine failure. The pilot, ENS D.A. Jacobs, 470708, U.S. Navy was recovered by LBYTE helicopter within 4 minutes after crashing, and was aboard safely and uninjured within 7 minutes after crash. 109 sorties were flown.
- 1/15/51: Commenced air operations with strikes against military emplacements and ammunition dumps in the Kangnung, Wonju, Tanyang and Namdae-Ri areas, destroying 38 buildings and one ammunition dump. Six villages housing enemy troops were destroyed by burning with napalm and numerous troops were killed. 68 sorties were flown.
- 1/16/51: Rendezvoused with logistics support group in logistics area. Replenished 87.5 tons of ammunition, 128,000 gallons aviation fuel, 6,220 barrels of fuel oil. Received 7 Korean refugees from the Wonsan area who were in critical condition from the U.S.S. NORRIS (DDT-859). U.S.S. NORRIS rescued 21 Korean refugees from drifting Sampan upon orders from OTC (Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LBYTE).

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CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS
(Continued)

- 1/17/51: Conducted air strikes against Hungnam, Yudong-Ni, Wonju, and Seoul with close support missions in the Wonju, Yongwal, Nokchonni and Hoengsong areas. 96 sorties were flown.
- 1/18/51: Directed fighter sweeps into the Hungnam area. Close air support missions were conducted in the Machiri, Hoengsong, Oktongui, Kusanni, Hajinburi, Yongju and Murungni areas. 104 sorties were flown.
- 1/19/51: Concentrated close air support missions were directed to the Yongwal and Machari areas. At 1512 departed strike area enroute to Sasebo, Japan in accordance with CTF-77 classified dispatch 180330Z. 35 sorties were flown.

(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR JANUARY 1951:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
1/13	135	2	Suwon	Troops, houses
1/13	136	3	Wonju	Troops, houses
1/13	137	2	Suwon	Troops
1/13	138	5	Yongin	Troops, buildings
1/13	139	4	Wonju	Troops, buildings
1/13	140	4	Wonju	Buildings
1/13	141	4	Suwon	Supply Dump
1/13	142	5	Wonju	Aborted due to weather
1/14	143	6	Wonju	Burned enemy village
1/14	144	2	Yongwol	Troops, tank, truck, bridge
1/14	145	6	Seoul	Tank, truck, troops
1/14	146	2	Yongwol	Troops, houses
1/14	147	6	Wonju	Troops, military supplies
1/14	148	4	Wonju	Troops, houses
1/14	149	13	Yongwol	Buildings.
1/15	150	4	Kangnung	Troops
1/15	151	8	Wonju	Warehouses
1/15	152	6	Tanyang	Troops, enemy village
1/15	153	4	Namdae-Ri	Troops, buildings
1/15	154	4	Wonju	Troops, Dest. Ammo Dump.
1/15	155	6	Tanyang	Troops, buildings

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PART II (Continued)

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(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR JANUARY 1951(Cont'd):

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAS MISSION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TARGETS HIT</u>
1/17	256	2	Hungnam	Buildings
1/17	157	2	Hungnam	Warehouses
1/17	158	2	Yudong-Ni	Troops, Pack Animals
1/17	159	2	Wonju	Troops
1/17	160	4	Seoul	Troops, enemy village
1/17	161	4	Pungnim-Ni	Supplies, buildings, troops
1/17	162	3	Hungnam	Troop column
1/17	163	2	Yongwol	Troops, houses
1/17	164	2	Nokchonni	Barracks, troops
1/17	165	4	Hoengsong	Troops (500)
1/17	166	4	Yongwol	Troops, enemy village
1/17	167	4	Yudong-Ni	Enemy village, troops
1/17	168	2	Wonju	Enemy village, troops
1/18	169	2	Machiri	Troops, houses
1/18	170	4	Moengsong	Troops, houses
1/18	171	4	Oktongin	Troops, tank
1/18	172	4	Kusanni	Gun emplacements, troops
1/18	173	4	Hajinburi	buildings
1/18	174	2	Yongju	Troops, buildings
1/18	175	6	Murungni	Troops, buildings
1/18	176	4	Hajinburi	Enemy villages
1/18	177	4	Wonju	Troops
1/18	178	4	Yongin	Troops
1/18	179	2	Kusanni	Enemy village
1/19	180	12	Yongwal	Troops
1/19	181	4	Machari	Troops, buildings

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DECLASSIFIED PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Ordnance expended during the period 1 January to 19 January 1951:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bombs: 100# FRAG (Daisy Cutters)	256
220# FRAG	263
350# ADB	9
500# GP	6
TOTAL	534 Bombs
Rockets: 3.5" AR	22
5" HVAR	831
TOTAL	853 Rockets
Machine Gun Ammunition:	
.50 cal.	91,260
20 MM	23,466
TOTAL	114,726 Rounds
Napalm: MK-5 and MK-12 (9% mixture) tanks	341
TOTAL	22,506 # Napalm

(b) Performance of Aviation Ordnance:

(1) Napalm:

With the advent of cold weather, greater care was taken that napalm was mixed well in advance of take-off, gasoline was heated while mixing and the mixture was agitated to insure a good "gel". Some improper burns and duds were still encountered so a continuing record of location, altitude, angle of drop and results was kept to ascertain the causes of failure. Of 341 MK-12 and Jap F51 tanks dropped, 46 failed to ignite properly. Most of these were dropped in snow and either slid along on top of the snow without the sudden deceleration and bursting of hitting a hard object or they buried themselves in the snow so the results could not be observed. It is recommended that a study of snow drops and fuze action be made to determine and correct the probable causes of failures under these conditions.

(c) 20 MM Guns:

Careful maintenance, routine inspection and cleaning and wiping the guns dry has resulted in excellent 20MM gun performance in spite of the cold weather encountered.

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PART IV

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BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship: - None

(b) Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>				<u>OPERATIONAL</u>			
	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost:	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Damaged:	0	3	4	7	0	0	0	0

(c) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Buildings containing enemy troops	52	227
Villages containing enemy troops (Less than 50%)	6	(Over 50%) 7
Supply Dumps	00	1
Ammunition Dumps	00	1
Tanks	1	2
Trucks	2	1
Gun Positions	2	1 (20MM Quad)

Numerous enemy troops were killed by highly effective close support missions in the Wonju - Suwon area.

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION

1. Medical:

(a) Casualties:

(1) One aviator, ENS William George Wagner, U.S. Navy, reported missing in action in December report officially declared killed in action.

(b) Injuries:

(1) Aircraft - 1
 (2) Major - 5
 (3) Minor - 21

6

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION
(Continued)

(c) Surgery:

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|----|
| (1) Ships Company | - | 11 |
| (2) From Other ships | - | 0 |
| (3) Major surgery | - | 3 |
| (4) Minor surgery | - | 8 |

(d) Average number patients treated daily - 125 (out-patients)

Average number of patients on sick list daily - 10

(e) First Aid Lectures to various divisions - 19

(f) General Health of the crew. Training Films and Lectures:

- (1) General health of the crew has been good. Incidence of venereal disease has run unusually high as a result of contacts in Sasebo, Japan.
- (2) Training Films were shown and 31 lectures were given on the problems of survival to the ships company and air group during the period covered by this report.
- (3) During the month 19 venereal disease training films and lectures were given to remainder of ships company and air group personnel who were unable to attend lectures during December as well as all new personnel upon reporting aboard during this month.
- (4) Seven (7) Korean refugees suffering from frost bitten feet were received on board for treatment from U.S.S. NORRIS on 1/16/51. They were transferred on 1/17/51 to U.S.S. ISBELL for further transfer to Army authorities at Pusan.

2. Dental:

- (a) During the month of January, the Dental Department staffed by two dental officers and four dental technicians completed 460 restorations, surgically extracted 13 teeth, performed 50 uncomplicated extractions with 16 miscellaneous treatments and 170 oral prophylaxis at 479 individual sittings.

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PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. Night Operations:

- (a) Air operations in close support of ground troops continued to emphasize that a continuing umbrella of aircraft is required over the front lines in order to provide the air cover when and where needed. It is relatively simple to provide this in a reasonable amount during daylight hours and to increase the amount of cover as more carriers are made available. But, to provide, in addition, an effective night cover to hold down the enemy's nocturnal movements results in a hardship on the flight deck crews, taxi pilots and ordnance crews of the daytime operating carriers. With three or more carriers however, such cover can be provided. The night or all-weather detachments on carriers should be continued in preference to a night carrier because all CV deck crews should be expert in night operations, and a more complete overall night coverage is available if required.

2. Engineering:

- (a) The main engine and boiler installation of the LEYTE has worked without breakdown in over $2\frac{1}{2}$ years and 200,000 miles of steaming. The LEYTE has only lighted off eight boilers for required full power runs and by steaming on four or six boilers has been able to schedule a continuing rotational upkeep and maintenance program on all boilers and auxiliary machinery. Six boilers have always been used when jets were scheduled. In all kinds of air operations from the light winds in the Mediterranean to the variable winds of the Japan Sea, six boiler power for speeds up to 30 knots has proven adequate for even jet operation.

3. Jet Barriers:

- (a) Another case of a voluntary no-hook jet landing occurred during this period of operations. The hook of an F9F-2 extended during a catapult shot and the hook shoe was broken off. The plane was brought aboard in a normal approach without hook. Approach speed was 103-104 knots, wind over the deck was 42 knots. Davis Barriers 1, 3, 4 and 5 were rigged. The plane engaged three barriers and was arrested with damage to only the wheel fairings. The plane was ready to be flown 24 hours later. After three such successful no-hook landings in the past six months, it is considered that the Davis Type Barriers is very efficient and causes minimum damage to the aircraft. It is recommended, however, that touch-down speeds be held as low as possible.

4. MARK-V IFF Doctrine:

- (a) It is recommended that the employment of Mode 2 (personal identification) and Mode 3 (flight leader identification) of Mark-V IFF be regulated by specific air control orders from fighter air directors when needed for positive identification. The automatic and uncontrolled use of these methods of special electronic identification severely reduces the effectiveness of the designed purpose by saturating the air controllers "PPI" scope with too many similar responses so as to preclude positive individual identification. This is especially the case in the air control umbrella over the Task Force.
- (b) It is recommended that during emergency operation, the letter for Mark-V identification usage assigned to a carrier be the letter appearing on the aircraft configuration as prescribed for U.S. Navy and Air Force Aircraft.
- (c) It is recommended that a policy be promulgated for the emergency employment of IFF similar to the following:
 - (1) Aircraft Equipped with Mark V System:
 - (a) Plane having emergency, go to Mode IV (Emergency) and key morse identification letter prescribed for air group involved in emergency.
 - (b) If plane goes down, Division Leader or Wingman of aircraft in emergency turn on Mode IV (Emergency) and key morse identification letter.
 - (c) No two airborne aircraft in same flight should key identification letter.

5. Air Operations (Total Summary):

- (a) Air Operations conducted against North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces 9 October 1950 through 19 January 1951:

Overall total sorties	3,933
Total Offensive and Defensive sorties plus aborts	3,736
Total Offensive sorties plus aborts	2,540
Total defensive sorties plus aborts	1,196
Total overall flight time	10,933.5 hrs.
Total time over target	2,513.36 hrs.
Total offensive sorties less aborts	2,456
Total offensive aborts	84
Total Defensive sorties less aborts	1,183
Total Defensive aborts	13
Total Administration Flights	197
Total Offensive flight time	7,813.5 hrs.
Total defensive flight time	2,718.3 hrs.
Total Administration flight time	401.7 hrs.
Total time over target under support controller	1,225.43 hrs.
Total time over target on strikes	1,287.93 hrs.

6. VHF Radio Installation in Primary Fly:

- (a) During this period a more complete evaluation was made of the AN/ARC-1 VHF transmitter/receiver installed in Primary Fly on a trial basis. This installation has resulted in more complete and flexible control of aircraft. It is especially useful while operating with other carriers that utilize individual land/launch frequencies. In one instance the flexibility of control resulted in expediting the recovery of a "sick chick" that had just been launched from another carrier, thereby saving an aircraft and possible a pilot. This installation consists of an AN/ARC-1 unit installed in Primary Fly, with local controls, power supplied from the ships 28 volt system and with an antenna so situated on the mast to give 360° coverage.

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PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS (Continued)

7. Intelligence:

- (a) General: During this period the Air Intelligence Office continued to operate with four permanently assigned officers. All pilots were briefed and debriefed in the ship's Air Intelligence Office by the ship's intelligence officers. This system was initiated due to the absence of squadron and air group non-flying intelligence officers. It proved a very expeditious means of accomplishing both briefing and debriefing, expedited the submission of strike flash reports and facilitated the maintenance of accurate records.
- (b) Air Intelligence Office spaces: The use of the intelligence office for briefing and debriefing presents a problem due to the lack of sufficient space available not only for the accommodation of the pilots of a strike group but also for the display of necessary intelligence. Display boards are lacking in number and generally too short to accommodate charts of the entire operating area. In order to partially alleviate this difficulty a 1/250,000 scale chart (AMS L-552) of Korea was joined and attached to a roller curtain. This unit was secured to the overhead (with temporary attachments) immediately in front of the chart desk. This location of the chart makes the entire length of the office available for the accommodation of large groups and makes the chart easily visible for all. For briefing the chart is rolled down (by means of an attached cord) to the desired area. A sheet of clear plexiglass is suspended before the chart showing all the information required for the particular flight. The chart is especially useful in debriefing airfield sweeps and armed reconnaissance missions which frequently extend beyond the usual operating area.
- (c) Maps and Charts: In spite of the difficulty presented in storing and handling the large number of charts used by the air group it is felt that the nature of the operations in the Korean theatre makes it mandatory that a complete set of charts be maintained on board. This ship's inventory of charts of the Korean area off-loaded in Sasebo totaled 35,000 sheets. Charts of each individual series should be carried in enough numbers to provide one sheet per pilot with several spares (a total of 140-150 of each chart). The problem of storage was solved by establishing a chart store room in the blower room adjoining the number 2 elevator machinery room. The store room in the Intelligence Office was used to stock approximately ten to fifteen sheets of each series of charts, available for ready issue.

7. Intelligence: (Continued)

(d) Intelligence: With a very few exceptions this ship received sufficient material to remain well informed on the overall situation.

(1) One exception to be noted is that current information regarding the activity of ground troops was lacking in the initial phases of the operating period. The importance of having this information for accurate briefing and for maintaining high interest level among pilots during close support operations cannot be overemphasized. The recent initiation by CTF-77 of a program for submitting detailed accounts of recent ground action to carriers and the inclusion in the General Situation Summaries originated by Commander Naval Forces Far East of detailed ground action was of extreme value to the overall operating efficiency of this ships air group.

(e) In several instances during close support work strike groups experienced difficulty in identifying friendly troops. The problem was due primarily to the fact that ground troops were not prompt in displaying recognition signals and in some cases did not show the correct signals for the day.

(f) Recommendations:

- (1) That the practice of briefing and debriefing strike groups as a whole rather than by squadron elements separated in ready rooms be considered for adoption as standard practice. The adoption of this practice will also serve to decrease the total number of air intelligence officers required and squadron intelligence officers could be utilized in the main Intelligence Office.
- (2) That the Intelligence Office of CV-9 carriers be rearranged and refurnished to better utilize the space now available and to accommodate more and larger display boards.
- (3) That in the design of the chart storage space for this class carrier, space be made available for a maximum inventory of 75,000 charts. Further consideration should be given to the stowing of folded (WAC and Pilotage charts) and rolled (AMS and Approach charts) charts.
- (4) That intelligence material be more expeditiously disseminated.
- (5) That ground forces be advised of the necessity for prompt and correct display of identification signals upon sighting friendly aircraft operating in their area.

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
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