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SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT

PsyWar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea - A Study

DIGEST

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DATE 10/11/53

ORIGIN

ACTION

Ltr to CO, PsyWar Center, w/1 incl (study)

TO BE HANDCARRIED TO FORT BRAGG BY COLONEL BLYTHE

REPLY REQUIRED BY

BRANCH

O&TBr/Prop Div/O C/PsyWar

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PROPAGANDA DIV		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS COPY YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> </div> <i>encl</i> <i>filed in folder behind list of papers.</i>
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EXECUTIVE		EXECUTIVE, PSYWAR
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		CHIEF OF PSYWAR
ACTION BY: <i>[Signature]</i> Capt Herbert Avedon		
SIGNED	DATE 28 Aug 53	DISPATCH <i>[Signature]</i>
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Capt Avedon/78328/P&T Br/cle

NOV 10 1953

PSYWAR 319.1 (C)

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea -
A Study

TO: Commanding Officer
The Psychological Warfare Center
3420th ASU
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

This document regraded
by PAR 8001 as indicated
Over the classification: *CONF*
(Classification)
3 Jul 57
(Date) *DEO*

1. Appended herewith is a study of deficiencies noted in psychological warfare operations during the recent Korean action. It is recommended that instruction at the Psychological Warfare School stress the observed weaknesses so that PsyWar personnel who may possibly operate in the future can take corrective measures.

2. The study includes a comparative analysis of three field inspection reports made by three OC/PsyWar officers, and of a fourth report by a former staff officer of the PsyWar Division, G3, Eighth Army. Neither the analysis, which is the most important part of the study, nor the study itself, are to be regarded as the definitive evaluation of psychological warfare operations in Korea. Both study and analysis are confined, however, only to the deficiencies reported upon.

3. Additional unsound practices, observed but not reported upon, are given minimal reference in the study. It is further recommended that these also be stressed in PsyWar instruction.

4. A sub-paragraph, "Action Taken", follows each deficiency noted. Where there has been no action taken or action is unknown, this datum has been eliminated.

PSYWAR
FOR THE CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:

OUT  **OUT**

1 Incl
"PsyWar Operational
Deficiencies in the
Korean Campaign"

H. P. HOUSER, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Executive
NOV 10 1953

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O&TBr/PropDiv/OC/PsyWar
28 Aug 53
Capt Avedon/53419/rs

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: PsyWar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea - A Study

Study of deficiencies noted in psywar opns during the recent Korean action prepared by Capt Avedon, including comparative analysis of three field inspection reports made by Colonels Fertig, Blythe and Boswell. By this action, cy of subj study fwd to PsyWar Center w/recommendation that instruction at PsyWar School stress the observed weaknesses so that PsyWar personnel who may possibly operate in the future can take corrective measures.

~~HA~~
HA

10 November 1953

NOTE: Forwarding of the inclosed study was delayed pending initiation of action on OCAFF proposal to abolish PsyWar Center. To be handcarried by Colonel Blythe to Fort Bragg. O&T Div/Col Stanley/cle

J.B.S.

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PsyWar 091 Korea C (10 MW 53)

*PsyWar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea A Study
Case No 6.*

A

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PSYWAR DEFICIENCIES

This document reviewed
for releasing:
3 Jul 52 DFD
(Date)

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Capt. Avedon/O&TB/PropDiv/OC/PsyWar

A STUDY
of
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
IN THE RECENT KOREAN CAMPAIGN

10 August 1953

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**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
of PSYWAR
in the KOREAN ACTION**

(NOTE: Inasmuch as PsyWar operations in the Far East continue, much of this analysis is written in the present tense.)

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

PSYWAR AFPE

OPERATIONS

1. General

a. DEFICIENCY 1: Combat Commanders Have Poor Opinion of PsyWar Operations.

Unit commanders and staffs are reported to be of the almost unanimous opinion that PsyWar operations in Korea are not as effective as they could be.

(1) Backgrounds: Psychological warfare operations in Korea have, unfortunately, not been as high in quality as they should have been. Performance has ranged from the unplanned (principal reason for the situation lies in the inexperience of personnel assigned to PsyWar), the unorthodox, and all the way to the inept. In addition, it is believed that the prevailing opinion of combat commanders has been partially due, too, to the lack of extremely necessary briefing by psywar staff personnel which should have normally been provided the commanders.

(2) Discussion: PsyWar, as old as it is in human warfare, is still comparatively new to the United States Army. Somewhat like the few

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cavalrymen who still look askance at the tank, the Army is filled with individuals who think paywar is something for college professors with which the Army should certainly not be cluttered up. Enemy troop formations, this unreconstructed type of thinking makes known, should be shot up or bombed, not have paper dropped on them. This viewpoint is an inherent weakness of psychological warfare which will probably continue to modify our operations for no little time to come. And when operations fall so far from desired levels as those in Korea, it is no wonder that combat commanders who are keenly interested in paywar have so low an opinion of it. As for the others, those who evince no interest and have not personally observed many paywar operations, it is believed that even were paywar operations to improve considerably, they would retain their unfavorable opinions. The reason for this inexorably fixed attitude vis-a-vis paywar is probably because these Commanders would not usually be afforded the opportunity of personally observing the improved operations. And, too, they most likely, if past practices are continued, would continue to be but imperfectly briefed or briefed not at all.

(3) Action Taken: F&S AFEB put on a comprehensive, one-time educational campaign in Japan, including replacement depots, which was very well thought of by all concerned.

(4) Action Indicated:

- a. Marked improvement in paywar planning, r

quality, dissemination accuracy, psywar indoctrination of friendly forces and possibly most of all, a campaign which would convince combat commanders that psywar is here to stay only because it actually, factually literally, does offer measurable support to the infantry.

b. It is further recommended that combat commanders be afforded improved briefing on psywar operations in their immediate areas.

2. Leaflet Dissemination

a. DEFICIENCY 2: Inaccuracy of Dissemination.

Leaflets reported not to have been reaching targets with frequency in proportion to the number of leaflets aimed at them.

(1) Background: PW interrogations indicate that comparatively few of the enemy have read a great many leaflets. A great many PWs have read none. Leaflet production has been at the rate of one billion a year. Tactical leaflets have been dropped on enemy troop formations within the forty-mile-north-of-the-line sector by slow moving transport aircraft which have had psywar crews hand-drop or kick out fused bundles of leaflets. These leaflets were aimed roughly along a line which corresponded to the enemy front lines or troop concentrations or road networks, much in the manner of a leaflet drop along a terrain contour line.

There was no thought of pin-pointed precision or of causing leaflets to fall on designated targets. The disseminating operation was properly referred to as "blanketing."

(2) Diagnosis: The conclusions which follow are affected by four factors; i.e., leaflet production figures, combined strength of both the OOF and NKPA, "blanketing dissemination" techniques and PW interrogation reports. It thus seems as though one of the two statements below must be true:

- a. The enemy is walking about in piles of leaflets up to his ankles. Or,
- b. If he hasn't seen them as the PW reports indicate, the billions of leaflets disseminated are being wasted on unpopulated terrain.

In either case, it would seem obvious that the astronomical production of the past would not be necessary if accurate dissemination means could be adopted.

(3) Action Taken: Change in policy already taken by AFPE relative to more accurately disseminating leaflets. There is to be an apparent cessation of the "blanketing" dissemination technique in favor of "pin-pointing" of targets by map coordinates which in turn are marked on air navigating maps as aimed-at points for leaflet drops.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that possibility of improvements in accuracy of leaflet dissemination be explored by AFPA. Further, that the matter of expediting research and development of leaflet disseminators for fighter and bomber aircraft be looked into by Requirements Division, OCPW.

3. Propaganda Themes (Leaflets and Radio)

a. DEFICIENCY 3: Too Many Themes.

Too many leaflets concerned with too many issues supported by too many themes both related and unrelated, have been disseminated according to reports. Too great a range of stimuli has been directed at enemy.

(1) Background: Leaflet production and dissemination from the beginning of the Korean hostilities have totalled almost two and one half billions. Eighteen million leaflets per week (during most of 1952 and the first part of 1953) were customarily disseminated over enemy front line troops. For an index of themes used, both related to prime issues and unrelated, and enemy reactions sought, see Tab C.

(2) Discussion: Approximately 1200 leaflets were disseminated upon enemy targets since the first leaflets were dropped on enemy troops, an average of about three leaflets per day. It was customary whenever almost any one had an idea which could be presented with sufficient

plausibility, to produce a leaflet implementing the author's plan. The total number of themes made for a bewildering diversity of stimuli which, had the enemy been bent on reacting to them, would have had him spinning in circles.

(3) Action Taken: There has been an appreciable diminution in volume of production with consequent reduction in number of themes used.

(4) Action Indicated: A definitive evaluation of the number and subject of themes should be made for analysis by those concerned. It is recommended that training of paywar personnel emphasize the adverse psychological impact of too great a number of leaflet, radio and loud-speaker themes.

4. Leaflet Production

a. DEFICIENCY 4: Propaganda Quantity Rather than Quality.

Operating units reported to be under self-induced pressure to produce propaganda under any and all considerations.

(1) Backgrounds Modus operandi of leaflet operations was to produce leaflets whenever circumstances made them seem like a reasonable idea at the time. There was leaflet production by PWS, leaflet production by the 1st RML Group, leaflet production by the PayWar Div, Eighth Army, and leaflet production by the 1st L&L Co., though this latter

organization actually created or produced the smallest quantity of leaflets on its own of the four, having confined its activities primarily to the production and reproduction of leaflets conceived by others in Eighth Army. In addition, there was a steady stream of leaflet ideas which resulted in leaflet production by one of the three producing agencies above from outside sources; i.e., senior staff members, visiting officers from the XI, and, of course, tactical units (mostly by general officers or G2s and G3s of Corps and Divisions). There were no paywar plans or planning which merit the term. Planning divisions merely produced operations entitled "Plan xxx" of varying periods of duration. There was some coordination among the producing agencies at theater and army level. This coordination, however, was considerably less than merely imperfect. There was a period during the last month or so of the calendar year 1951 when every effort was made to produce a total for the year of more than one billion leaflets. It is a matter of record, unfortunately, that the effort was successful.

(2) Discussion: There were staunch, influential proponents of ever-increasing leaflet production both in Eighth Army and AFTE whose principal argument was "the more leaflets, the better." It is the unqualified opinion of this writer that not only have the targets not been reached (see "Inaccurate Dissemination" above) but that portion of it which has been affected by leaflets has been overwhelmed and numbed by the tremendous volume. Further, it is believed that the target has seen so many leaflets hurled at it by one means or another, that the attention value of a message flying through the air has been largely lost.

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The effectiveness of a markedly dramatic medium of communication has thus been badly weakened through misuse.

(3) Action Taken: Slow curtailment of great production volume has been noted with, however, frequent increases from new, temporary laws. Net result, fortunately, is a lesser volume. Some small improvement marked.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that operating agencies should draw, or have drawn for them, perhaps, a sharper distinction between behavior and attitude targets with emphasis on which type of propaganda enemy front line troops should receive. This re-drawing of traditional strategic-tactical paywar lines should be brought into clearer focus in all training. Further, it is believed that all operating agencies should be "sold" the principle that leaflets to enemy front lines should be principally those which exploit by behavior affecting stimulation, tactical vulnerabilities of suitable importance. And more, that both paywar operating agencies and training personnel be convinced that leaflet production and dissemination were better limited to matters of some importance, that serious thought be given to both the vulnerability and the target such in the same manner as serious thought is given to heavy artillery fire and even as more serious thought is given the matter of firing medium artillery than that given to automatic weapons. It is recommended that the point to be made is that a message flying through the air over the heads of enemy troops is an extraordinarily effective means of communication and that the law of diminishing returns affects leaflet dissemination as it does every other form of human activity.

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b. DEFICIENCY 5: Propaganda Literacy Level Too High.

Leaflet, radio and loudspeaker propaganda reported not precisely at literacy level of target audience. Considered too "high flown," "over audience's heads," according to some reports. Foreign language advisors and writers not the best, it is reported, all available procurement sources not utilized.

(1) Backgrounds: Paywar personnel, especially in Eighth Army and certainly including an appreciable portion of the PMS staff, were inexperienced and untrained. The same condition was true with respect to the qualifications of the foreign language personnel (Chinese and Koreans) hired to wage successful paywar against Chinese and North Korean troops and civilians of the latter nation. Both Chinese and Korean personnel soon showed themselves incapable of divorcing themselves from their own notions of an inflated position they held vis-a-vis their own countrymen. They could not or would not bring themselves down to the level of the target audience against whom friendly efforts were directed. To do so, in their minds, would have been to seriously lose face. Eighth Army leaflets and loudspeaker scripts produced by native Chinese were conspicuous by reason of usually having been dissertations on the history of Soviet occupation of Manchuria with much learned comment on Soviet politics. PMS leaflets were of the same nature. The latter's radio operations were in a format and mood that smacked of Hollywood and the writers' awareness of Occidental styles and preferences. The Chinese employees, especially, had the inferiority complexes of White Chinese, exiled from

their native heath and were ever prone to grind their own political axes rather than conduct straight paywar. They, as well as the Koreans, invariably considered it a loss of face to indulge in any but higher-than-the-lowest language. Repeated attempts to procure qualified Chinese or Korean personnel met with failure.

(2) Discussion: The inability of translators to convey thoughts in one language into thoughts which are absolutely indigenous to the second language, is a basic weakness of all written and spoken language translations. This gives rise to two basic types of translation error which are almost (there is argument by proponents of either side) equally wide of the desired mark; the predilection of the insufficiently trained to insist that their English language copy be translated word for word into a foreign language and a presumption that anyone with whom the use of a particular foreign language is native, is able to write effective propaganda. It is considered that neither of these two methods is an effective one. Of the two, the lesser evil is certainly the second, that of having propaganda written by a native of the country against whom the propaganda is disseminated. But there are glaring weaknesses in such a method which should be obvious. None of the Chinese or Koreans hired to assist in waging PayWar against the CCF, NKPA and North Korean civilians were scientists, scholars nor area specialists. None knew anything at all about paywar. They were either Chinese or Koreans of more than average (for Chinese and Koreans) education with a good knowledge of English who knew no more of their own peoples' psychology, customs and culture than so many average American business men, grade school teachers,

envelope addressers or "previously unemployed" Americans would know of American psychology, customs or culture. To say nothing of paywar. Not being oriented in any direction except their usual white collar philosophies, these people knew almost nothing of military slang, for instance. It is submitted that being afforded the luxury of qualified paywar personnel indigenous to the countries we oppose is rarely in evidence. Lacking this according-to-the-book aid, experience indicates that it is inadvisable to allow either Chinese or Koreans to write their own original copy, either for leaflets, radio or loudspeaker scripts. Just as it is as foolhardy, more foolhardy, in fact, to have precise Oriental translations of written English-language paywar. Common practice and that considered to be the most advisable, is to write paywar in English and insist that the Chinese and Koreans "translate" it (in the widest connotation of the abused word) perfectly into the requisite foreign language; idiomatically, in the best current usage, in the vernacular of the target audience, making use of the target audience's customary use of logic or non-logic, of direct or most circumlocutory style, of getting to the point or of merely implying it, of calling a spade a spade or an "iron hand" and on a literacy level consonant with the audience's tastes, vogue and education.

(3) Action Taken: Eighth Army Paywar propaganda was, at one time, more "high flown" than it has been for the past year and a half. It is suggested that there is a difference between propaganda being "over the heads of our audience" and being delivered in the most suspicious manner. Now, and for the past nine months or so, it has been in extraordinarily simple language even though not in quite the simplest language

that may be achieved. Even though it is not in the vernacular of the target audience. It, at Eighth Army level, is not over the heads of our target audience but could get closer to their hearts. Interesting is the fact that Eighth Army has developed a method of reaching its Chinese target audience with a written language that possibly increases the latter's literacy from less than twenty percent to approximately fifty percent or more.

(4) Action Indicated: Thorough exploitation is advised of all Formosan and Hong Kong sources for suitable area writer-advisors and increase, if necessary, in allocation of funds for their hire. Training of such personnel procured at the PayWar Center is strongly recommended before their being given field assignments. It is also urged that procurement agencies insist that only suitably trained personnel be given key berths in psywar units and on staffs. It is recommended, too, that continual, specific, evaluation be made by OCFW of all propaganda until its literacy level reaches the desired level and that continuing periodic spot evaluation be made. And, finally, that the system of Chinese phonetics used be thoroughly tested and evaluated.

5. Radio Dissemination

a. DEFICIENCY 6: Lack of Potential Target Data.

No one in PayWar radio operations seems able to come forth with reliable statements as to the size of the potential radio audience, according to reports. (Discussed under "Intelligence Evaluation.")

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6. Loudspeaker Operations, Ground

a. DEFICIENCY 7: Need for Loudspeaker Teams Organic to Divisions.

Operational inefficiencies reported to have given rise to a belief that loudspeaker teams ought to be organic to divisions.

(1) Background: The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, organized for and assigned to a Field Army, has been supporting what amounts to an Army Group. Loudspeaker Section Leaders and Loudspeaker Platoon Leader have rarely, with few exceptions, properly supervised the activities of loudspeaker teams. Many combat commanders have been piqued because loudspeaker teams, in numbers requested, have not always been assigned them. ROKA combat commanders, especially, have complained bitterly at conditions which allowed more enemy loudspeaker teams to face a given ROK unit than friendly loudspeaker teams which supported it. There has been a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of combat commanders who wished loudspeaker teams to operate precisely as the commanders wished. The matter on which there has been sharp disagreement almost invariably has been on the subject of surrender. The surrender issue has revolved around the feasibility of exhorting a fresh, well-fed, well-equipped, well-dug-in enemy to surrender. Loudspeaker personnel, acting on advice from their CO and PayWar Division, G3, Eighth Army, have, as gracefully and tactfully as possible, refused to

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operate in this manner. Combat commanders faced with the need to secure PWs, have insisted that surrender appeals be made under circumstances which were not favorable. A final reason for demand for speaker units organic to divisions is that there have never been enough teams to supply demands.

(2) Discussion: The present T/O&I unit, assigned to a field army, can be made to operate efficiently with proper supervision of properly trained personnel by properly trained officers. It is believed that no further decentralization of the paywar operating unit on the army level should be made. The root of the matter is that combat commanders see a comparatively new weapon which suggests an easy method of securing PWs. Education and indoctrination in paywar principles should ease a problem which does not exist among other branches of the Service. It is not believed that acceptance of paywar personnel by combat commanders yet exists to the same degree as, for instance, acceptance of Engineer, Signal or Chemical Warfare or other personnel who support combat units. In just about no case will a combat commander dictate methods by which mines will be detected or a dud bomb be disposed of. This is not the case with operating psychological warfare teams which are continually exhorted to operate in a manner in direct denial of principles laid down in paywar field manuals. Knowledge of paywar principles exists in minds of only few officers outside of paywar staffs and units. Experience indicates that were paywar loudspeaker teams assigned to divisions for

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allocation to regiments and lower units, the teams' prime mission would be to induce surrender under circumstances in which surrender appeals are not good practice. This mis-use of paywar facilities at tactical levels would prevail for approximately ninety percent of the total propaganda output.

(3) Action Taken: AFPE ordered Eighth Army to activate a loudspeaker detachment of three loudspeaker teams under the command of a captain to operate within one division. No results of activation or operations yet known. It is believed detachment has not been activated due to equipment shortage.

(4) Action Indicated: It would seem as though a re-assessment of loudspeaker team operations in Eighth Army ought to be made. There are strong arguments on both sides. It is believed, however, and as indicated above, that arguments for further decentralization are not tactically sound.

b. DEFICIENCY 8: Operational Inefficiency.

Loudspeaker Section Leaders reported not seeming to know "too much about the Army." They are not too well acquainted with tactical utilization of loudspeakers according to reports. Nor do they visit their teams during operating periods, confining their visits to daytime when teams usually do not broadcast. Few scripts reported

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written by Loudspeaker Section Leaders. Other reports note only one of the loudspeaker sections has a mechanic and that enlisted personnel are inadequately trained.

(1) Background: Loudspeaker personnel rarely knew anything more than the barest essentials known by basic trainees. It is a fact that not only did they not know "too much about the Army," they didn't know much about the "tactical utilization" of their weapons or anything else that wasn't crammed into them in an intensive seven-day L&L course and which probably didn't "take." The matter of infrequent visits to loudspeaker teams by Section Leaders has long been known. The situation was corrected for a short time during the summer of 1951 but almost immediately reverted to the personally more convenient method of Section Leaders making periodic visits to teams during the hours of daylight. Scripts are usually taken from a volume of bound scripts called "Contingency Scripts," and are beyond the capabilities of most inadequately trained and otherwise imperfectly qualified loudspeaker team personnel. The loudspeaker section which luxuriates in the presence of a mechanic is fortunate, there usually being only one for the entire company.

(2) Diagnosis: The principal weakness in all pywar operations and no more noteworthy among the loudspeaker teams than in other pywar operations on all levels, is the lack of experienced, trained, qualified personnel. In loudspeaker teams, made up of under-ranked enlisted personnel, it is quite customary to hold the latter up as glaring examples of poor

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operations. The lack of proper supervision of their teams by Loudspeaker Section Leaders is due to a lack of command supervision which enables the 1st Lieutenants who took advantage of it to lead a leisurely life at Corps Hq instead of on the lines with their teams. The leisurely life was inherited, as it were, by the continuing stream of replacement lieutenants. Even though the matter was corrected for a short time, the Section Leaders reverted to the easy life at the first opportunity and change of command. It is considered that the inertia which kept, and apparently still so keeps, most Section Leaders from living with their teams, is so formidable that it requires continual command supervision until all the proponents of such indefensible conduct have been rotated and there is no experience known among Section Leaders remaining in the Theater other than the desirable one of living on the lines with team members with only periodic visits to Division and Corps. It is believed that the matter of personnel on the teams able to write speaker scripts will take care of itself when personnel assigned to do that work know how and are capable of doing it. It is believed, too, that deficiencies in the number of persons able to maintain loudspeaker section equipment will be satisfactorily cared for by the assignment of qualified personnel. The I/O&E is adequate. The assignment of personnel for I/O&E slots is not.

(3) Action Taken: Requirements Div, Personnel & Budget Branch, has made substantial progress in the establishment for OC/PayWar of an SOP within the Army Personnel System, which will provide the trained qualified personnel needed in Propaganda, Special Forces, and supported staffs and units, both overseas and in the Continental United States.

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(4) Action Indicated: It is believed that most of the inefficiencies will satisfactorily be resolved by reason of the newly authorized "package" shipments to the theater. It is recommended, however, that the Commanding Officer of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company be formally apprised of the inefficient performance of his Section Leaders by PayWar Div, G3, Eighth Army, and that he be requested to take corrective action at once.

e. INEFFICIENCY 9: Inadequate Flexibility of Loudspeaker Company.

Unit with present T/O&E reported unable to adequately man Eighth Army's 155 mile front.

(1) Background: There have never been enough teams to entirely satisfy all combat commanders especially the EOKs who would use as many as six or eight friendly teams to oppose as many "shouting" teams among the enemy as a matter of face saving. There have been innumerable complaints at the lack of teams to support all the units which requested them. The loudspeaker team was designed and manned to care for the requirements of a field army. Eighth Army is more accurately described as an Army Group.

(2) Discussion: There is no reason why the Loudspeaker Company could not have been augmented by extra T/O&E teams except the continual and unhealthy lack of qualified personnel to fill even its own authorized slots. As the company now stands, teams could be added with no complication

except in the matter of material support which the Loudspeaker Platoon of the Company could readily handle. Even though the existing T/O&E has been revised, the Company still would not be able to care for an Army Group. Equipment augmentation has been admirable, enabling the unit to make use of twice the number of public address systems authorized. Personnel augmentation has not been adequate. At no time, however, was the concept of a greatly augmented Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company brought forward. Repeated requests for personnel were made. Repeated reports were made to the effect that the company was over-extended.

(3) Action Taken: T/O&E is being revised by OCAFF to better fit requirements.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that additional teams, complete as "packages" and complete with equipment, be assigned as need occurs to augment an Army Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company. Lacking the necessary teams, as would most probably be the case, it is believed that authorization for the necessary augmentation of the Loudspeaker Platoon should be made a matter of record easily referred to when appealing to Army or theater GIs (in the T/O&E, for instance). It is further recommended that in the latter case, the augmentation authorized be for loudspeaker, transport and maintenance personnel plus equipment, to be used to accomplish markedly increased missions.

d. DEFICIENCY 10: Increase in Enemy Fire in Vicinity of Loudspeaker Positions.

(Deficiency 10 - continued)

Friendly troops and commanders dislike presence of friendly loudspeaker teams, according to reports.

(1) Background: Colonel Alfred, CO, 5 RCT referred to the unpopularity of loudspeaker teams by saying that troops on the front line "detest" loudspeaker teams due to the fact that "every time a team opens up, an artillery concentration comes in." In addition, the CO said that the Lt in charge of the team "comes down with orders to set up at a certain location," causing friction and many times are not allowed to operate by combat commanders. Col Alfred also stated that there were things which could be done to overcome the situation. He alluded to an educational program for our troops on the use and capabilities of paywar plus a program to see "call commanders on the use of paywar" and ended his comments with a recommendation that a paywar organization be made organic to divisions.

(2) Discussion: There is no loudspeaker team which has a record of enemy counterfires with every broadcast. Many teams received enemy fires after many broadcasts. But not one team received artillery (or even mortar) nor received any noticeable reaction, every time it opened up. All friendly personnel did not "detest" loudspeaker teams though some of them undoubtedly did. It was more customary to hear friendly personnel from GIs to senior officers, make jocular reference to, mixed with grudging respect for, the amount of artillery friendly loudspeakers brought down upon

friendly positions. And on the not infrequent occasions when officers in charge of speaker teams came "down with orders to set up at a certain location," those orders were the orders of Corps G3 through the Corps PayWar Officer. Most frequently, however, and very SOP, speaker positions are selected with the advice of Company and Platoon Commanders. There have been instances during which some lower unit commanders, of the sort referred to by Col Alfred who "detest" loudspeakers, would request that the speakers be placed in a defiladed position from which our messages could not be heard by the enemy, thus disposing effectively of any threat of more than normal enemy fire. In cases such as these, speakermen and officers customarily attempt to reason things out with local commanders and failing this, resort to aid from division and corps PayWar officers and finally, if necessary, to the CO of the 1st I&L Co and all the way to the Chief, PayWar Div, Eighth Army. It is unfortunate, however, that friendly loudspeaker positions draw enemy fire almost as certainly as friendly armor or automatic weapons. (Teams normally place horns or loudspeakers of public address systems from one to four hundred yards from the well dug-in amplifiers. Horns are normally well camouflaged and away from troops but searching enemy fire does harass friendly positions.) For comments on further decentralization of the loudspeaker company assigned to an army, see DEFICIENCY 7 and DEFICIENCY 9 plus discussion under "Div PayWar Officers" and "Corps PayWar Officers" under "REQUIREMENTS, PERSONNEL."

(3) Action Taken: Orgn & Material Branch, Eqmts Div is presently developing a binaural public address system amplifier (FY 1955) and recorder-

reproducer (FY 1953) which will cause what might be termed a "stereo-aural" reaction among a listening audience which changes the listeners' impression of aural depth perception. The development processes are not yet on a formal level but when perfected and made a part of a loudspeaker team's equipment, should help considerably to delude the enemy as to the location of a speaker position and thus reduce the amount of fire on or near it. There have also been T&E programs of no high order.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the incidence and quality of educational paywar indoctrination of friendly troops and commanders be increased. Further, that the development of binaural dissemination of sound be expedited in accordance with existing priorities of the research and development program.

e. DEFICIENCY 11: Enemy Loudspeaker Propaganda More Flexible Than Friendly.

Report indicates that friendly propaganda does not react to situations as fast as the enemy's. Although fire is directed mostly at loudspeaker operations, the remarks also are pointed at friendly leaflet propaganda.

(1) Background: Communist leaflet propaganda is generally wide of the mark and generally aims at its targets with themes which are of doubtful value. They have (the Communists), on occasion, especially during the past year, produced excellent propaganda which has hit its target with enviable accuracy. However, a tabulation of pin-pointed,

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hard-hitting propaganda of each of the opposing sides will show a comparatively poor score by the Communists. Red loudspeaker propaganda on the Korean front is usually of a low degree of excellence, seriously lacking in credibility. There does not seem to be much centralized control (which is not a weakness in itself) of loudspeaker broadcasts and many have been made which are obvious untruths and which have made impossible-to-keep promises. In the matter of loudspeaker programming, the UN's performance is of a much higher calibre than the Communists' and it is only since the Communists have copied friendly styles, that their programming has moved up from the unbelievably low levels at which they started.

(2) Discussion: The above report, it is believed, is the product of displeasure with our loudspeaker effort on the part of combat commanders. It is further believed and as has been said elsewhere in this analysis, that most of the dissatisfaction was reported by ROKA commanders whose ideas of paywar techniques are inalterably confused with their driving need to maintain face. On the actual debit side, however, friendly paywar's untrained loudspeaker personnel have, perforce, resorted to contingency loudspeaker scripts instead of habitually writing scripts carefully tailored to the tactical circumstance. This makes for a less fresh species of propaganda, less fresh than the Communists' which is fresh enough most of the time to be considered half-baked. Only approximately twenty percent of our ground loudspeaker broadcasts are written on the spot by personnel who are sufficiently trained and of enough talent to be above having to

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use the contingency scripts provided. An informal, on-the-spot evaluation of Eighth Army paywar indicates that the reason for the assumption by friendly non-paywar personnel that enemy propaganda is more flexible than ours, is that enemy loudspeaker personnel are prone to say what seems to be just about anything they happen to be in a mood to say. Broadcasts of the type which offer "cadillacs and women" to any friendlies who defect, are almost the rule rather than the exception. The CCP does, however, make good use of friendly wounded and dead between the lines but generally reduces its credibility to past the vanishing point. It is also true that friendly broadcasters have been prohibited from discussing the armistice stand in great detail. The enemy has not.

(3) Action Taken: Totally untrained (paywar-wise) personnel have been subjected to an intensive seven-day course by the 1st L&L Co before going into the field.

(4) Action Indicated: Personnel and Budget Branch's new "package" shipping of trained personnel should take care of the basic weakness. Suggest, however, that "the grass on the other side of the fence always looks greener" and will continue to until steady indoctrination and orientation of friendly troops and commanders satisfactorily explains that the grass "over there" is not really as green as it looks from our side.

f. DEFICIENCY 12: Friendly Announcers Speak Imperfect Chinese.

Loudspeaker announcers do not have command of perfect, unaccented Chinese, according to one report.

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(1) Backgrounds: Loudspeaker teams make use of indigenous announcers for broadcasts to North Korean and Manchuria-born Koreans to broadcast to the Chinese. The Manchurian accent would be perfectly satisfactory for the Mandarin Chinese dialect used with the exception that the Koreans who formerly lived in the large Korean colony in Manchuria must have been rather clannish, having spoken Korean in their homes rather than Chinese, giving the Manchurian-accented Mandarin an additional Korean accent. At any rate, just about all Koreans born in China, having been educated in Chinese schools and having worked in China until about 1946, speak Mandarin Chinese (and all other Chinese dialects) with a pronounced Korean accent. There are quite a number of native Chinese residing in the Seoul area and in other parts of South Korea but these would not risk their lives and endure the hardships of front line living for the amount of money offered.

(2) Discussion: Though there are times when it is possible to use an accented voice over a loudspeaker, enemy target groups are usually less readily subverted to friendly ideologies when the effort is made by persons who speak the former's language with noticeable foreign accents.

(3) Action Taken: A wage scale rise in the early Spring of 1953 made Chinese nationals residing in South Korea more interested in service with loudspeaker teams. Several were employed.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that replacement be made of Koreans who speak Chinese imperfectly with a generous and grateful separation accorded the Koreans who formerly did the announcing. Many

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of the latter could have made more money with their knowledge of two and three languages but chose to risk their lives in order to materially help fight Communism. Several were wounded. There is a possibility all have been replaced by Chinese nationals but the matter is believed important enough to warrant inquiries to ascertain this fact.

7. Loudspeaker Operations, Air.

a. DEFICIENCY 13: Poor Reception.

Air broadcasts apparently are merely heard but not understood, according to most reports.

(1) Backgrounds: PWs interrogation reports indicate that enemy has repeatedly heard air broadcasts but has not been able to distinguish messages. There have been monotonously repeated breakdowns of voice plane public address equipment, necessitating that the planes be out of action for frequent periods of long duration. Air broadcasts were begun before the NKPA or SUF made use of crew-served automatic anti-aircraft weapons. Anti-aircraft fire was as intense during most of the last year of Korean hostilities as it was in Europe during the last war. There were frequent hits scored.

(2) Discussion: Present equipment does not produce readable messages under battle conditions, even those which do not consider matters like fire fights or artillery duels, beyond 3500 feet. This is a distance

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from the ground which makes it distinctly inadvisable for voice planes to continue their flights without resorting to evasive action, a tactic which would effectively cancel what value the reception of the message might have had. Mechanical difficulties are great, as indicated in the reports. But the obtaining reason for discontinuance, in my opinion, is danger of flak aimed at what amounts to an almost stationary target within the reach of small arms fire, not to say crew-served weapons. Many planes have come through the fires aimed at them and have successfully broadcast times without number. It is considered opinion, however, that these planes were too high above their targets for successful reception of messages. The number of Psk who report having understood air broadcasts bears out this theory. As does the effective use of the voice plane under entirely different conditions in South Korea and elsewhere. The medium is too effective when properly used to dull it by mis-use.

(3) Action Taken: Frequent reports of the unserviceable air broadcasting equipment have been made by Eighth Army. There has been a good deal of correspondence on the subject between AFPE and OCPW. Improved equipment is reported to be enroute. Cessation (but possible resumption) of air broadcasts over North Korea.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that air broadcasts be halted until improved equipment, now en route, is thoroughly tested and found to meet requirements of 7500 foot broadcasting altitudes.

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8. PsyWar Units.

This is a cross-reference. Analysis of reports on operations of psywar units will be found under "Ground Loudspeaker Operations," under "Personnel, Discipline" and "Personnel, Replacements, Corps PsyWar Officers."

9. PsyWar Staffs.

a. DEFICIENCY III: Eighth Army PsyWar not in Command Channels

Reported deviation from command channels is confined principally to a Letter of Instruction that was disapproved for forwarding through normal distribution.

(1) Background: Extraordinarily high personnel rotation rate among Division and Corps G3's, PsyWar Officers and Unit Commanders, was responsible for a damaging lack of knowledge concerning psywar capabilities and possibilities. Chief, PsyWar Div G3, Eighth Army, prepared an LOI for Corps and Division PsyWar Officers which would be on hand for the interval which began when experienced officers were rotated and ended when Army psywar staff officers could properly brief the newcomers. The LOI was approved by Army G3 but disapproved by the Army Chief of Staff. The LOI was sent back through channels when the disapproving Army Chief of Staff was rotated. A lack of understanding of psywar problems plagues psywar personnel at all levels. PsyWar personnel have not allowed in-channel snags and

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stymies to interfere with operations but have secured necessary support for them by most discreet means.

(2) Discussion: In the preconceived opinion of the rest of the Army, psywar personnel is guilty of "long-hairedness" and military immaturity. This is offset, to some degree, by the noteworthy performance of 1st L&L Company loudspeaker teams who have manned weapons on occasion to repel enemy attacks on platoon positions, made loudspeaker broadcasts in front of friendly positions, have gone on patrols and participated in other similar activities. Added to this are activities of other psywar personnel which have given the lie to such incorrect, though prevailing, opinion.

(3) Action Taken: Close adherence to command channels whenever possible has been the rule in all psywar echelons. Staff visits were made frequently to all critical points in Korea and a comprehensive educational program was carried out during a one-week period in Japan.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a well-integrated, intensive program be put on to apprise senior officers, as well as unit commanders of lower levels, of the support that may be proffered by psywar and that attempts be made to convince them that it is effective even though the officers may not be able to see its effectiveness. Further, all concerned should be convinced, that psywar may be brought into action like any other supporting arm. When it becomes customary for senior officers to treat psywar personnel in the manner personnel of other branches are treated through channels, it will not be any more necessary to accomplish

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psywar missions by out-channel assistance than it is to so accomplish the missions of other branches.

b. DEFICIENCY 15: Over-supervision by AFPE Staff

Operations Division, PWS, reportedly supervises the activities of the RB&L Group too much. PWS's supervision being more nearly operations, which duplicate some of the RB&L's.

(1) Backgrounds: I know very little about the control over the Theater field unit by PWS except that it emphatically does control the RB&L Op. If, however, PWS's control over the RB&L is anything like Psywar Div G3, Eighth Army's control over the 1st L&L Co (See SOP, 1st L&L Co), PWS does control an operating unit to a point at which it no longer operates, being reduced to the status, merely, of a producing-as-ordered-reproducing agency.

(2) Discussions: As Eighth Army PsyWar now operates, for instance, a shocking amount of duplication and money could be saved by eliminating the 1st L&L Company, which is not repeat not recommended, maintaining only an Army printing detachment (or not even having that and augmenting the Army's Engineer Topo outfits or AE installations to absorb psywar's production load) and assigning loudspeaker teams to Corps. A great deal of money either could be saved in that manner or by disbanding the large Army PsyWar staff.

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(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended, however, that the entire concept of the responsibility of Army PsyWar in Korea be compared with that of the Army Loudspeaker Company's responsibility and that a decision be arrived at which will define the two. If the decision is made which will indicate that operations are, as competently authorized, the responsibility of the I&L Co, it is further recommended that Eighth Army PsyWar Division of G3 be slowly reduced until it meets the level authorized by an Army T/D. And further, that Psywar Section AFPE be similarly reduced and that both Army and Theater staffs slowly cease activities as operating agencies. Note is made here that it would be highly advisable that all officer personnel assigned to both field units be unusually well qualified and experienced until the planned, but new, procedure is accepted by all concerned. At that time, for the combat zone, at least, such action will eliminate the prospect of an I&L Company which does not advise, does not write, has no intelligence function, does not load leaflets, does not disseminate, does not control (except administratively) the operations of its loudspeaker platoon.

c. DEFICIENCY 16: Unofficially Added T/O&E Mission:

R&L Op apparently is reported to have assigned its personnel the mission of reaching every member of its target audiences in Korea "with strategic leaflets on a regular schedule."

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(1) Background: The 1st RB&L Gp's T/D (or the proposed T/O&E) obviously does not contain any such mission. There has been no declaration of such a mission nor any written plan which states the extra-mission, which I have ever seen.

(2) Discussion: The three-part error in the above technique may be attributed to imperfect interpretation of psywar principles having to do with mandatory dissemination, the propaganda saturation point of target audiences, the lessening of a psywar medium's impact by over-use and the relative spheres of attitude (strategic) and behavior (tactical) propaganda dissemination.

(3) Action Indicated: It is believed that the simple expedient of procurement of qualified personnel for all psywar agencies would effectively prevent operations of the sort reported in the future.

10. Naval Support

DEFICIENCY 17: Imperfect Allocation of Facilities.

Army PsyWar requirement reported not met in Theater of Operations, could be met by utilization of Navy facility assigned to the Mediterranean.

(1) Background: Navy's radio ship COURIER, equipped with a 150kw transmitter is presently (at the time of the report) in the Mediterranean.

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Army PayWar has a 5kw transmitter ready for shipping to AFPE "if Navy can find a ship to station it" off Wonsan. Air Force's ARC has indicated it can supply 45 technicians to run it.

(2) Discussion: This would seem a perfect liaison chore for OCPW, granting the operational need in AFPE and considering the possibility of unattributable operations or RFE support in USAREUR.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the operational requirements of USAREUR and AFPE be assayed and necessary liaison with the Navy be undergone in order, if deemed advisable, to get the radio ship COURIER assigned to AFPE or a ship capable of being a base for the Army transmitter dispatched there, instead. It is further recommended that AFPE be advised as to the consideration given the problem and decision taken.

11. Air Support

DEFICIENCY 15: Non-utilization of Air Force Support of Army.

ARC Wing (now believed to be group) reported to have enough planes and personnel to satisfactorily support and reinforce PayWar AFPE but is presently in the Philippines with the exception of AFPE ORJ training of small echelons.

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(1) Background: ARC personnel, many of them highly qualified, are confined to training activities in the Philippines. High-level approval was granted for small groups to take on-the-job-training with Eighth Army PsyWar installations and, to a smaller extent, with AFPE installations. This was begun sometime during the winter of 1952-53. The ARC personnel proved to be of appreciable value. All concerned were pleased with the arrangement.

(2) Discussion: Attempts, at a low level, were made to have personnel remaining in the Philippines to add to psywar resources by producing strategic leaflets for AFPE. These attempts failed. ARC personnel were eager to participate in AFPE operations. Various persons reported morale in the Philippines was going downward steadily by reason of the ceaseless training so near a Theater of Operations for which they could not do their share.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that immediate steps be taken at requisite levels to accomplish the transfer of ARC now in the Philippines to AFPE to support the latter's psywar operations in the event of a resumption of hostilities. And in that event, that the greatly increased personnel to be thus made available be integrated into present operations. Further, that the sizeable excess anticipated in total psywar strength, be assigned to comprehensive, well-planned evaluation of current operations and, if latter mission is accomplished, to evaluation of past operations as far back as the beginning of psywar in Korea, 28 June 1950.

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OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

1. Guidance

DEFICIENCY 19: Insufficient Guidance.

Lack of complete guidance to operating agencies from higher authorities on all requisite subjects, is reported.

(1) Background: Guidance in the form of an intermittent stream of bulletins came down from State Department. AFPE furnished intermittent guidance to Eighth Army. Eighth Army furnished occasional guidance to the loudspeaker teams.

(2) Discussion: Definite complaint was made by an AFPE branch chief to the effect that sufficient guidance was not made available from a National level. What did come down was usually neither detailed nor timely enough. Accomplishment of a psywar operational mission usually requires concern with the most delicate nuances of meaning of both the written and spoken word.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the matter of National policy guidance for Theater psywar be investigated and, if possible, that it be stepped up relative to increasing quantity, clarity and distribution speed. Further, it is believed that more detailed policy guidance

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with greater clarification as to all possible copy and idea slants, should be furnished operating agencies by Theater Headquarters psywar staff. And finally, that Theater Headquarters psywar staff be furnished psywar guidance by OCFW compiled from the National guidances which are sent directly to Theater as an additional and possibly more authoritative interpretation.

2. Media and Agencies

DEFICIENCY 20: Uncoordinated Operations.

Army psywar media reported not coordinated vis a vis each other. Theater psywar operations launched by AFPE not coordinated perfectly with those of Eighth Army, according to reports which also note poor liaison between FWS AFPE and PsyWar Eighth Army and that Army PsyWar not coordinated with VOA or RFA. Poor liaison between FWS AFPE and PsyWar Div G3, Eighth Army, also reported.

(1) Background: Coordination between or among various psywar media at Army level is a rarity and only accomplished with great effort. Imperfect coordination and liaison usually exist between AFPE and Eighth Army. Liaison officers have been assigned to Korea by AFPE but AFPE is not as aware of Eighth Army psywar problems as it would be had it a liaison officer from Eighth Army. PsyWar in Korea is not coordinated with VOA's or RFA's dissemination in the same area.

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(2) Discussion: The concept of coordination among the principal psywar media in Korea is almost totally lacking. True, during the past year, leaflets, ground loudspeakers and radio all implemented a divisive endeavor known as CLEAVER but leaflets might be attempting a split between the CCF and the Kremlin; ground loudspeakers, a split between the CCF and NKPA and radio a split between CCF and North Korean civilians. Such a divisive attempt in as many directions as there are media, would be to aim target groups as to friendly intentions. But what was much more usual would be something like leaflets attempting a split between Mao Tse Tung and the Kremlin; ground loudspeakers, a split between CCF officers and CCF enlisted personnel; and radio between government tax collectors and North Korean farmers. All attacks were divisive, to be sure, but together did not utilize either shock action or a concentration of force. More remarkable, however, than a mere lack of coordination among psywar media, is the lack of dissemination coordination of a single medium -- leaflets -- by both AFPE and PsyWar Eighth Army. Leaflets, of several differing themes, were customarily dropped by each agency on the same targets during the same day, possibly within a few hours, or less, of each other.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a matter of agency, theater and media coordination be given even greater emphasis in the PsyWar Center. It is anticipated, however, that the new policy of providing experienced or well-trained PsyWar personnel for PsyWar units and staffs will correct grave errors in operational coordination.

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3. Combat Commanders

DEFICIENCY 21: Combat Commanders Lack PsyWar Briefing

Adequate briefing concerning psywar operations, support and possibilities reported not given combat commanders,

(1) Backgrounds: Both Corps and Division PsyWar officers have frequently been able to devote only small portions of their entire time to psywar matters. Due to shortage of time, those matters have most frequently been only the most pressing. There has rarely been time for either to leave their offices to brief combat commanders.

(2) Discussion: There is no dispute regarding the matter — combat commanders have not rpt not been properly briefed often enough to have convinced them that psywar is an effective supporting service. There is no dispute that Corps and Division PsyWar officers have not had the time to adequately brief them. Corps PsyWar officers, although nominally on a full-time PsyWar job, have not always been able to devote themselves to it. Too frequently each is regarded as just another G3 officer whose prime concern is G3 matters other than psywar which must be cared for before other, lesser matters can be touched. Division PsyWar officers are almost invariably given their psywar jobs in addition to their other duties. Usually junior officers, their other-than-psywar duties use up all of their time. PsyWar comes at the end of a long list. There is no disputing, to repeat, that the commanders are not briefed, that the persons whose job it is are usually too

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busy to do it -- and there is no dispute that reinforcements to the office of the Corps PsyWar Officer would probably be used in other G3 matters. Visits by members of the Army PsyWar staff have not been on a large enough scale.

(3) Action Taken: Comprehensive series of lectures given at many points in theater was extraordinarily well received by those to whom it was given. This group did not include combat commanders in Korea. There have been occasional lectures given units in Korea.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a concerted, comprehensive campaign of instruction be given to the entire officer corps of the Army somewhat in the same manner as indoctrination on atomic energy was given within the past two years. Further, that a Division PsyWar officer, either as a division T/O&E individual or from an augmented I&L Co, be assigned whose principal job would be to completely brief all concerned commanders regarding psywar activities affecting the enemy troops whom they face. And finally, that liaison from Army psywar staff be increased greatly. Caution, however, is suggested against measures which would make for inundating combat commanders with continuous streams of non-combat psywarriors from Theater Headquarters or the ZI. Agree that commanders and staffs of combat units must be continuously briefed and represent that command channels from Chief, PsyWar Div G3, through Corps PsyWar officers down to Division PsyWar officers ought to keep all interested sufficiently informed. They could be given an able assist by the CO, Army Loudspeaker Company, his Loudspeaker

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Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Loudspeaker Platoon Section Leaders and Loudspeaker Team chiefs. This opportunity is taken, too, to state that psywar cannot be conducted successfully by desk-borne personnel and that it is imperative for all operating personnel to spend time in the lines. This first-hand experience should especially include all writers and artists.

4. Coordinating Data

DEFICIENCY 22: PsyWar material flow between OCPW and FWS not great enough.

Freer flow of psywar material needed between both organizations according to reports.

(1) Background: Field operational units and staffs have always felt the pinch of insufficient psywar information, intelligence, plans and operational reports. Much material has come from OCPW, but not nearly enough, it has been felt by all concerned at the receiving end. This is even more true from the operating agencies to OCPW.

(2) Discussion: The flow between the highest DA PsyWar echelon and the lowest is not steady, deep nor reliable. In addition to the above named categories (information, intelligence, plans, reports) guidances, survey results and projects, evaluation, research and development projects, training emphasis, personnel procurement development (like the recent "package shipments") and all the manifold activities of OCPW would provide stimulation, confirmation and hope to field personnel.

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(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that OCPW prepare a list of its activities which would be of value to the field and that steps be taken to see that the contents thereof are forwarded to operating units and staffs without appreciable delay. And further, that an "out-channels" distribution system, although it may duplicate the "in-channels" system, be effected from all unit CO's and Chiefs directly to OCPW.

5. Duplication

DEFICIENCY 23: Overlap by PWS and 1st RB&L Gp.

Leaflet production by Hq and Hq Co of 1st RB&L Gp is reported to be closely supervised and monitored by Operations Division of PWS that there is overlap if not duplication. (DEFICIENCY 15 on page 30 of this analysis.)

(1) Background: The 1st RB&L Gp is an operating agency by right of its authorized T/O&F mission. The PWS operates, too.

(2) Discussion: The above statements are facts. Unless CO, 1st RB&L Gp, disregarded his authorized mission, he could not keep from duplicating certain operations of the Operations Division of PWS. And unless Operations Division, PWS, were content to allow the 1st RB&L Gp to do the operating, they could not help but duplicate some of the Group's work. Neither party is willing to (1) do less than assigned responsibility, or (2) less than it can with over-strength staff.

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(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the same action be taken as recommended for DEFICIENCY 15, modified for AFPE and the RB&L Op especially rather than the 1st L&L Co and PsyWar G3 Eighth Army.

6. Displacement of Echelons:

DEFICIENCY 24: PsyWar AFPE Physically Divided.

PWS in AFPE has offices in both Yokohama and Tokyo.

(1) Background: The return of Tokyo to the Japanese has long been planned. Present move is part of the ultimate displacement contemplated. Incident to the gradual displacement, are many awkward separations of parts of the same organizations. PWS's separation is awkward and makes for lessened efficiency.

(2) Discussion: Though literally concerned with sound practice and procedures in the field, OCPW would do best by premeditatedly not discharging its responsibility in the interests of not publicly reducing the confidence it places in the abilities of a chief of a Theater Headquarters section. It is almost entirely a matter of command.

(3) Action Taken: Further moves and increased, three-part separation contemplated.

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(h) Action Indicated: It is recommended that OCFW do nothing at all.

7. Inter-Service

DEFICIENCY 25: FEAF Dissatisfied with Present Role in AFPE PsyWar.

Air Force LnO reported concerned that Air is primarily delegated to the role of "truck drivers" in psywar operations in which FEAF participates.

(1) Background: There has been a gradual coordination between Army and Air Force psywar personnel which has steadily increased in stature.

(2) Discussion: Liaison with the Air Force was not always good. I am more qualified to report on liaison between Air Force and Army at the Korean level than at Theater. Not much is known about the liaison at Theater Headquarters except that the present incumbent (Lt Col Hold) at AFPE used to be the Army LnO. He is a man of action and some good ideas with not much patience for anything less than efficient, logical methods. During his tenure as Air Force LnO at Army, he repeatedly proffered good ideas from our sister service which almost invariably resulted in psywar operations (usually leaflets) which implemented them. He, on behalf of the Air Arm, has expressed great satisfaction with the results on occasion.

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(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a qualified Air Force Liaison Board be formed of ARC and Theater Air personnel, mostly of the former who are, chiefly, well qualified men. It is contemplated that members of the board would work in the various operating and planning offices of PWS and would meet periodically to discuss Army-Air Force combined operations. (It is considered that Army leaflets dropped by Air Force planes are not combined operations but that Army leaflets which relate to Air Force strikes, downed pilots and the like, are.)

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INTELLIGENCE1. SourcesDEFICIENCY 26: Limited Intelligence Sources

P&W are reported as Eighth Army's prime intelligence source.

(1) Background: There is an intermittent flow of intelligence from various sources to Army from P&W which is occasionally augmented by similarly sourced material from OGPW. An additional influx comes from G2 sources. Army psywar intelligence produces just about all other psywar intelligence from one single source, the mach-interrogated PW.

(2) Discussion: The root of the matter is an old one on which psywar has made no headway and probably never will; i.e., shall psywar be an intelligence collection agency, too, or shall G2 be the only one? The production of psywar intelligence by G2 (June '50 to date) leaves much to be desired, giving rise to the belief that adequate psywar intelligence will not be produced and delivered with dispatch until psywar does it on its own. What psywar intelligence has been produced, seems to me an indictment of the coordination psywar intelligence has effected or has been able to effect with all the sources under the control of G2 and JACK. There should be much more reliable intelligence available than that supplied by P&W in a combat zone which is jammed with agents and line-crossers from both sides.

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(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that we throw ourselves on the mercies of G2, that the matter, with especial reference to the psywar intelligence production of the Korean campaign, be brought to his attention. Further, that we either assume the responsibility of training a stipulated number of G2 officers at the PsyWar Center or that we be permitted to assign PsyWar personnel to assist, literally, G2 officers in various departments of that large office.

2. Vulnerabilities

DEFICIENCY 27: Intelligence Not Main Vulnerability Producing Source

PsyWar Intelligence Branch, PsyWar Div G3, reported as not being the agency which produces enemy vulnerabilities for exploitation by Projects Branch.

(1) Background: With the exception of a ten-month period from Summer of 1952 until late Spring 1953, the Intelligence Branch of Eighth Army PsyWar has not posed the vulnerabilities from which the psywar producing branch created their exploitation. The modus operandi was the other way around; i.e., Projects Branch thought of some exploitation from a vulnerability they, Projects, believed existed. Intelligence checked on the matter and with confirmation, the psywar exploitation was produced.

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(2) Discussion: Entirely due to the efforts of the former Chief, Intelligence Branch, during the period referred to above, a forceful attempt to reverse the backward method was made. For a short time, Intelligence did, in fact, pose many vulnerabilities which were exploited by the proper psywar production section of Eighth Army PsyWar. However, Intelligence did not differentiate adequately between PsW complaints and true psychological vulnerabilities. Probably the main reason for this lay, not in the Intelligence office and with the reporting officers, but in the abilities of the interrogating personnel who, themselves, did not know and therefore could not differentiate between a gripe and the underlying reason which prompted it. Digging deeply for the reasons would often have produced actual vulnerabilities.

(3) Action Taken: Great improvement, as indicated above, was made by a knowledgeable (though not PsyWar trained) hard-working Intelligence Branch Chief. It is to be hoped that the new, more correct, direction of the Branch's operations will continue.

(h) Action Indicated: Again, reliance is placed upon the new personnel procurement plan of shipping qualified people to do specialists' work. It is believed that the matter will correct itself automatically by reason of the right people being at the right place at the right time.

3. Essential Elements of Information

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DEFICIENCY 28: Complex EEI

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"PsyWar EEI's for G2 must be few and simple," according to reports.

(1) Background: PsyWar intelligence has been unsatisfactory.

There is a great need for more information than has been forthcoming; specific, psywar-oriented information. G2's cooperation (at Army level) has been token. PsyWar EEI are normally desperate requests for vitally needed information which cannot be obtained by any other means even though it is not obtained by virtue of the lengthy, desperately involved EEI's either.

(2) Discussion: Granted that EEI's should be succinct and few in number. Such formulation of them is virtually impossible under conditions which presently exist in Eighth Army. PsW are not made available for psywar interrogation until weeks after capture (it is believed ten days is the earliest possible time; longer delays are most usual). If it were possible for psywar interrogators to work concurrently with regimental IPW teams, conditions would be greatly improved as they would be if loudspeaker section leaders, division, corps psywar officers and Army psywar staff members, would occasionally interrogate PsW. Unless and until the above becomes the rule, EEI's, of necessity, must be presented to G2 channels in large numbers. It is believed that they could readily be made more brief than is customary. It is also believed, however, that brevity in psywar EEI would be indecipherable by untrained interrogation personnel or intelligence agents. PsyWar is in a position somewhat analogous to that of an untrained field group

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working for AEC who know no more about atomic energy than practically all of the Army knows about psychological warfare. It can readily be understood how brief, basic EEI from the AEC would be almost totally meaningless to the untrained, the non-scientific. One wonders why it is so difficult to understand that the brief, basic EEI from psywar can have more meaning to the untrained, the non-psywar.

(3) Action Taken: Uncoordinated, intermittent attempts by psywar individuals from all levels of staff and operational units, have made attempts to interview PsW immediately upon capture. There has been extraordinarily little of this.

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a basic list of EEI for many levels (immediately upon capture, IPW, Division, Corps, Army, Theater, etc.), and for many degrees of PsW (private, non-com, senior non-com; company grade, field grade, general officer; political officer, medical officer or corpsman; stupid or intelligent; educated, literate or illiterate; rear area or combat; pro-friendly ideology or anti; deserter or legitimately captured, etc.,) be prepared by PsyWar Center for approval by OCPW and eventual forwarding to field commands through channels and by more direct, informal means. It is recommended that the lists of EEI of all categories be reproduced in quantities large enough for all psywar interrogators, as well as all psywar intelligence and other interested psywar personnel, to have at least one copy. The EEI's should be given wide distribution by personally explained dissemination, among all unit, S2 and S3, G2 and G3

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personnel including all MISC's and other interrogating detachments and teams as well as to all unit commanders all the way down to platoon, section and squad leaders.

4. Evaluation

a. DEFICIENCY 6: Lack of Potential Target Data.

No one in psywar radio operations seems able to come forth with reliable statements as to the size of the potential radio audience, according to reports.

(1) Background: A great amount of radio propaganda is disseminated by AFPE through the facilities of the 1st RB&L Gp and indigenous Korean radio stations. There have been repeated intelligence reports indicating that radio receivers in North Korea have been confiscated by Communist authorities. Intelligence reports indicate that a few military radios are in the possession of personnel of the OCP from regimental headquarters on, rearward. Repeated attempts by Eighth Army PsyWar to secure figures from AFPE which indicated the number of radio receivers in North Korea failed.

(2) Discussion: There is no minimizing of the value of reaching hard-core Communists who either listen unofficially or monitor friendly broadcasts. The question arises, however, whether it is worthwhile going to the staggering expense of AFPE's comprehensive radio programming to an

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audience, exclusive of the hard-core, which might not be there. Data could have been produced by G2 agents, it is thought. An effective evaluation of the size of AFPE's potential radio audience was indicated.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that evaluation of the problem be effected as speedily as possible before North Koreans acquire more radio receivers during the truce than they had during the hostilities.

b. DEFICIENCY 29: Inadequate Evaluation of Operations.

A well-coordinated evaluation of psywar operations is reported to be lacking.

(1) Backgrounds: People continually look for results of psywar effort. Results are usually difficult to produce. Evaluation is necessary although not a formally assigned mission (which is owned by G2). Not enough evaluation has been attempted. This applies to all operating and staff levels.

(2) Discussions: Concurrence is recorded herein with a need for evaluation and the possibility of evaluating all psywar in Korea to a degree. Complete non-concurrence is also recorded with reference to the possibility of any but this partial evaluation of psywar in Korea or in any other combat area. It is believed that the reporting officer (see above) refers to a degree of evaluation that is impossible until hostilities end and then only

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upon successful completion of comprehensive surveys by large specialist staffs and crews of expert public opinion takers. This would entail an expenditure which would certainly rival that of the Strategic Bombing Survey of the Air Force during the last part of, and after, the last war. We certainly can, however, which we have not done, evaluate our efforts in terms of previous learned experience in psywar in other wars, in psychology, in contemporary anthropology, in advertising, in many forms of public relations, in public opinion, in the use of the media of mass communications, PW interrogation reports, PW panels, PW aides, research, surveys, and other continuing efforts which are vital preliminaries to an ultimate evaluation which can only be made at the cessation of hostilities. The above preliminary evaluation will not tell us "how successful or unsuccessful our psywar efforts are" but will give experienced psywar personnel invaluable clues which they will be quick to recognize, enabling them to redirect their efforts more accurately.

(3) Action Taken: Partial, sporadic evaluation of friendly leaflet and loudspeaker operations made and recorded by Eighth Army PsyWar. Some evaluation of friendly radio operations, leaflet themes by AFPE PsyWar. Good content analysis of enemy radio themes made by AFPE PsyWar. There has been little more.

(4) Action Indicated: See recommendation under "Action Indicated" for DEFICIENCY 18, pages 33 and 34, having to do with an evaluation of present and past Korean psywar operations by an assist from Air Force ARC

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personal. It is further recommended that this evaluating group be increased by all RB&L and L&L personnel available in AFPE (exclusive of those engaged in consolidation paywar). Another recommendation is made that evaluation effort be extended by use of G2 agents in North Korea and that the latter be furnished a set of KEI's through AFPE and Eighth Army. Finally, it is recommended that a comprehensive evaluation project be begun without further delay. Korean hostilities are over at the moment. This might be the time to begin the sort of comprehensive post-hostilities evaluation of all paywar operations referred to above.

5. Research

DEFICIENCY 30: Inadequate Research

Propaganda is reported produced without adequate research resources.

(1) Background: There was a library of about fifty volumes in PayWar Eighth Army, but most were instructional material for inexperienced personnel. Few were reference works. ORO reports and one or two HUMPRO reports, mostly evaluations of operations of the immediate Korean part, came down to Eighth Army PayWar.

(2) Discussion: With inadequate area advisors, paywar operations were even more in need than is usual of ready research resources. There were no personnel available for this purpose and those who operated, were not experienced research people even had they been able to find the time

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some way to indulge in the badly needed requirement. Recommendations were made to HANFRO representatives as to research requirements of immediate value. Urgently needed, for instance, is a study which would indicate both the most preferred art form and that most readily understood by the CCP. The project was prepared by Eighth Army PsyWar and got as far as the reproduction of almost one hundred sets of sixth different art treatments, each being ten versions of six basic subjects. To the best of my knowledge the project is still in Eighth Army PsyWar headquarters waiting for a research staff to complete the study. Another urgently needed study is of the effect of the recently used phoneticization of the Chinese language on the CCP literacy index.

(3)

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the psywar research program be evaluated with especial reference to that part of its product which will go down to the operating agencies. It is suggested that the more recondite portions of the program might not be necessary in that they would affect only the most perfectionist psywar scientists and students who would have other less handy material available to them. It is being suggested here that our research program change its orientation from that of the staff level and higher to the operational slough.

6. PW Interrogation (See DEFICIENCY 26 under "INTELLIGENCE, Sources", Page 45. See "Discussion" under DEFICIENCY 27, page 47.)

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PLANNING

PsyWar Plans

DEFICIENCY 31: Lack of Long Range Plan

There is no over-all Theater plan for psychological warfare operations, according to reports.

(1) Background: There have been a great number of "plans" which apparently have satisfied psywar planners at Eighth Army and AFPE. There is also a plan, believed to be the one referred to as the AFPE "Master Plan," which has to do with basic human urges. There have been no other psywar plans to my knowledge except one in Eighth Army which was never approved.

(2) Discussion: The so-called "plans" which spice operational reports from PWS AFPE and PsyWar G3, Eighth Army, have always been, not "plans," but operations, either of brief or not-so-brief duration. There have been no long range plans which merit the name which this former member of Eighth Army psywar staff has seen.

(3) Action Indicated: Again, reliance and hope are placed upon the new-for-psywar tactic of placing qualified (experienced and/or trained) personnel in the right jobs at the necessary time.

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REQUIREMENTS

1. Personnel

DEFICIENCY 32: Inexperienced, Untrained Personnel in Units and on Staffs.

Vast majority of officer and enlisted personnel reported not to have been qualified. (See "Leaflet Production" under OPERATIONS).

(1) Background: Starting with the time at the beginning of the Korean outbreak when the only psywar person in what was then called FECOM was a former Military Police lieutenant colonel (not the present CO of the 1st RE&L Co), psywar units and staffs have labored to produce as best they could within the limit of their capabilities. Their capabilities were certainly not of the highest. The overwhelming majority had had no psywar experience. Many of the later members of PWS AFPE, however, were graduated from the Psywar School or had had some psywar experience. None of the members of Eighth Army PsyWar with the exception of approximately five officers had had psywar experience or training. This figure (believed to be accurate but possibly mistaken by one or two) affected the entire period of Korean hostilities during which the personnel rotation rate was phenomenal. The 1st I&L Co was better off in that they had a total (during the entire campaign) of about six or seven section leaders and two CO's who had been trained in psywar. Corps Psywar officers were untrained with the exception

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of about three, at various periods. Division PsyWar officers never were trained nor experienced to my knowledge. There never has been one, repeat one, enlisted graduate of the PsyWar School assigned to psywar in the Far East. There never have been psywar personnel who were area specialists. There never have been psywar personnel who were linguists with the exception of one officer who was not fluent in the pertinent language. There never have been loudspeaker or radio announcers who were psywar trained (I may be mistaken with regard to all the radio announcers at AFPE but I seriously doubt it. I am right about the loudspeaker announcers.) The 1st RB&L Gp had a fine lot of trained psywar personnel to begin with plus a decent flow of replacements but did not operate. A portion of the team chiefs and other loudspeaker team personnel were subjected to an intensive, comprehensive seven-day unit psywar course some of the time.

(2) Discussion: The facts explain themselves, it is considered, requiring no further discussion.

(3) Action Taken: The Personnel and Budget Branch has made substantial progress in the establishment for OC/PsyWar of an SOP within the Army Personnel System, which will provide the trained qualified personnel needed in Propaganda, Special Forces, and supported staff and units, both overseas and in the Continental United States.

(4) Action Indicated: Accomplishment of the above program.

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2. Training

DEFICIENCY 33: Poor Training

Personnel reported poorly trained in psywar, poorly trained in basic military matters and school of soldier. (See Loudspeaker Operations and DEFICIENCY 32, immediately above.)

(1) Background: Refer to DEFICIENCY 32, immediately above.

(2) Discussion: Added to the facts and opinions listed under DEFICIENCY 32, is the information that repeated requests, pleas, exhortations and, almost, prayers were made by cable, letter, command report, operational reports and even personally (to the former Chief OCPW) to alleviate the matter of untrained but operating personnel in AFPE. All sources, both psywar and, unfortunately, non-psywar, are agreed that psywar personnel are inadequately trained.

(3) Action Taken: A new plan has been perfected by Requirements Division which should end the matter of untrained persons in psywar operations.

(4) Action Indicated: The accomplishment of that plan which is to begin implementation in September of 1953.

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3. Division PsyWar Officers

DEFICIENCY 34: Lack of Full-time Division PsyWar Officer.

Controversy in reports over the need for having a full-time Division PsyWar officer whose job would be comparable to that of a Corps PsyWar officer. (See DEFICIENCY 7, page 13, under "Loudspeaker Operations" and DEFICIENCY 21, page 38, under OPERATIONAL COORDINATION).

(1) Background: All concerned are aware that psywar is not properly coordinated among staffs of units lower than corps. Although a Division PsyWar officer is usually appointed on the latter level, his psywar duties are in addition to his other T/O&E responsibilities. There have been frequent complaints and corrective requests from corps and divisional levels to bolster the weakness. It is believed that a formal request was made upon D/A for a revised divisional T/O&E and that the proposed revision has been approved. At all events, this possible approval was unofficially announced in Eighth Army. One of the subject reports indicates no interest was found in a full-time Division PsyWar officer.

(2) Discussion: It has been the considered opinion of most psywar personnel who have been and still are members of Eighth Army PsyWar Div G3, that such a change would be highly desirable. It is believed that dissenting opinion is almost entirely the product of non-psywar officers whose notions of the role of psywar in combat may not be the most comprehensive. A full-time Division PsyWar officer -- whether from division T/O&E's

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or from an augmented I&L Co -- could effect the liaison regarded as vital for the fullest utilization of psywar in the realm of behavior-affecting operations.

(3) Action Taken: The action referred to in discussion immediately above was taken. It is believed that a formal request for a revised divisional T/O&E which would include a slot for a Division PsyWar officer has been made and approved.

(4) Action Indicated: In view of the dissenting opinions voiced by one of the reporting officers, it is recommended that the field be asked to prepare another staff study and make their recommendations as to whether a Division PsyWar officer is deemed necessary or not.

h. Corps PsyWar Officers

DEFICIENCY 35: Corps PsyWar Officers Coordinate Imperfectly.

Corps PsyWar officers reportedly do not visit psywar operating personnel in the lines; their coordination is with U.S. military advisors rather than with indigenous army officers; they lack sufficient knowledge in the basics of psywar.

(1) Background: Until comparatively recently, Corps PsyWar officers were neither trained nor experienced nor, as a matter of fact, even conversant with psychological warfare. There have been some trained psywar

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officers sent to fill the Corps slots and such improvement in operations and coordination was immediately noted. Unfortunately, however, is the predilection of Corps G3's to saddle Corps PsyWar officers in the former's offices with many duties other than psywar, duties which included lengthy and regular G3 reports and other operational activities to the almost total exclusion of psywar matters. One Corps PsyWar officer filled a G3 slot other than the authorized psywar slot for a sizeable portion of his entire tour of duty with the corps.

(2) Discussion: It is not believed that the matter of coordination (including briefing of combat commanders concerned, necessary Corps Commander briefing, Corps Commander-directed PsyWar studies, maintenance of the Corps PsyWar office and the routine business of that office) will ever be perfectly solved by the procurement of trained psywar officers for corps and a full-time psywar officer for divisions. The Corps PsyWar officer, in my opinion, will need an assistant to remain in the Corps PsyWar office while the Corps PsyWar officer is out on his necessary liaison, reconnaissance and public relations (in the most inclusive sense of the term).

(3) Action Indicated: Reference is again made to the new era of psywar personnel procurement and to the added assistance of a full-time Division PsyWar officer, who, it is again recommended, should be authorized.

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5. Units

a. DEFICIENCY 36: Inadequately trained L&L Co.

See DEFICIENCY 32, page 56, under "Personnel" and DEFICIENCY 33, page 58, under "Training, REQUIREMENTS". See Loudspeaker Operations.)

b. DEFICIENCY 37: Inadequate Flexibility of L&L Co.

(See DEFICIENCY 9, page 18, under "Loudspeaker Operations, OPERATIONS").

c. DEFICIENCY 38: Hq & Hq Co, 1st RB&L Op Needs Improvement as Military Unit.

Reported as a "home-standing", "union-hours" sort of a unit.

(1) Backgrounds: Unit performs two distinct types of duty; i.e., those of a military unit and those of a civilian advertising agency. Predominant effort is in the second classification, requiring that most personnel work in offices, radio studios and art departments for most of their waking hours.

(2) Discussion: Personnel of this unit are occupied for the most part in the roles of artists, writers, program directors and similar occupations which require the utmost in the exertion of individuality,

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originality and reaching of new intellectual horizons. It is made a matter of record that I have worked on numerous occasions with personnel from this group within and outside the confines of their unit and that they comported themselves at all times within my ken in a military manner, were efficient, willing and pleasant to work with.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that no action be taken by OCPW. It is considered that the forwarding of subject report to the CO, 1st RB&L Gp will have resulted in whatever correction might be necessary.

d. DEFICIENCY 39: Need for Loudspeaker Unit Organic to Division.

See DEFICIENCY 7, page 13, under "Loudspeaker Operations, OPERATIONS").

6. Replacements

a. DEFICIENCY 40: Staff and Unit Personnel Replacements Not Adequate.

Replacements of specialized psywar personnel for both psywar staffs and units in AFPE have been unsatisfactory. (See "Action Indicated" on page 12 under DEFICIENCY 5; "Discussion" on page 16 and "Action Indicated" on page 18 of DEFICIENCY 6; "Action Indicated" on page 25 of DEFICIENCY 12, page 31 DEFICIENCY 16, DEFICIENCY 20, page 36, DEFICIENCY 27 page 46; DEFICIENCY 32, page 56; DEFICIENCY 33, page 58; and DEFICIENCY 35, page 60. See Loudspeaker Operations.)

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b. DEFICIENCY 41: Non-Rotation of Loudspeaker Team Personnel

Members of loudspeaker teams are not replaced as are infantry troops who are in the lines for lesser periods than the psywar personnel on teams.

(1) Background: Team members have chronically been in short supply, never in sufficient quantities to satisfy all demands for their presence even if enough equipment had been available. Infantry units are customarily brought into reserve. All loudspeaker teams operate at all times when equipment is available. There are no reserve teams.

(2) Discussion: It is considered that loudspeaker team members do not have as difficult a time in the lines as the infantry troops. Although the former have infrequently gone on patrols and, again infrequently, have broadcast in front of the MLR and the OPLR when there was one, they are usually well dug-in and usually take cover under heavy enemy fire. Only rarely have they had to stand by with the infantry they supported to repel an attack. It is true that they rarely are officially relieved but it is also true that they frequently have to go back to Platoon or Company Headquarters (usually in Seoul) for equipment repairs. It is also true that they frequently go back to supporting units for supplies and that it is somewhat customary that a member of most teams get down from the tops of hills every few days for the purpose of resupplying food, gasoline, water, telephoning in reports or effecting liaison with battalion, regimental S2's or 3's or divisional or Corps 2's, 3's or Corps PsyWar officer. It is

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an unusually rare Team Chief or team member who has not been back of the front line for some distance over a protracted period. It is true that most of the teams have been in one position for several months (two and three, usually) at a time. But the personnel which made up those teams rarely were glued to their positions.

(3) Action Taken: Little "R&R" is given as often as possible in the 1st L&L Co area which is well equipped for it. There is an impressive awareness at Company Headquarters of the problem of men being in the lines for too great periods without relief.

(4) Action Indicated: Faced with a never-satisfied demand for loudspeaker teams, it is difficult to see how a reserve could be maintained. It is recommended, however, that reserve teams become an established factor in loudspeaker operations in static situations.

7. Morale

a. DEFICIENCY 42: Combat Personnel Not Receiving Combat Promotions.

Classified as combat personnel from a point of view of their pay and constructive credits earned toward rotation to the ZI, loudspeaker team members' promotions were not the same as other combat personnel.

(1) Background: There was an extended promotional "freeze" in Eighth Army mainly due, it was said, to the vast number of promotions made

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in the early phases of the Korean campaign of personnel who had since been rotated to the ZI. At all events, the ensuing uproar in Korea was so great that the "freeze" was lifted for infantry, artillery, armor and supporting chemical warfare units. Loudspeaker team members who stayed in the lines as long as most infantry and who certainly were supporting them, were not considered to be in the same classification as far as promotions went. The reason given was that the parent organization had its headquarters in Seoul, far behind the front lines. Many loudspeaker men, especially Team Chiefs, spent nine months and longer in the lines and were rotated home as privates, first class.

(2) Discussion: There seems to be no argument as to the merits of the complaint of the loudspeaker men. Everything to change the situation that occurred to those who could do anything about it, was done. No effort was successful. The adverse dictum from AG, Eighth Army, was terse and final.

(3) Action Taken: Attempts to have the Loudspeaker Platoon given a promotional "unfreeze" were unsuccessful. As quickly as possible, presumably, the "freeze" was lifted sometime later to some small extent by Eighth Army for all Eighth Army troops. Promotions were again allowed which, however, were considerably below authorized T/O&E grades.

(4) Action Indicated: It is seriously suggested that an effort be made to have the members of the Loudspeaker Platoon given some special dispensation from D/A which would have them considered as combat personnel

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in future operations. Having most of the responsibilities of combat men, it is not considered unreasonable to expect that they be granted most of the rights which might accrue to them some day in the future.

b. DEFICIENCY 43: Lack of PsyWar Insignia

A need for a PsyWar insignia is indicated, it is reported.

(1) Background: PsyWar, at present, has no distinctive insignia. It is not a separate branch of the Service.

(2) Discussion: PsyWar personnel are a distinct and separate group of specialists. Not quite accepted, it is demoralizing to a degree to see personnel to be looked down upon and thought of as "not-belonging". Aside from its value in inter-branch relations and the degree of further acceptance it would help achieve, the matter of insignia is, properly, an important morale problem.

(3) Action Taken: 1st I&L Co has been authorized, under the provisions of applicable Army Regulations, an insignia of its own. The PsyWar School (or Center) has an insignia or seal. Suggestions for PsyWar insignia were hand-carried from Korea by Colonel Blythe to General McClure (see Tab "F").

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the matter of psywar insignia for all psywar units and staffs be considered if an insignia for PsyWar, generally, cannot be authorized and that proper steps be taken to obtain authorization for the psywar insignia for which approval can be secured.

6. Material

a. DEFICIENCY hh: Need for PsyWar Leaflet Shells.

105mm artillery shells used to disseminate leaflets are not previously prepared for leaflet dissemination.

(1) Background: Leaflet shells used are unmodified 105mm smoke shells. Each has to be opened with sufficient strength to frequently strip the threads of the base ejection plate which is not designed for repeated reopening and closing. The smoke canisters have to be burnt with consequent loss of valuable material.

(2) Discussion: See TAB G.

(3) Action Taken: Frequent reports and requests made. (See TAB G)

(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that leaflet artillery shells be modified in accordance with recommendation from Operations Branch, PsyWar Div G3, Eighth Army.

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b. DEFICIENCY 45: Unsatisfactory Air Broadcasting Equipment.

See "Air Loudspeaker Operations" under OPERATIONS.

c. DEFICIENCY 46. Poor Technical Services Coordination of PsyWar Equipment.

Special psywar equipment may be maintained more satisfactorily through closer coordination with the Technical Services.

(1) Background: Specialized PsyWar equipment in Korea, with the exception of one experimental public address system, has been obsolete or obsolescent. Unsatisfactory equipment reports were turned in for some. Nevertheless, all equipment was maintained by the Technical Services concerned without the desirable authorization from D/A level.

(2) Discussion: Equipment might have been maintained with more dispatch and enthusiasm had orders from D/A been sent down to the Technical Services. Certainly a great deal of effort by personnel in the field would have been spared. The main trouble was not in the maintenance or the lack of maintenance, but in the equipment which was most unsatisfactory and which could not produce in the manner required nor stand up to the rigors of Korean combat.

(3) Action Taken: Everything from unsatisfactory equipment reports to telephone calls, cables, letters, command reports, operational reports and personal messages to visiting ZI (OCPS) personnel.

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(4) Action Indicated: It is recommended that a step-up be made in the due dates of prototype models of new equipment and that the testing and production of the testing models be greatly expedited.

d. DEFICIENCY 47: PsyWar Equipment Hard to Maintain. (See "Background", "Discussion", "Action Taken" and "Action Indicated" for DEFICIENCY 46, immediately above.)

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CONSOLIDATION PSYWAR

1. Present Operations

DEFICIENCY 48: Consolidation Psywar in South Korea Not Satisfactory.

Consolidation psywar in South Korea practiced by Department of State, Eighth Army, and Korean Zone of Communications reported not satisfactory.

(1) Background: Consolidation psywar ordinarily would have been in the hands of CA/MG in South Korea but the organization fell into bad favor before the hostilities and was taken over by USIS of the Department of State. USIS has done some fine things but its effort does not seem to have been well coordinated. Its headquarters, for instance, which should have been a typical example of the USA in Korea was shabby, run down and boasted only some dog-eared periodicals. Eighth Army psywar produced what was ordered by the psywar division of ROKA and later by KCOMZ. There never has been a coordinated venture with the exception of the mopping up of bandits in the Chiri-san sector which was more nearly first-phase consolidation psywar coordinated with the military. ROKA would like to conduct consolidation operations but they have given every sign that their consolidation psywar would be mostly concerned with playing politics and gaining valuable equipment for which it would be difficult to locate a responsible individual once it had been turned over to them.

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(2) Discussion: The successful bandit operation referred to above made use of routine air and ground loudspeaker programs and leaflet drops, with a few of the latter and one or two leaflet themes of a high degree of excellence. The unusually high rate of defection noted is attributable not to the excellence of psywar but to the encircling pressure of the ROK Capitol Division and the rigors of a Korean winter on dissident elements without food, clothing or shelter. It is unfortunate, however, that no effective consolidation work has been done. Anti-American feeling is allowed to grow and has increased to serious proportions. On the other side of the slate, anti-Korean feeling (by American personnel) waxes, is well-known, continually demonstrated, and is allowed to grow, too, unhindered. It is by this latter type of personnel that most of the consolidation work is done.

(3) Action Indicated: It is recommended that the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company be given the necessary consolidation assignment but that they be well briefed in the objectives and methods of consolidation psywar. It is further recommended that additional personnel in the form of competent advisors be attached to the 1st I&L Co to give very necessary assistance to that unit. If necessary and Eighth Army PsyWar Div continues to operate, it is recommended that the attachment of the advisor be made to Eighth Army PsyWar. Further, it is recommended and exhorted that OCPW prepare a consolidation psywar plan complete with mission and phases for implementation by the operating consolidation unit in Korea. Note is made here of dissenting opinion in one report in the matter of there being no

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possibility of activating a US consolidation unit. It is recommended that the matter be thoroughly looked into, assayed pro and con and acted upon without further delay. Consolidation power should be deeply into the first phase of its operations at this moment.

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C

TYPICAL

EUSAK - AFTE

DISSEMINATION

DURING PERIOD OCT - NOV 1952

**DISSEMINATION TO KUSAK TARGETS OF CURRENTLY
IMPLEMENTED FEC PSYWAR PLANS**

<u>PLAN:</u>	<u>FRAUD*</u>
Termination:	Armistice
Target:	CCP, NKPA, NK
Operation:	Exploitation of CP's
Objective:	To discredit Communist regime in China, NK
Stimulation:	Infinite variety ranging from threat of dissolution of basic family unit to slavery, xenophobia, pride, hunger, lack of security, land hunger, drain on national resources plus others without limit.
Dissemination and Frequency:	750,000 leaflets by air each week; 13% of all ground loudspeaker broad- casts; 2% of all air broadcasts.
Sought Reaction:	Fear of imminence of threat, anger because of it, anger directed at Communism, disaffection from Communism.

* Terminated, but completed operations are usually supplanted by new operations.

PLAN:**Termination:****Target:****Operation:****Objective:****Stimulation:****Dissemination and
Frequency:****Sought Reaction:****HOLIDAY****Armistice****CCF, NKPA, NK****Tying propaganda on tails of well-known holidays****To exploit feelings generated by traditional holidays by using them as a base for attitudinal changes.****Thoughts of home, family; the "good old days."****1,250,000 leaflets weekly by air, 1% of all ground loudspeaker broadcasts and occasional air broadcasts.****Nostalgia, grief, lethargic spirits, deep reflection, possible reorientation.**

<u>PLAN:</u>	<u>PARLEY *</u>
Termination:	End of Conference
Target:	GCP, NKPA, NK
Operation:	Exploitation of Sino-Soviet Moscow meetings.
Objective:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To publicize Soviet exploitation of China; inferior role of GCP. 2. To publicize Chinese exploitation of Korea and latter's inferior role.
Stimulation:	Allegations of USSR imperialism to Chinese or, to Koreans, allegations of USSR-Sino colonisation plans; emphasis of target groups' subordinate role.
Dissemination and Frequency:	350,000 leaflets by air weekly.
Sought Reaction:	Loss of face, fear of foreign rule, fear of changed mores.

* Terminated, but completed operations are usually supplanted by new operations.

PLAN:**Termination:****Target:****Operation:****Objective:****DEADLOCK****Armistice****CCF, NKPA, NK****Exploitation of Truce Talks.**

1. To inform targets of truce talk developments; to convince them they are due to UN effort.
2. To show UN humanitarianism.
3. To show UN is for peaceful Korea unification.
4. Exploitation of USSR's aspirations to control Korea.
5. To publicize UN rehabilitation and reconstruction aid to Korea.

Stimulation:

Truce Talk developments; UN humanitarianism; UN plans for Korean unification; USSR imperialism, rehabilitation of South Korea.

Dissemination and Frequency:

350,000 leaflets by air weekly; occasional ground loudspeaker broadcasts.

Sought Reaction:

Disinclination to fight or die as war is ending; approval of UN because of unusual humanitarianism; hope for unification and unprecedented rehabilitation of SK; fear of USSR dominance.

PLAN:

Termination:

Target:

Operation:

Objective:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

STRIKE

Armistice

CCF, NKPA, NK

Pre and Post-Air Strike
warnings and exploitation.

1. Humanitarian reduction of enemy civilian casualties.
2. Exploitation of target group's shocked frame of mind.
3. Reduction and possible break-down of NK home-front effort.

Shock induced by air strike and via propaganda - warning of more air strikes, reminder of lack of CCF air support and futile Communist promises, a suggested way out of predicament.

165,000 leaflets by air weekly.

Fear, anger and anger-with-direction, i.e., Communist rule.

PLAN:ODD LOTS

Termination:

Usually Armistice.

Target:

CCF, NKPA, Civilians.

Operation:

Small quantities of leaflets gathered together and shipped to FUSAK for dissemination.

Objective:

Any and all of above.

Stimulation:

Total of all or part of all stimuli produced, current and past.

Dissemination and Frequency:

500,000 leaflets by air weekly.

Sought Reaction:

Beyond analysis.

<u>PLAN:</u>	<u>NEWSLETTER</u>
Termination:	Arms ties
Target:	OCF, NKPA, NK civilians.
Operation:	Regular newspaper of selected world news events.
Objective:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To keep target group informed. 2. To reduce effectiveness of Communist "Big Lie" and other untruthful tactics. 3. To counter Communist propaganda.
Stimulation:	The news; the opposite that which differs from what has been told by Communists; confirmation of rumors.
Dissemination and Frequency:	2,250,000 weekly by air.
Sought Reaction:	Disposition to question; disbelief; alarm; disaf- fection; increase in credibility of friendly propaganda.

PLAN:

Termination:

Target:

Operation:

Objective:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

MISCELLANEOUS PLANS

Not known beforehand.

Not known beforehand.

Not known beforehand.

Not known beforehand.

Undetermined beforehand.

650,000 weekly by air.

Undetermined beforehand.

PLAN:

REHAB

Termination:

Armistice

Target:

NK civilians

Operation:

Leaflets in praise of
SK rehabilitation.

Objective:

Counterprop, to CP's
charges UN strips SK, that CP
is building up NK.

Stimulation:

Pictorial proof of high
standard of living in SK; fac-
tual rehabilitation (against
mere Communist promises.)

Dissemination and Frequency:

300,000 leaflets every ten
days by air, 1% of ground
loudspeaker news items daily.

Sought Reaction:

Envy of SK; disappointment
with NK; disaffection from
Communism, potential alignment
toward UN.

DISSEMINATION TO EUSAK TARGETS
OF CURRENTLY OR USUALLY IMPLEMENTED
EUSAK PSYWAR PLANS

<u>PLAN:</u>	<u>FRIS</u>
Termination:	Armistice
Target:	NKPA, NK
Operation:	Exploitation of normal CCF-NKPA, NK relations.
Objective:	NKPA, NK-CCF split.
Stimulation:	Improper or annoying act, intention or need by ally.
Dissemination and Frequency:	860,000 leaflets by air per week; 1% of ground loud- speaker broadcasts, occa- sional air broadcasts.
Sought Reaction:	Distrust, dislike, hatred, disaffection for and between allies.

PLAN:

Termination:

Target:

Operation:

Objective:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

HEARTACHE

21 days from start.

Units of 15th OCF Army.

Ground loudspeaker and
leaflet nostalgic re-
minders of home in China.

1. To induce marked degree
of nostalgia.
2. To induce hopelessness.

Voices from home; nostalgic
music.450,000 leaflets by air per
week; three or four 15-minute
ground loudspeaker broadcasts
per day for 21 days.Nostalgia, grief; worry,
lethargy, disaffection,
misery, hopelessness.

PLAN:

SLOWDOWN

Termination:

14 days after start.

Target:

Units of 15th CCF Army
subjected to HEARTACHE.

Operation:

Ground loudspeaker and
leaflets stimulating
defection by slowing down.

Objective:

1. To exploit hopelessness
by offering our brand
of hope.
2. To slow down 15th CCF
Army's opns.

Stimulation:

Hope, suggested actions which
logically follow basic urges.

Dissemination and Frequency:

225,000 leaflets by air per
week; three or four 15-minute
ground loudspeaker broadcasts
per day for 14 days.

Sought Reaction:

Defection to degree of
stimulation; thought of fur-
ther defection, slowdown of
operations.

PLAN: **HARVEST MOON**

Termination: 6 days after start.

Target: NKPA

Operation: Ground loudspeaker and leaflet exploitation of dearth of men on NK farms.

Objective:

1. To engender a feeling of hopelessness.
2. To induce nostalgia.
3. To cause worry about NKPA's families.

Stimulation: Voices from home; nostalgic music, dramatic delineation of famine conditions at home.

Dissemination and Frequency: 1,500,000 of two leaflets by air plus three or four 20-minute broadcasts per day for 6 days.

Sought Reaction: Worry, grief, nostalgia, hopelessness.

PLAN:

PURMUP

Termination:

Armistice

Target:

SK Bandits

Operation:

Consolidation of dissident groups by all media.

Objective:

1. Paywar support of tactical operations.
2. Coordination with FEC radio propaganda.
3. Consolidation of ROKA, UNCACK, UNCURE, USIS missions.

Stimulation:

Untenable tactical situations; fear, hunger, sad plight of families, unification of Korea.

Dissemination and Frequency:

1. 100,000 leaflets by air weekly.
2. As tactical situation indicates and by a desirable media.
3. Sporadically.
4. At request of other agencies.

Sought Reaction:

Fear, defection, worry.

PLAN:

Termination:

Target:

Operation:

Objectives:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

SAFE CONDUCT

Armistice

CCF, NKPA

Guarantee of Safe Conduct,
Good Treatment.

1. To assure enemy of safe
conduct thru good treatment
behind UN lines.
2. To help insure acceptance
of POW by friendly troops.

Formal guarantee, signature by
high authority; three languages;
money-like appearance.

2,500,000 weekly by air.

Recognition that there is complex
machinery involved in caring for
POW; acceptance of formal document
and Army Commanders as safeguards
for POW protection.

PLAN:

Terminations:

Target:

Operation:

Objective:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

STORY OF AN ESCAPE

Armistice

CCF, NKPA

Assurance that escape is possible and feasible.

1. To induce defection.
2. To counter Communist scare propaganda re impossibility of escape.

Apparently factual record of an actual and successful escape.

1,250,000 weekly by air.

Allayed fears, wish fulfillment.

PLAN:

Termination:

Target:

Operation:

Objective:

Stimulation:

Dissemination and Frequency:

Sought Reaction:

TACTICAL DEMANDS

Armistice

CCF, NKPA

PsyWar support of
tactical situation.Exploitation of tactical
vulnerabilities.Tactical situation plus
all inherent in it.1,000,000 leaflets by arty,
1,000,000 by light air,
5,000 by patrol weekly; 20
ground loudspeaker broad-
casts and 5 air broadcasts
per week.As the tactical situation
indicates.

PLAN:

MISCELLANEOUS STREAMERS

Termination:

Armistice

Target:

CCF, NKPA, NK civilians

Operations:

Utilization of waste paper
or other small units of
paper.

Objective:

1. Not determined in advance,
usually to publicise some
slogan adverse to Communist
cause.
2. Sometimes to make important
statements simply and pith-
ily.

Stimulation:

Recognition of slogan known
among enemy coming from UN side.

Dissemination and Frequency:

500,000 weekly by air.
98 ground loudspeaker broadcasts and
2 hours of aircasts weekly.

Sought Reaction:

Depends on subject matter, usually
acceptance of a rumor or pseudo-
official presentation of something
talked about.

TOTAL

DISSEMINATION AND FREQUENCY

11,950,000 leaflets weekly,

198 ground loudspeaker,

7 hours of air loudspeaker broadcasts.

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INHERENT PSYWAR WEAKNESSES
SUGGESTED BY THE
ANALYSIS
(TAB B)

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INHERENT PSYWAR WEAKNESSES

1. Personnel. To achieve even minimal success, psychological warfare must be practiced by experienced or well-trained soldiers. It cannot be successfully practiced by personnel who are merely academicians any more than it can be successfully practiced by those who are merely soldiers.

2. Leaflet Dissemination. Although leaflets may be disseminated by infantry patrols and many other small-volume, non-ultramodern means, air drops cannot be effectively made from slow-moving aircraft which are immediately made targets of devastating enemy fire.

3. Issues and Themes. A bewildering diversity of issues and themes make for enemy reactions which can only be in a similarly bewildering diversity of directions, at best. At the worst and most usual, the reaction in such cases is remarkable for its entire absence.

4. Translations. A basic weakness of practically all language translations, both written and spoken, is the inability of most translators to convey thoughts in one language into thoughts which are absolutely indigenous to the second language.

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5. Leaflet Dissemination. Leaflet target audiences cease to react to the dramatic stimulation of messages dropping from the clouds at some period after the law of diminishing returns begins to take effect.

6. Dissemination. The greatest bit of radio propaganda ever devised is worthless unless it reaches an audience.

7. PayWar in the ARMY. Knowledge of paywar principles exists in minds of only few officers outside of paywar staffs and units. Experience indicates that were paywar loudspeaker team assigned to division for allocation to regiments and lower units, the teams' prime mission would be to induce surrender under circumstances in which surrender appeals are not good practice. This mis-use of paywar facilities at behavior-reaction level would prevail for approximately ninety percent of total propaganda output.

8. Appointment of Knowledge. Untrained paywar personnel cannot be made to perform satisfactorily without a high degree of informed supervision at all levels of command.

9. Enemy Counter. Friendly loudspeaker positions draw enemy fire almost as certainly as friendly armor or automatic weapons.

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10. Enemy Propaganda. "The grass on the other side of the (paywar) fence always looks greener" unless a steady indoctrination and orientation program among non-paywar personnel satisfactorily explains that it is not.

11. Language Fluency. Enemy target groups are usually less readily subverted to friendly ideologies when the effort is made by persons who speak the former's language with noticeable foreign accents.

12. PayWar, to the Army. PayWar personnel, guilty in the preconceived opinion of the rest of the Army of "long-hairedness" and military immaturity, must be more than circumspect in observation of proper military conduct; from behavior under fire all the way to correct staff procedures and the school of the soldier.

13. Detailed Guidance. Accomplishment of a psywar operational mission usually requires concern with the most delicate nuances of meaning of both the written and spoken word.

14. Intelligence. Adequate psywar intelligence will probably not be produced and delivered with dispatch (by G2) within the next ten years until psywar does it on its own.

15. Detection of Vulnerability. There is often a great distance between a PW's complaint and the vulnerability which prompts it.

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16. EPI. Untrained collection agents can rarely provide the answers to EPI which are as short and succinct as they should be.

17. Evaluation. Evaluation can never be complete until after hostilities are ended. This emphatically does not mean that there can be no evaluation until that time.

18. Coordination. No paywar operation can ever be fully utilized unless all friendly elements concerned are thoroughly briefed.

19. Friendly Support. Friendly troop commanders must be aware of the paywar attack on enemy troops facing them.

20. The Paywar Man. Personnel employed in the conduct of successful psychological warfare operations must continually project their minds in two directions - the traditional, duty-bound regimentation of military channels and the uninhibited artist's reaching toward new intellectual horizons.

21. Combat Paywar Badge. Close support of infantry platoons and companies brings to paywar personnel most of the dangers to which combat infantrymen fall heir but few of the privileges. (One right, however, cannot be denied a very limited group of paywar personnel - that of being among the few among the entire Armed Forces who close with the enemies of their country.)

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22. Mirror Propaganda. Constant reiteration of any theme (the "Big Lie" technique introduced by the Nazis and assiduously practiced by the Communists) makes for effective propaganda. More effective propaganda, however, is that which apparently is not propaganda. The most effective propaganda is that which is apparently news reports, both helpful and harmful to a degree; i.e., "mirror" propaganda, to our cause.

23. Consolidation Paywar. Consolidation paywar in the end of the third and final stage (Japan, early Autumn of 1953) must frequently not even make token use of "propaganda" in the more commonly accepted meaning of the term, confining itself principally to the paywar consolidation mission of causing a target audience to be well-intentioned toward American aims and policies. Consolidation paywar which has even a "taint" of propaganda usually fails in accomplishment of the mission.

24. Paywar, General. Psychological warfare, as old as it is in human warfare, is still comparatively new to the United States Army. Somewhat like the few unreconstructed cavalrymen who still look askance at armor, the Army is filled with individuals of high and low rank who think Paywar is something for college professors with which the Army ought not be cluttered.

25. Paywar, General. Hot metal against an enemy is more effective than so much inked paper under any and all circumstances. This is prevailing Army-wide opinion.

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26. Paper vs Bullets. Overlooking the possibility of one disaffected apple spoiling the whole barrel, too many in the Army are of the opinion that the only good enemy is a dead enemy.

27. PsyWar in the Army. Army staff officers, combat commanders, troops, are not aware of the scope or capabilities of psychological warfare.

28. Army Acceptance of PsyWar. Army-wide acceptance of psywar personnel by combat commanders does not yet exist to the same degree as, for instance, acceptance of Engineer, Signal or Chemical Warfare or other personnel who support infantry units. In just about no case will a combat commander dictate the methods by which mines will be detected or a dud bomb disposed of. This is not the case with operating psywar teams which are continually exhorted to operate in a manner in direct denial of principles laid down in psywar field manuals.

29. Collection of PsyWar Intelligence by G2 Operatives. PsyWar Intelligence is in a position somewhat analogous to that of untrained field groups working for AEC who know no more about atomic energy than practically all the Army knows about psywar. It can be understood how brief, basic EEI from the AEC would be almost totally meaningless to the untrained, the non-scientific. One wonders why it is so difficult to understand that the brief, basic EEI from psywar can have more meaning to the untrained, the non-psywar.

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ADDITIONAL
UN SOUND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
NOT REPORTED UPON

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ADDITIONAL UNFOUNDED OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

Korean PsyWar operations have not been characterized, in this writer's opinion, by anything even approaching the ideal (except leaflet production). There was hardly any facet of operations (including leaflet production) which was not in need of marked improvement or, indeed, complete reorientation or reversal of direction. It is known, for instance, that all reporting officers did not report on all psywar operational deficiencies; specifically, the officer who compiled these data and made the comparative analysis of the four reports.

At least some additional important deficiencies were not reported for the simple reason that it was then believed to have been too difficult to achieve corrections in matters not as easy to point to as those reported.

Among the major deficiencies not reported upon (the minor were myriad) were:

- a. Insufficient build-up of friendly credibility.
- b. Use of only three psywar media (leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio).
- c. Continual antagonizing of enemy troops.
- d. Disregard for friendly loss of face.

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e. Not enough care taken to preserve apparent omniscience and authority of friendly propaganda.

f. Not enough attention paid to establishing authenticity of important propaganda documents.

g. A distinct non-relationship of themes to issues.

h. Disregard for the effective impact of psychological shock.

i. Poor, imperfectly oriented PW interrogations.

j. Non-use of repetition and repetitive techniques.

k. Mis-use of the surrender theme under conditions which ranged from the almost impossible to the slightly ludicrous.

l. The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare was unable to effectively control operations in the Korean campaign.

m. Majority of psywar dissemination by all three principally used media was addressed to maximal targets (CCF, NKPA, North Koreans), comparatively little use having been made of specifically addressed target groups.

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F

FIELD REPORTS

PsyWar Insignia

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, G3
 Headquarters EUSAK
 APO 301

31 October 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General Robert A. McClure

SUBJECT: PsyWar Insignia

1. Pursuant to suggestions made on your recent trip to the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company while I commanded it, the appended sketches for insignia are submitted to you by the safe hand of Colonel William J. Blythe.

2. Included are suggestions for both a Psychological Warfare seal or coat of arms and collar insignia.

3. Variations of two ideas are presented together with the suggested PsyWar motto, WAR FOR MEN'S MINDS, which latter the writer regards as the basic function of psychological warfare.

a. The fragment of stone depicted represents the earliest example of propaganda known to man, it being a free-hand version of the Sumerian message to the Babylonians or Assyrians found within the past half-dozen years. (Precise details and exact message in cuneiform ideographs must, of necessity, be obtained through research resources not available to us in Korea). The shape as well as the actual propaganda must be altered in conformance with the publicized original (pictured in the New York Times) at the time of discovery.

b. The silhouette of a man's head, the brain of which is being assailed by the lightning of truth, is almost self-explanatory.

c. The blue background is a continual reminder of two all-important aspects of psywar:

(1) Infantry blue reminds us that our prime mission is to support the infantry.

(2) Blue also serves as a methodology stimulus relative to our support of the infantry by depressing enemy troops' morale; i.e., the tactic of giving the latter the "blues" in order to reduce their combat efficiency.

HERBERT AVFDON
 Capt SigC
 Ass't Projects
 Branch Chief

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FIELD REPORTS


Combined Infantry-PyWar Operations

Artillery Leaflet Shells

OR Evaluation of Air Broadcasts

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HEADQUARTERS
187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team
Office of the Commanding Officer
APO 51, San Francisco, Calif.

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6 November 1952

E X T R A C T S

".....We are very much interested in PsyWar here
.....Practical soldiers are much needed in this field.

"Regarding our operation "Come On" I am enclosing a copy of the operation order which I hope will be helpful in understanding the basic concept of the operation. Actually, this was an experiment in the tactical use of PsyWar apparatus against a concentrated target for the purpose of encouraging desertion. Interrogation of a deserter from "Sugar Loaf" hill had indicated that the troops there were not all satisfied with their lot. They were in an exposed position, were being made to work day and night on their position and were generally unhappy about the situation. It was my thought that if we could work the loudspeakers into a position where they could be beamed back over "Sugar Loaf" and talk to these people without their political officers and others on their M/R hearing it, we might do some good. Unfortunately, the first two nights were wasted since the loudspeakers would not work after going into position. This left us only three nights to work since we were scheduled for relief on the fourth day.

"No prisoners were realized from this operation but we do have very good evidence that we were giving someone a hard time on the hill. On two different occasions during the operation small arms firing was heard from the hill. Also, each time we would smoke the hill, to screen the escape of deserters the Chinese would shell the hill, presumably in an attempt to prevent that escape.

"Operation "Come On" was run for three straight nights and on the third morning the program was varied by eliminating the artillery barrage and replacing it with a patrol moving to the rear of "Sugar Loaf" to place direct fire of recoilless rifles and machine guns into the bunkers on the reverse slope. This project was especially successful. Eleven enemy were estimated killed with several bunkers destroyed or damaged and no friendly casualties. The Operation Order covering this patrol action is also enclosed. I am satisfied that had we had a few more days we would have had some results in the way of deserters.

As for our own people they showed a very definite interest in this project and while naturally disappointed at the lack of tangible results

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the reaction has been more a desire to figure out what we did wrong rather than to blame it on any weakness of paywar as a weapon.

In my opinion this type of operation certainly is deserving of further study and should this RCT encounter a similar situation in the future I would certainly like to try a similar scheme again. I might suggest that some thought be given to acquiring some less cumbersome equipment for this type of operation. You may be sure that a patrol is presented with very substantial problems in moving a 300 lb generator over rough terrain during the hours of darkness.

Sincerely,

W. C. Westmoreland
Col., 187th Abn RCT
Commanding.

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OPERATIONS "COME ON"

NOTES:

1. Purpose:

To encourage desertions to the U.N. Lines of Chinese troops on "Sugar-Loaf".

2. Troops:

1 Plat. 1st Bn. Security Force
1 Plat. 2nd Bn. Alert Force.
2 Loudspeaker Teams, 8th Army
1 Sqd. 2nd Bn. Collecting Point #1
1 Sqd. 3rd Bn. Collecting Point #2
All available Artillery.
2 Platoons Tank, 73rd Tank Bn.
All available Infantry Crew Served Weapons.

3. Missions:

- a. Plat. 1st Bn. moves Loudspeaker Team #1 to position indicated on O/L prior to 242300 Sept 52. Provides security in depth and returns team to friendly lines at time indicated below.
- b. Plat. 2nd Bn. occupies position indicated on O/L prior to 242000 Sept 52 prepared to move in support of Security Force on call.
- c. 1 Sqd. 2nd Bn occupies Collecting Point #2 from 242400 to 250700 Sept 52 prepared to receive deserters.
- d. 1 Sqd. 3rd Bn. occupies Collecting Point #1 from 242400 to 250700 Sept 52 prepared to receive deserters.
- e. Loudspeaker Teams:
Team #1 broadcasts prepared surrender appeals as indicated in sequence of events, Team #2 broadcasts impromptu appeals on call.
- f. 2 Platoons, 73rd Tank Bn occupies positions indicated on O/L prior to 250600 prepared to fire in impact area on signal.
- g. Artillery: Register in impact area prior to 242200 Sept 52 and prepares to fire TOT on call (Approx 250630).

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- h. All available Inf Crew served weapons which will be brought to bear in impact area prepare to fire five (5) minute barrage on signal.

4. Sequence of Events:

- 211900 - Security Force depart OPLR.
- 212000 - Alert Force in posn.
- 212300 - Speaker #1 in position.
- 212330 - Speaker #1 broadcasts prepared script #1.
- 212400 - Collecting Points #1 and #2 in position.
- 250215 - Speaker #1 broadcasts prepared script #1.
- 250415 - Speaker #1 broadcasts prepared script #1.
- 250430 - Security Force withdraws.
- 250530 - Speaker #2 (softly) begins impromptu appeals to come into UN lines.
- 250630 - (Approx) Artillery will lay TOT on impact area. On this signal, all Tanks and all Inf supporting weapons place five (5) minutes barrage on impact area. Rate of fire of all weapons will be based on current allocation of ammunitions.
- 250635 - Speaker #2 broadcasts prepared script #2.
- 250635 - Tanks withdraw.
- 250700 - Collecting Points return at OPLR.

- 5. Above sequence to be repeated on night of 25-26 Sep 52. All units repeat missions with same personnel.
- 6. All personnel along OPLR and MLR will be oriented to the possibility of deserters entering area at points other than Collecting Points. Extreme measures will be taken to assure safe passage through the lines.
- 7. No firing to be permitted within 500 yds of "Sugar Leaf" or along river South to Collecting Points between hours of 2000-0600 each night except in case of attack or on clearance of this Headquarters.
- 8. Communication:
 - a. RCT Commo Officer will provide direct wire service between Collecting points #1 and #2, Control Point, OP #5 and Security Force.
 - b. Alternate SCR 300 radio will be maintained between Control Point, OP #5, Security Force, and Tank C.O. RCT Commo Officer will coordinate.



PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, G3
Headquarters EUSAK
APO 301

22 October 1952

SUBJECT: Artillery Leaflet Shells, BF, M8, with Fuse for 105mm Howitzer

THRU: Colonel Blythe

TO: Colonel Hansen

1. On the occasion of your recent visit you requested that certain information relative to operations problems concerning artillery leaflet shells be informally recorded and transmitted to your office.

2. The problem, simply, is this: Artillery shells, 105mm have never been shipped to this theater specifically prepared or intended for PsyWar purposes. The result has been that our shell requirements have had to be met by attempting, with indifferent success, to borrow an allocation from Ordnance smoke stock. Even when accomplished, the product of this borrowing is far from satisfactory, from a practical, economic, or operational point of view. Shell base plates, firmly emplaced at the factory, must be removed so that cannisters may be unloaded. The base plates are then replaced until such time as the shell is to be leaflet loaded. This initial handling and subsequent tamping, invariably necessary in re-loading, results in about 30% defective rounds due to stripped plate threads causing premature base plate ejections. Of no small moment, too, is the total waste of factory labor expended in loading the shells with smoke cannisters, the uselessness of shipping needless cannister weight overseas, cannister cost (\$4.74 each), which is total as they are destroyed when unloaded, and, last, the waste of theater labor expended in unloading.

3. Recommend that 105mm artillery shells intended for PsyWar leaflet dissemination purposes be specifically prepared, as indicated below, and shipped to theaters, in constant quantities based on predetermined PsyWar requirements:

- a. 105mm shell should be marked leaflet.
- b. Base plates should be only finger tight.
- c. Each shell should contain the following:
 - (1) One (1) bag of black powder.

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SUBJECT: Artillery Leaflet Shells, BE, M84 with Fuse for 105mm Howitzer

- (2) One (1) metal baffle plate.
- (3) One (1) unholed steel disc (special).
- (4) Eight (8) mill-board washers.
- (5) Two (2) unholed mill-board washers (special).
- (6) One (1) copper sealing disc.

d. Leaflet shell shipments should, in all instances, be accompanied by a fuse shipment of equal quantity.

LEONARD KLECHNER
Capt Inf

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Airplane Propaganda Broadcasts

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17 Nov 52

1. Since the middle of the summer, I have personally read every PW interrogation report.

2. Many PW state they have heard our airplane propaganda broadcasts, but with only one exception, all state that they could not understand any of it at all.

3. Recommend we discontinue this effort unless:

a. The volume of the broadcast can be increased enough to override the airplane engine noise.

b. A method can be found to orbit, circle or slow the plane to the point where a short message can be heard at a given point on the ground.

-----COL VAN MATTA-----
SA 708

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the Army Staff**

Entry 338 - Box 7
Psych Warfare Admin Office
Records Br. - Decimal File (U) 1951-54
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